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HEGEL'S LOGIC 



BOOKS BY 
JOHN GRIER HIBBEN. 



HEGEL'S "LOGIC." An Essay 
in Interpretation. 12mo. 
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THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSO- 
PHY. An Introduction to the 
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LOGIC. 



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HEGEL'S LOGIC 



AN ESSAY IN INTERPRETATION 



BY 



JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, Ph.D. 

STUART PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1902 






THE LIBRARY OF 


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CLASS ^XXo. No. 


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Published November, 1902. 



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J. D. H. 

Drei Schwestera, Gute, Heiterkeit, Verstand, 
Du hast zu Deinen Parzen sie erkoren ; 
Sie sind's, die weben Deines Lebens Band. 

— Hegel. 



PREFACE 

In his Logic Hegel has endeavored to incor- 
porate the essential principles of philosophy 
which in the development of the world's thought 
have forced themselves upon men's convictions, 
and have been attested by a general consensus 
of opinion. An insight into the Hegelian sys- 
tem means, therefore, a comprehensive and ap- 
preciative grasp of the history of philosophy in 
the salient features of its progress. The Logic 
serves also as an excellent introduction to the 
more specific study of German philosophy which 
has been most profoundly affected by the writ- 
ings of Hegel, both in the philosophical schools 
whose doctrines have been grounded confess- 
edly upon Hegelian principles, and also among 
those which represent a radical reaction against 
Hegel. Moreover, the system of philosophy as 
outlined in the Logic is not merely a speculative 
system of abstract thought, but is at the same 
time an interpretation of life in all the fulness 
of its concrete significance. Upon these con- 
siderations, therefore, it is evident that a 
knowledge of the Hegelian system must prove 



Vlll PREFACE 

of inestimable value to the student of philoso- 
phy. Unfortunately the proverbial obscurity 
of Hegel has deterred many from undertaking 
a systematic study of his works. It is my con- 
viction that the text of the Logic is self -illumi- 
nating. It has been my endeavor, therefore, 
to simplify all technical terms and explain their 
significance in the light of the definitions as 
given by Hegel himself, and as indicated in 
the context where such terms severally occur. 
There has been throughout an attempt to render 
intelligible the fundamental Hegelian doctrines 
by means of simple statement and illustration. 
The method of interpretation has grown out of 
the belief that the best commentary upon Hegel 
is Hegel himself. The basis of this exposition 
has been the Logic of the Encyklopadie der phi- 
losophischen Wissenschaften, Hegel's Werke^ VI. 
During the preparation of this volume I have 
received valuable suggestions from my friend, 
Professor Creighton of Cornell University, to 
whom I gladly express my indebtedness. 



J. G. H. 



Princeton University, 
October 6, 1902. 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. The Logic as a System of Philosophy . 3 
II. The Various Attitudes of Thought to- 
wards the Objective World. The 

Metaphysical Systems .... 23 

III. The Empirical School . . . .38 

IV. The Critical Philosophy .... 45 
V. The Theory of Intuitive Knowledge . 61 

VI. A General Survey of the Logic . . 68 

PAET I 
THE DOCTRINE OF BEIXG 

VII. Quality 85 

VIII. Quantity 105 

IX. Measure 119 

PAET II 

THE DOCTRIXE OF ESSEXCE 

X. The Doctrine of Essence in its General 

Features ....... 136 

XI. Essence as the Ground of Existence . 148 

XII. Appearance, or the Phenomenal World 167 

XIII. Actuality, or the Real Would . . 183 



CONTENTS 



PART III 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XIV. The General Nature of the Notion . 205 

XV. The Subjective Notion .... 215 

XVI. The Objective Notion .... 249 

XVII. The Idea or the Eternal Keason . . 269 
XVIII. The Relation of the Logic to the Phi- 
losophy of Nature and the Philosophy 

of Mind 288 

APPENDIX 

A Glossary of the more important Philosophical 

Terms in Hegel's Logic 295 

INDEX 309 






INTRODUCTION 



Von der Grosse und Macht des Geistes kann der 
Mensch nicht gross genug denken. Das verschlossene 
Wesen des Universums hat keine Kraft in sich, 
welche dem Muthe des Erkennens Widersiand leisten 
konnte, es muss sich vor ihm aufthun und seinen 
Reichthum und seine Tiefen ihm vor Augen legen 
und zum Genusse bringen. — Hegel. 



INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER I 

THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 

HEGEL'S Logic is not a logic in the formal 
and restricted sense in which that term 
is usually understood, as the science or the art 
of reasoning. It has a far larger scope, embrac- 
ing as it does a complete system of philosophy 
in itself. Philosophy, according to Hegel, is a 
science of things in a setting of thoughts ; it is 
the science of the universe as it is interpreted 
by thought, and as it has significance for the 
mind which observes the wealth of its varied 
manifestation. ' The intelligence which contem- 
plates the universe finds therein a like intelli- 
gence revealing itself, as face answereth to face 
in a glass. That intelligence which character- 
izes the observing mind and the world which 
is the object of the observation is one and the 
same. In order to understand the essential 
features of the Hegelian system, it is neces- 
sary to appreciate at the beginning the funda- 

3 



4 INTRODUCTION 

mental characteristics of the intelligence which 
constitutes its centre and core. 

With Hegel thought, whether manifested in 
the activity of mind or revealed in the order 
and harmony of the universe, has four distinc- 
tive features. 

It is essentially active and never passive. 
The mind is not to be regarded as a plastic 
medium upon which impressions are produced 
by the varied stimulation of the several senses. 
The mind is not a photographic plate to hold 
whatever may be printed upon it and then to 
give back upon demand whatever it may have 
received. Thought is the rather to be conceived 
as a force, a dynamic centre. Its function is con- 
structive. The creative and sustaining source 
of the universe is a thought force; and the 
thought activity which we are conscious of ex- 
ercising partakes of the same nature. 

The second function of thought is to trans- 
mute the crude material given by the senses 
into a systematic body of knowledge. Out of 
a chaos of sensations, perceptions, feelings, and 
the like, thought builds up an orderly cosmos. 
To extend the figure already employed, thought 
interprets the world in a series of portraits 
rather than photographs. And as an interpre- 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 5 

tation by means of a portrait always involves 
an ideal element, so in the interpretation of 
the world of thought there is always an ideal 
element. But the introduction of an ideal ele- 
ment does not render the interpretation unreal. 
On the contrary, whenever a superficial view of 
the world gives place to a deeper insight, when 
thought like the great creative Spirit broods 
over it, we are persuaded that the change which 
is wrought by thought brings us nearer to the 
heart and truth of things themselves. 

It is of the nature of thought in the third 
place to seek the universal significance of every 
particular experience by which it is confronted. 
The animal lives and moves and has its being 
in the midst of particular experiences, and it 
does not possess the capacity of reflecting upon 
them, or possesses it in a very restricted manner. 
Reflection, which is the characteristic mode of 
thought, may be defined as the reference of a 
particular experience to its appropriate univer- 
sal. Man as the reflective animal alone pos- 
sesses this power of seeing things in their 
universal aspect. It is often said that man 
differs from the animal in that he is endowed 
with a conceptual capacity, that is, the capacity 
to form universal ideas. Thus when one says, 



6 INTRODUCTION 

" This is a man, a dog, a horse," etc., he is sim- 
ply referring the particular object of perception 
which occupies the centre of the field of vision 
for the moment to the appropriate class or group 
or kind to which it belongs. Such a group or 
class idea is a concept and has always a univer- 
sal significance, and all of our assertions contain 
some such reference to a universal. Moreover, 
language itself as the vehicle of thought is a 
system of symbols which represent universal 
ideas, and which thought employs for the pur- 
pose of a complete characterization of particular 
experiences which must remain without meaning 
until they are properly interpreted in the light 
of their universal relations. ^ 

In the fourth place, every thought reference 
carries with it a consciousness of the Ego, or 
the personality which makes the reference. 
Every conscious thought process, however sim- 
ple, and however relatively unimportant, is in 
itself the declaration of a free personality. 
Wherever there is thought, there is person- 
ality, according to Hegel's fundamental dictum. 
Therefore the intelligence which is so variously 
manifested in the world about us bespeaks an 
all-embracing Ego, which is the great universal 
and to which all separate Egos are to be referred 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 7 

as individuals to their corresponding genus. 
Such an Ego, as a cosmic centre, gives unity 
to the activities of all personalities throughout 
the universe, comprehending all in one system, 
which in every part, however minute, is charac- 
terized by intelligence. 

Such being the nature of thought in general, 
a dynamic, constructive, interpretative, and per- 
sonal force, we will now examine its functions 
more in detail. Occupying as it does the cen- 
tral place in the Hegelian system, it is necessary 
at the outset to understand fully Hegel's con- 
ception of thought activity. It is obvious that 
thought manifests its activity in numerous ways. 
In the reference of the individual experience to 
its appropriate universal there is an incalculable 
number of universals, as various as the manifold 
possibilities of the world of experience itself. 
In this connection there is a question which 
naturally suggests itself, and which is also one 
of the fundamental problems of philosophy, 
"Are there not in thought a certain definite 
number of comprehensive universals to which 
all others may be referred, and which will serve 
to mark off well-defined areas of knowledge or 
modes of thought, so that when we speak of the 
world of knowledge these divisions may be re- 



8 INTRODUCTION 

garded as constituting the great continents of 
thought?" 

Such large divisions of our knowledge are 
called categories (die Denkbestimmungen). 
The original meaning of category is found in 
the Greek verb /carriyopelv, to predicate, that is, 
the categories are the possible ways one can 
predicate various attributes of any subject, so 
that together they form a natural classification of 
the most comprehensive themes of our think- 
ing. They indicate the different ways in which 
the mind can view the world of experience. 
They are to be regarded as the typical modes of 
thought. 

As an illustration, we may take the table of 
the categories, as outlined by Aristotle, which 
is as follows : — 

1. Substance^ 

2. Quantity. . . % 

3. Quality. 

4. Relation. 

5. Action. 

6. Passion (i.e. the object of action). 

7. Where (i.e. space). 

8. When (i.e. time). 

9. Posture. 
10. Habit. 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 9 

When we have described anything as regards its 
substance, how large it is, what its nature is, its 
relations to other things, how it acts, how it is 
acted upon, its space and time conditions, its 
posture and its habit, then we have well-nigh 
exhausted the possibilities of description. 

Hegel's system of philosophy as contained in 
his logic may be appropriately styled a natural 
history of the categories, being essentially an 
exposition of their nature, their relations, and 
the mode of their development. The main doc- 
trines of the logic concerning the categories 
may be summarized briefly as follows : — 

The categories are not to be regarded as sepa- 
rate and isolated points of view. They sustain 
such reciprocal relations that together they form 
a single and harmonious system. This system, 
moreover, partakes of the nature of a series, in 
which the several terms may be grouped in the 
order of their progressive complexity, the first 
term being the simplest, and the succeeding 
terms more and more complex. Every term also 
contains two kinds of elements, — the explicit and 
the implicit. Explicitly every term is the result 
of all the terms which precede it, and implicitly 
it is the potential of all which are to follow. 

It is the nature both of thought itself, and 



10 INTRODUCTION 

also of things as interpreted by thought, that 
when we start at the lowest category where 
knowledge is reduced to a minimun, i.e. the 
least that can be possibly predicated of any- 
thing, there is a natural constraint of the mind 
to pass on to a higher category, a higher level of 
thought, in order to complete the defects and to 
remove the limitations of the lower ; and so on 
and on, until the highest possible category is 
reached which will comprehend and explain all 
the others. This movement of thought is 
occasioned by the circumstance that the mind 
revolving about itself in the sphere of a single 
category is always confronted by two disquiet- 
ing considerations. It is never satisfied with a 
result that is partial, and it will not tolerate a 
contradiction or inconsistency. Hence arises 
this inner constraint to transcend the limits of 
the single category in question, that is, a partial 
point of view, in order to overcome its defects 
and contradictions. This progressive movement 
of thought is called the dialectic, and is the dis- 
tinctive feature of the Hegelian method in the 
construction of his system of philosophy. 

The term "dialectic " originates in the ancient 
Greek philosophy, probably with the old Eleatic 
Zeno, and it has been made familiar in the teach- 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 11 

ings of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato. The 
latter recall to mind a picture of two disputants, 
the one maintaining a proposition, the other 
opposing it, while out of the discussion there 
emerges a more exact and adequate statement of 
truth. This is, in substance, the method of 
Hegel : the examination of a positive statement 
or thesis, which is confronted by an opposed 
statement or antithesis, and out of the opposition 
there results a synthesis, which is a resolution of 
the existing contradiction upon a higher plane 
of thought. Upon the same level or from the 
same point of view contradictory statements 
must ever remain obstinately irresoluble ; it is 
only in a higher sense that they can be regarded 
as half truths combining to form truth entire. 
Such a synthesis, therefore, always represents a 
progress in thought, an advance to a higher 
point of view, a more comprehensive survey, a 
deeper insight, a wider prospect. 

In order to understand the dialectic method, 
the following observations must be carefully 
considered : — 

The first stage, that of the so-called thesis, is 
designated by Hegel as the stage of the abstract 
understanding ; the second, the antithesis, which 
is a representation of the incompleteness of the 



12 INTRODUCTION 

first by showing its obverse side, is known as that 
of the negative reason ; the third, the synthesis, 
is known as the speculative stage, or that of 
positive reason. 

The terms which are here employed — the 
abstract understanding, the negative reason, 
and the positive reason — are used in a sense 
peculiar to Hegel. There is a fundamental 
distinction drawn between abstract and con- 
crete, a distinction which runs through the 
entire philosophical system of Hegel. Abstract 
is used always in the sense of a one-sided or 
partial view of things. Concrete, on the other 
hand, is used to indicate a comprehensive view 
of things which includes all possible considera- 
tions as to the nature of the thing itself, its 
origin, and the relations which it sustains ; it 
is the thing plus its setting. 

The first of the three stages is referred to also 
as the product of the understanding (der Ver- 
stand), the second and third, as that of the nega- 
tive and positive reason (die Vernunff) respec- 
tively. There is evidently a distinction drawn 
between the understanding and the reason. 
Hegel does not intend to leave the impres- 
sion, however, that there is a certain definite 
faculty of the mind which we call the under- 






THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 13 

standing, and still another quite distinct which 
we call the reason. Such a view fails wholly 
to grasp his meaning. Hegel maintains that 
the mind works as it were upon two levels, 
a lower and a higher, and yet one and the 
same mind withal. Upon the lower certain 
considerations are overlooked which are the 
characteristic and essential features of the 
higher. Upon the lower level, that of the under- 
standing, the mind employs one of its functions 
to the exclusion of the rest; namely, that of 
discrimination, the seeing of things in their 
differences, and therefore as distinct, separate, 
and isolated, — out of relation to other things 
and to the unitary system which embraces 
them all. While, therefore, the function of the 
understanding may be regarded as a process 
of differentiation, that of the reason is essen- 
tially a process of integration. Reason is the 
synthetical power of thought. It is the put- 
ting of things together in their natural rela- 
tions. The reason takes note, it is true, of the 
differences which are in the world of experience, 
and yet nevertheless is capable of apprehending 
the unity which underlies these differences. It 
sees things not as apart and separate, but as 
cohering in systems, and the distinct systems 



14 INTRODUCTION 

themselves as forming one all-comprehending 
system, the universe itself. 

It is evident, therefore, that the understand- 
ing and the reason are not necessarily antitheti- 
cal terms. The work of the understanding is 
preliminary to that of the reason. Where they 
appear, as they often do in the Logic, as antago- 
nistic, it is the false view of the understanding 
which is the object of the Hegelian scorn ; namely, 
that view which regards the offices of the under- 
standing as complete in themselves, and needing 
no higher operation of the mind to supplement 
or correct them. 

It is the office of the negative reason to make 
manifest the limitations of the understanding 
and the contradictions which every one-sided 
and partial view of things necessarily involves. 
The office of the positive reason, on the other 
hand, is to make good the defects which the 
negative reason reveals. In this connection 
Hegel employs two technical terms which ap- 
pear frequently in the development of his sys- 
tem. They are negation and absolute negation. 
By negation is to be understood this process of 
negative reason which results in the denial of 
the primary thesis. By absolute negation is 
meant the overcoming in turn of this first con- 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 15 

tradiction by an assertion which denies it and 
which involves a higher point of view. This 
is equivalent to a negation of a negation, which 
has the force always of an affirmation. Duplex 
negatio affirmat. The three steps of the dialectic, 
therefore, are affirmation, negation, then a nega- 
tion of this negation which is itself an affirma- 
tion. It is to be observed, moreover, that the 
term " dialectic " is used in two senses in Hegel, 

— a general and a special sense. In the former 
sense it designates the threefold process of 
thought as a whole, which has just been out- 
lined. In its special use it is applied merely 
to the second or negative stage of the process, 

— the limiting of the original statement through 
its contradiction. 

The antithesis, moreover, which opposes in 
thought the primary thesis is not a chance con- 
fronting of a statement by another which hap- 
pens to oppose it. The contradiction is never 
external, artificial, or arbitrary, but is one which 
grows out of the very nature of the original 
thought itself. Every thought which is one- 
sided, thereby of necessity involves its own 
contradiction. From the very fact that it is 
finite and therefore incomplete, it must at some 
point or other prove inadequate, and therefore 



16 INTRODUCTION 

fall of its own weight. It cannot support itself, 
nor can it justify itself. Thus, to use an illus- 
tration of Hegel, we say that man is mortal, 
and seem to think that the ground of this mor- 
tality lies in the external circumstances which 
constantly surround and menace him; but the 
true view of the matter is that life in its very 
nature as life involves the germ of death, and 
so the life of a finite creature being essentially 
at war with itself works its own dissolution. 
This dialectic may be seen in the common prov- 
erb summum jus, summa injuria ; that is, to push 
an abstract right to its extreme is to pass in- 
sensibly to its contradictory, and to cause in 
reality injustice rather than justice. So also 
Hegel draws attention to the fact that in the 
sphere of politics extreme anarchy passes over 
into its opposite extreme despotism; and that in 
the sphere of ethics the following proverbs attest 
the same general principle, — " Pride goeth be- 
fore a fall" and "Too much wit outwits itself.", 
The dialectic finds further illustration in 
the history of philosophy itself, wherein the 
several systems of thought are confronted each 
by its opposed system, while out of the contro- 
versies which ensue there emerges a more com- 
plete system which combines the truth and 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 17 

discards the errors, which each of the conflicting 
systems contained. Such a process is repeated 
again and again in the gradual development 
of the fulness of truth which only centuries 
of controversy and of experience are able to 
reveal. 

We have referred thus far to the method by 
which Hegel proposes to construct the world of 
knowledge, and to show how part is related to 
part throughout, and all parts to the whole in a 
progressive development wherein every advance 
marks a growing completeness of knowledge. 
But this is but one-half of his system ; for 
Hegel maintains, as one of the cardinal doc- 
trines of his philosophy, that the laws of thought 
are at the same time the laws of things, and that 
the categories of thought correspond precisely 
with the determining characteristics of things. 
The rational system of thought is with him 
equivalent to the true philosophy of all being. 
Thus with him epistemology and ontology are 
one ; the secret of the mind is the secret of the 
universe. Man as a rational being is veritably 
a microcosm. " Know thyself and all is known/' 
This is all summarily expressed in the Hegelian 
dictum, " The real is the rational, and the ra- 
tional is the real." This is in accord with the 



18 INTRODUCTION 

doctrine of Spinoza, who affirms that " the 
order and concatenation of ideas is the same as 
the order and concatenation of things." x Hegel 
regards the cosmos and the cosmic processes as 
the manifestation of reason. Moreover, it is of 
the essence of reason to manifest itself in the ob- 
jective world. Reason has two sides, — a thought 
side and a force side, a rational and a dynamic 
essence, — and these two are one. Reason is to 
be regarded, therefore, as underlying all thoughts 
and all things. In the physical world the laws 
of phenomena finding expression in mathemati- 
cal formulae represent the thought side of rea- 
son ; the phenomena themselves are but the 
particular manifestations of these laws, the con- 
crete and dynamic realization of the reason im- 
plicit in them. Every individual thing in the 
universe must be regarded as having some uni- 
versal law or principle of reason as the very root 
and substance of its being, attributes and activi- 
ties. This universal principle of reason is the 
creative and constructive force of the universe. 
It is seen in the architectonic principle which is 
the soul of the plant, in the creative and sustain- 
ing power in the animal and in man, in the 
formation of character, in the building of insti- 
1 Spinoza, Ethics, II, p. 7. 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 19 

tutions, in the development of church and of 
state, and of the arts and sciences. 

This principle of reason Hegel calls the 
Begriff. To convey its full significance I have 
adopted the usual translation of this term ; 
namely, the notion. It will be necessary, however, 
to enlarge our usual connotation of the term 
" notion," so that as an equivalent for Begriff 
it will signify this universal principle of reason 
which is active in all thought and in all things. 
Let us examine a few passages of the Logic in 
order that at the beginning we may form a cor- 
rect idea of Hegel's own interpretation of the 
term. " The Begriff is the principle of all life ; 
it is at the same time the absolutely concrete, 
that is, finding complete manifestation in re- 
ality." * 

" The Begriff is found in the innermost heart 
of things, constituting them what they in reality 
are." 2 "The forms of the Begriff are the living 
spirit of reality, and whatever is real is such 
only because these forces are active in them, 
making them what they are." 3 

It is obvious that the Hegelian system is one 
of idealism. The cosmic force is to be regarded 



-iD- 



i Hegel, Werke, VI, § 160. 
2 VI, § 166. 3 VI, § 162. 



20 INTRODUCTION 

as the manifestation in its various phases of 
the all-embracing reason, and all history as an 
evolution of this reason in the progressive un- 
folding of its inner activity. This idealism is, 
moreover, an absolute idealism ; that is, the un- 
derlying reason, which is the creative and sus- 
taining principle of all things, is in the midst 
of all its variety of manifestation absolutely one 
and the same, from which nothing can be taken, 
and to which nothing can be added. It is com- 
pletely unconditioned and independent. It is, 
therefore, the Absolute, that is, God. The 
highest manifestation of this principle of reason 
Hegel calls the Idea {die Idee), desiring to indi- 
cate by a single word that the supreme power 
of the universe is not mechanical and material, 
but essentially rational and spiritual. The Idea, 
the Absolute, God, are to be regarded as strictly 
synonymous terms used by Hegel interchange- 
ably, and with no shade of distinction in their 
meaning. 

In the exposition of Hegel's system he en- 
deavors to show that the world of knowledge 
unfolds by the inner constraint of its own dia- 
lectic from the simplest beginnings through 
more and more complex stages until it reaches 
complete fulfilment in the all-embracing Abso- 



THE LOGIC AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 21 

lute. But though the Absolute is the consum- 
mation of the process as a whole, nevertheless 
the Absolute, as the creative and sustaining 
principle of reason itself, must be both the be- 
ginning of the process, and must underlie every 
succeeding stage of the process as well. There- 
fore every cross-section, as it were, of this 
process of evolution reveals some phase of the 
Absolute, incomplete it is true, and, therefore, 
if taken by itself misleading, but so far forth it 
remains an unmistakable manifestation of the 
divine reason which is its ground and justifica- 
tion. Thus Hegel defines the Absolute as the 
essence of all being in general; as cause, and as 
law in the physical universe ; as consciousness, 
purpose, beneficence, justice, etc., in the realm 
of mind. From this point of view Hegel's sys- 
tem may be characterized as the progressive 
revelation of God. 

Hegel's method of exposition in general may 
be summarized, therefore, as an attempt to show 
the various stages of development in the mani- 
festation of the principle of reason as a growing 
revelation of the Absolute in such a manner that 
every stage by itself is partial, and therefore 
involves its own contradiction ; but that these 
contradictions contain, nevertheless, common 



22 INTRODUCTION 

elements by which, from a higher point of view, 
they may be reconciled and combined. Such a 
point of advantage being gained in the progress 
of thought, there will be disclosed, however, a 
new contradiction, again to be resolved by 
earnest consideration and penetrating insight 
in a higher synthesis, and so on and on through 
every stage of the process to the end where 
alone there may be found an abiding place in 
the Absolute, wherein there is found no contra- 
diction and no incompleteness. The process is 
one, the underlying ground is one, and any ele- 
ment in the process receives its full significance 
solely in the light of the whole ; then and then 
only is its truth revealed. Truth with Hegel 
means always that knowledge which embraces its 
object upon all possible sides and in all of its possi- 
ble relations as the complete expression of the eter- 
nal reason which underlies it. This is a thought 
akin to that of the old Hebrew poet and philoso- 
pher who said, " In thy light shall we see light," 
and that of the later Hebrew who so constantly 
insisted that everything is known only as it is 
viewed sub specie aetemitatis. 



CHAPTER II 

THE VARIOUS ATTITUDES OF THOUGHT TOWARDS 
THE OBJECTIVE WORLD. THE METAPHYSICAL 
SYSTEMS 

THE fundamental conception of the Hegelian 
system of philosophy is that of universal 
reason dominating all thoughts and all things. 
It is necessary, therefore, at the very beginning 
to appreciate the inherent relation between 
thoughts and things in general, or more specifi- 
cally between the thinking mind and the objec- 
tive world. In order to understand fully the 
Hegelian attitude of thought to the objective 
world, the world which furnishes us the materials 
of knowledge, and of which we ourselves are 
but a part, it will be worth our while to examine 
somewhat in detail the doctrines of other philo- 
sophical systems upon this subject in the light 
of Hegel's criticism of them. Their divergence 
from the Hegelian system will serve b) r contrast 
to mark the characteristic features of that system 
itself. There are four typical views as to the 

23 



24 INTRODUCTION 

relation of the thinking subject to the objective 
world. They are as follows : — 

1. The metaphysical systems. ^ 

2. The empirical schools. 

3. The critical philosophy. 

4. The theory of intuitive or immediate 
knowledge. 

The first of these attitudes of thought re- 
gards the external world as perfectly pictured 
in thought. The question is not raised as to 
the difficulty of passing from the object which 
is perceived to the thinking subject which per- 
ceives it. The way is regarded as open and 
free. The objective reality of the outer world 
is assumed as a matter of fact. The testimony 
of the senses is taken as unquestionable. It 
is the standpoint of naive realism, which rests 
upon the assumption that all things are in their 
essence what they seem to be in our perception 
of them. A natural result of this point of view 
and of this method of interpreting the world of 
experience was that abstract and empty phrases, 
refined metaphysical distinctions, in short, the 
terminology of the schools came to be used in- 
stead of living words in the description of living 
experience. No wonder that philosophy became 
sterile and dry as dust when the truth of the 






THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 25 

world of reality was expressed in the desiccated 
formulae of metaphysical speculation. In other 
words, the actual world of living experience 
was forced in a purely artificial and arbitrary 
manner into metaphysical molds. For these 
molds were cast with no consideration what- 
soever of the patterns which the real world 
might have furnished. They were fashioned 
according to the caprice of speculation, and 
the demands of certain postulates of thought 
which had no basis in reality. In respect to 
all this, Hegel's contention is that a genuine 
knowledge of the external world must come 
through a process in which the particular ob- 
jects of knowledge are allowed actually to char- 
acterize themselves; in other words, we must 
interrogate the facts of experience and allow 
them to tell their own story. We must not 
take for granted certain characteristics and cer- 
tain relations as necessarily obtaining because 
our speculations seem to demand them. We 
dare not apply to concrete objects of thought 
predicates which have been derived elsewhere 
and without any consideration of the nature of 
the objects themselves. We should not antici- 
pate experience, but faithfully interpret it. 
Take for example the supreme object of all 



26 INTRODUCTION 

thought, God Himself. It is but a poor and 
inadequate conception of God which results 
merely from ascribing to Him a series of predi- 
cates which have been deduced from certain 
metaphysical necessities. However many such 
predicates may be, they together fail utterly to 
exhaust His infinite nature. The Orientals 
appreciated this when in the Hindoo philosophy 
God is declared to be the many-named, or the 
many-sided, and this without limit of any kind 
or degree, so that if the resulting names should 
be formed together to constitute a series, the 
result would of necessity be an infinite series. 

Moreover, Hegel insists that the various meta- 
physical schools all adopted a wrong criterion 
in that they are content to derive their defini- 
tions from popular conceptions. Any popular 
conception of God, of the world, or of the soul 
is necessarily inadequate and therefore false, 
for it must be colored necessarily by the nature 
of the age, or of the race whence it emerges, 
and so far forth it is particular, local, and mis- 
leading. Any definition of God which embodies 
a popular conception of Him, however complete 
that conception may be, fails to sound the 
depths of His being and nature. It is Hegel's 
most vehement contention that the only true 



THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 27 

method of building up the world of knowledge 
is to allow the objects of thought freely and 
spontaneously to expound their own characteris- 
tics. Thus God's being is known only as re- 
vealed in the continuous unfolding of Himself 
in the cosmic processes, in nature, in history, in 
man. And so we may define man as a rational 
animal ; but at best this is only a vague groping 
in the dark, for our knowledge of man cannot 
be compressed into a single judgment. That 
was the snare of the metaphysical schools, the 
belief that all objects of knowledge could be 
expressed completely within the scope of a 
formal definition or a stereotyped formula. 
What man is, in all the possibilities of his devel- 
opment as artisan, mechanic, scholar, soldier, 
citizen, statesman, martyr, or reformer, and so 
on without limit, that the complete history of 
humanity alone can reveal. The term "ra- 
tional," as used in the traditional definition of 
man, conceals a vast territory of knowledge which 
lies behind it. We appreciate the limitless extent 
of this region when we even superficially medi- 
tate upon the many-sided manifestations of 
which the idea of rationality is capable. It is 
only in the free activity of the constructive 
principle working within an object of knowl- 



28 INTRODUCTION 

edge that its essential characteristics are re- 
vealed. 

Moreover, the old metaphysic was dogmatic 
in the extreme. Although the results of such 
speculation were partial and one-sided, they were 
nevertheless stoutly maintained as absolute and 
final. This insistence upon the ultimate nature 
of partially conceived truth indicates the char- 
acteristic spirit of the school. Content with the 
half truth and the twilight of the understanding 
they never attained the full knowledge as re- 
vealed in the light of reason. In addition to the 
general point of view and method of the meta- 
physical systems, their treatment of several 
special problems is not only a matter of inter- 
est in itself, but has an indirect bearing upon 
some important points of the Hegelian system. 
These problems are four in number. 

1. As to the nature of being in general, — 
ontology. 

2. As to the nature of the soul, — rational 
psychology or pneumatology. 

3. As to the nature of the world, — cos- 
mology. 

4. As to the being and nature of God, — 
natural or rational theology. 

The doctrine of being, or ontology, resulted 



THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 29 

from the attempt to answer the question as to 
how being in general might be adequately char- 
acterized. The distinctions raised by the meta- 
physical schools were largely verbal. Whenever 
certain absolute terms were found which seemed 
to involve no contradiction to the generally 
received conceptions of the day, then the meta- 
physician was completely satisfied that he had 
given expression to the truth in its fulness. 
He did not pause to inquire as to the concrete 
significance of the terms which he used or as 
to their illustration in actual experience. Such 
terms, for example, as existence, finitude, sim- 
plicity, complexity, and the like, were used as 
the current coin of expression by the metaphysi- 
cal school, and with but little thought as to 
their precise meaning and the definite scope of 
their application. Hegel's criticism, at this 
point, is quite characteristic and illustrative of 
his general method. He insists that every term 
which we employ in philosophical thinking 
should represent a notion, that is, an idea of 
universal and necessary significance, and that 
such a notion cannot have a one-sided, abstract, 
and rigid meaning, but must have a wealth of 
meaning in itself. Every notion, moreover, 
must be regarded as a small world within itself, 



30 INTRODUCTION 

having manifold characteristics connected and 
interrelated in an indefinite variety of ways. 
The term which represents such an idea can 
therefore never be employed in a stereotyped 
manner as was the custom of the metaphysi- 
cians. The very fact that such an idea embodies 
within itself inner connections or relations 
renders it necessary that contradictions must 
arise which can be resolved only by viewing 
them in the light of the whole body of knowl- 
edge. To cut such an idea off as a finished 
product, incapable of further modification or 
development, is to deal with it in a manner 
extremely artificial and unphilosophical as well. 
Ideas are living processes and not dead prod- 
ucts. " Let us avoid, therefore," Hegel would 
say, " the use of terms to which we have attached 
partial and poor meanings. Let the supreme 
task of thought be to overcome the superficial 
and the abstract." 

The second question discussed by the meta- 
physicians was that of rational psychology, or 
pneumatology ; it had special reference to the 
nature of the soul. The pre-Kantian meta- 
physic regarded the soul as a thing, an in- 
dependent entity. This conception at once 
suggested the question, which proved to be an 



THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 31 

utterly futile and misleading inquiry, as to the 
seat of the soul; and the further question as 
to whether the soul, inasmuch as it is a thing, 
should be regarded as simple or composite. It 
was thought that upon the fact of its simplicity 
depended the truth of the doctrine of immortal- 
ity, inasmuch as whatever is not composed of 
parts can suffer no dissolution. Hegel insists 
at this point that the inner life of the mind or 
soul cannot be regarded as a finished thing, a 
product once for all complete, without possibil- 
ity of development. Such a conception renders 
impossible also any processes of action and re- 
action between the several elements which con- 
stitute the essence of the soul's life and varied 
activity, and leaves unexplained the external 
phenomena of the mind which are so incalcula- 
bly complex in all the variety of their many- 
sided manifestations. The mind must be 
regarded, according to Hegel, as a concrete 
reality which is evidenced by its manifestations. 
It is not a " thing," as the metaphysicians use 
the term "thing," but rather an inward con- 
structive force determining the various phases 
of its external phenomena in an unlimited, pro- 
gressive development. 

The third branch of the traditional metaphvsic 



32 INTRODUCTION 

was that of cosmology. The topics which it 
embraced were the world, its contingency or 
necessity, its eternity or its necessary limita- 
tion in time and space, the formal laws of its 
changes, the freedom of man, and the origin of 
evil. The general standpoint of the metaphy- 
sician before the time of Kant was that thought 
presents to us a number of alternative judg- 
ments, one of which must be wholly true and 
its opposite wholly false. Therefore, in refer- 
ence to the particular questions which arose in 
the sphere of cosmology, the metaphysicians 
held that one is of necessity constrained to 
choose between the theory that the world is 
created or that it is eternal; that man is the 
product of the law of necessity or that he is 
free. They held, moreover, that the good and 
evil in the world are natural opposites, and can 
never be reconciled. Hegel characteristically 
opposes this one-sided view of things by main- 
taining that the world contains on all sides an 
indefinite number of opposites, and that it is 
the peculiar function of the reason to reconcile 
and harmonize them completely. His system 
is essentially a universal resolution of all the 
contradictions and inconsistencies of existence 
in the all-embracing synthesis of the reason. 



THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 33 

Thus the idea of freedom which involves no 
necessity, and the idea of necessity which 
involves no freedom, are alike merely the 
partial abstractions of the understanding. In 
the actual world, the world in which we live, 
and move, and have our being, freedom and 
necessity are not divorced. For there can be 
freedom only in that community wherein liberty 
is guaranteed by law. And as regards the 
necessity which nature everywhere imposes 
upon us, it must be remembered that the free 
activity of the individual is possible only to the 
extent to which he can depend implicitly upon 
the uniformity of nature's laws ; for were nature 
without law, and its phenomena the result of 
the caprice or whim of ruling deities as in the 
old mythological conception, the free purpose 
of man would be constantly thwarted and 
annulled. 

The fourth branch of metaphysics is that of 
natural or rational theology. It is concerned 
with the fundamental conception of God, 1 1 is 
attributes, and the proof of His existence. 
The radical error of the metaphysical logic 
is revealed in their attempt to discover some 
objective ground for the being of God. The 
resulting idea of God thus formed, creates the 



34 INTRODUCTION 

impression of being derived from something 
external to God Himself. But God must be 
conceived as the sole ground of all things vis- 
ible and invisible, and therefore as independent 
of anything in the nature of a foundation or 
support of His being and existence. For if 
God is regarded as a being, derived from the 
world, then the very finitude of the world 
processes would cling to the idea of a God thus 
conceived. As Hegel suggests, the metaphysi- 
cian is confronted with the following dilemma : 
either God is the actual substance of the 
world, including the mind of man, which is 
endeavoring to come to a knowledge of Him, — 
which is pantheism ; or God is an object distinct 
from the apprehending mind, the subject, — 
which is dualism. Hegel in the development of 
his system endeavors to effect a synthesis of the 
divine and human consciousness in such a way 
as to avoid the two extremes of dualism and of 
pantheism; it is only, however, when the entire 
system is unfolded before us that we have any 
basis for judging whether he has succeeded in 
this difficult undertaking. At this stage of the 
discussion it is sufficient merely to mark his 
general purpose in this regard as a radical point 
of departure from the metaphysical view. 



THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 35 

There is a phrase which is often employed 
in speculations concerning the being of God. 
It is this, " Consider nature, and nature will 
lead you to God." Hegel in this connection 
enters a vigorous protest, inasmuch as this 
phrase seems to imply that God is the consum- 
mation merely of the great cosmic process, 
whereas the truth lies in the thought that 
while God may be regarded in a certain sense 
as the final consummation of all things, yet 
nevertheless He must be regarded also as the 
absolute ground of the initial stage and every 
subsequent stage of the cosmic development. 
God is the beginning as well as the end of 
the world's evolution. It is only in a very 
partial sense, therefore, that we are justified in 
saying that nature leads man to God, for in 
another and deeper sense we are constrained 
to believe that it is God Himself who makes 
nature possible. Nature leads backward as 
well as forward to God. 

As to the attributes of God, they were con- 
ceived by the metaphysicians in so indefinite 
and vague a manner as to be utterly devoid 
of any genuine significance. These schools of 
thought seemed to possess a natural dread of as- 
signing to God any attributes whatsoever which 



36 INTRODUCTION 

were distinctively human upon the ground 
that to think of God's nature as at all resem- 
bling human nature would be to degrade and 
dishonor Him. Fearing that they might be- 
come anthropomorphic, they lapsed into a 
vague indefiniteness which was without any 
significant content whatever. Yet they seemed 
oblivious of this evident defect, and satisfied 
with a summary of the divine attributes in 
some such vague and unmeaning expression 
as the following, " God is the most real of 
all beings." But Hegel in criticising such a 
statement as this insists that the most real of 
all beings of whom, however, nothing is af- 
firmed definitely, is after all the very opposite 
of what it purports to be, and what the under- 
standing supposes it to be. Instead of a 
being ample and above all measure, the idea 
is so narrowly conceived that it is on the 
contrary poor and altogether empty. It is 
with reason that the heart craves an answer 
to its question as to the nature of God which 
will mean something. When the idea of God 
is reduced to an indefinite and meaningless 
formula, God is then removed to a sphere so 
foreign to our thought and life as to be reduced 
to an absolute zero. Without a content pos- 



THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 37 

sessing any positive significance our thought is 
shorn of all meaning whatsoever. As Hegel 
puts it in striking epigram, " Mere light is 
mere darkness." 1 Notwithstanding Hegel's 
radical difference in general point of view, 
however, and his critical attitude toward the 
metaphysical schools, nevertheless he frankly 
acknowledges that there is something of per- 
manent value in one feature at least of their 
teachings, — namely, in their insistence upon 
the fundamental truth that thought constitutes 
the essence of all that is. And this truth he 
has incorporated in his own philosophical sys- 
tem as its cardinal doctrine. Thought, how- 
ever, with Hegel does not consist in abstract 
definitions and formulae, but is revealed in its 
fulness only in the concrete realities of life. 

1 Werke, VI, § 36, Zusatz. 



CHAPTER III 

THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 

IN the course of the development of philo- 
sophical thought it was natural that there 
should follow a reaction against the abstract, 
vague, and indefinite results which had been 
the outcome of the metaphysical speculations. 
This reaction found expression in the teachings 
of the empirical school of philosophy. The 
empiricists insisted that the starting-point of 
all thought must be something definitely fixed 
and secure, some concrete reality such as can 
be found only in actual experience. The 
metaphysical procedure started with abstract 
universals, and the difficulty which it could 
not overcome lay in the fact that there was no 
way of passing from vague generalities to the 
abundant variety of particular manifestations 
which correspond to such universals in the 
world of reality. It is the function of thought 
to interpret experience and not to anticipate it. 
Therefore the empiricists urged that the logical 

38 



THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 39 

and natural beginning of all inquiry after truth 
should be the particular instances which nature 
presents in such prodigal profusion. They in- 
sisted, moreover, that the true and only source 
of all experience is to be found in our sensa- 
tions and perceptions. According to this view 
the foundations of knowledge rest solely upon 
the direct testimony of the senses ; here, and 
here alone, can consciousness be certain of itself 
and the results of its own operations. What- 
ever may be doubted, here at least is certitude, 
a firm footing, and the assurance of substantial 
progress. And so we find the fundamental 
doctrine of empiricism formulated in the 
words, "Whatever is true must be in the 
actual world and present to sensation." This 
would seem to be indeed a common-sense basis 
for all serious investigation and for the con- 
struction of a sound practical philosophy ; and 
there is, indeed, much to recommend and to 
justify its claims. Hegel calls attention to 
the very valuable contribution to thought 
which has come directly from the empirical 
school, and to which he himself fully sub- 
scribes, — namely, that it is necessary for every 
man to see for himself and to feel that he is 
present in those primary facts of knowledge 



40 INTRODUCTION 

which he feels constrained to accept. If one 
is really to know things, he must see them as 
they are. This is certainly in complete accord 
with the modern scientific spirit of inductive 
inquiry which grounds all investigation upon 
a study of actual sources, and that, too, at first 
hand. 

The weakness of empiricism, however, as 
Hegel points out most conclusively, consists in 
the fact that any sensation, or combination of 
sensations which according to the empiricist is 
the ultimate ground of appeal, is always a par- 
ticular and individual experience. It is impos- 
sible to pass from such experiences to the 
universal idea or law which they illustrate 
without introducing some conceptions which 
transcend the purely empirical presupposition 
that we know only particular phenomena and 
their immediate connections and relations. 

Hume had long since drawn attention to the 
fact that when we interpret the phenomena of 
experience as manifesting universal principles 
and as related by necessary causal connections, 
we are thereby reading into the phenomena what 
they themselves do not contain, but that with 
which they have been invested by our thought. 
Granted that necessity and universality are found 



THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 41 

everywhere in our consciousness, what reason 
have we, Hume would say, to assert that these 
characteristics are also the attributes of things 
themselves. If sensation is to maintain its 
claim to be the sole basis of all that men hold 
as truth, then these ideas of universality and 
necessity must be regarded as merely conven- 
ient fictions of the mind, clever it is true, but 
by no means trustworthy. Hume very frankly 
accepted this conclusion ; and so must every 
thoroughgoing empiricist. Hegel insists, how- 
ever, that the reason joins to these fundamental 
processes of sensation and perception its pecul- 
iar function of interpreting in the light of their 
universal and necessary significance that which 
they present as particular experiences. This 
relation between the reason on the one hand 
and the elementary data of the senses on the 
other, follows logically from the basal postulate 
of the Hegelian system that whatever is found 
to be an ultimate characteristic of reason must 
also apply in like manner to reality itself. 

Again, the method of empiricism is essentially 
one of analysis, — that is, the subjecting of our 
experiences to a kind of dissecting process which 
separates them into their constituent elements. 
The defect of such a method is that it makes 



42 INTRODUCTION 

no provision whatsoever for any corresponding 
synthesis. After the work of analysis is com- 
plete, it is necessary to have some unifying and 
constructive function of the mind as its natural 
and necessary complement. It is such a function 
which enables us to pass from phenomena to the 
laws which underlie them. Dissection as an 
exclusive process is suggestive only of death, 
and can never reproduce the living organism. 

Moreover, if thought is active in systematizing 
the crude material which is given by the senses, 
then it must bring to the process something 
more than that which the crude sensation of 
itself is able to give. 

As to the questions which are of special mo- 
ment for the philosophical thinker, concerning 
God, the soul, and the world, the empirical school 
took the position that the mind of man is so 
constituted that it can deal only with finite 
material. Finding truth only in the outer world 
as mediated by the senses, they insisted that even 
if the existence of a supersensible world be 
granted, any knowledge of that world would be 
impossible. From this point of view it follows 
that there is no place in such a system either for 
a theory of morals or a philosophy of religion. 
Both ethics and religion thus lose all objective 



THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 43 

character, and at the same time their universal 
validity. The logical outcome, therefore, of this 
doctrine is materialism, which in its general 
methods and results is diametrically opposed to 
Hegelianism. There have been, however, some 
philosophers who have styled themselves disci- 
ples of Hegel and yet have been pronounced 
materialists. They are the so-called Hegelians 
of the left; they are such writers as Feuer- 
bach and Strauss. This peculiar development of 
the Hegelian school must be regarded as a perver- 
sion of Hegel's teaching rather than the logical 
outcome of his system. Hegel's criticism of ma- 
terialism is so clear and emphatic as to give no 
uncertain sound. He draws attention to the 
fact that materialists in general regard matter 
in the light of an abstraction ; it is after all the 
unknown somewhat behind phenomena, of which 
they are merely the manifestation. And when 
the materialists come to explain what matter 
itself is, its fundamental nature and essential 
characteristics, they are constrained to employ 
certain concepts as force, causation, action and 
reaction, and the like, which are essentially meta- 
physical concepts for which materialism pure 
and simple can give no warrant whatsoever. 
Moreover, the world of sense-perception, as 



44 INTRODUCTION 

materialism conceives it, can give only a series 
of isolated and separate phenomena. To think 
of them as forming component parts of an in- 
terrelated system, and as sustaining necessary 
relations to each other and to the whole, would 
be equivalent to the rationalizing of the material 
universe, and this means the introduction of 
some non-materialistic factors. This procedure, 
of course, would contradict the fundamental 
postulate of materialism, that all knowledge is 
confined to the material data furnished by the 
senses. Materialism is here confronted by a 
practical dilemma. To defend its position, it 
must use the weapons of metaphysics ; but the 
moment one appears as a metaphysician he 
ceases immediately to be a materialist. The 
materialistic creed, therefore, must suffer either 
from inadequacy or inconsistency. And it is to 
overcome these limitations that Hegel seeks a 
solution in the creed of absolute idealism. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 

THE critical philosophy takes its name from 
the fundamental Kantian point of view that 
thought must itself investigate how far it has 
a capacity of knowledge, and in this way become 
critical of itself. Inasmuch as the sensation 
regarded as a pure sensation can never give 
in and of itself the idea of necessity and univer- 
sality, and yet we are conscious that our whole 
body of knowledge depends upon this very idea 
for its primary features of order and uniformity, 
therefore, the source of this idea, according to 
Kant, must lie in the very nature of thought 
itself. Moreover, he insists that this source is 
not to be sought for in the thought of any 
individual, regarded merely in his individual 
capacity, but in the thought which is the com- 
mon possession of all individuals alike, — that is, 
in the very nature of thought itself as pure 
thought irrespective of the peculiar modes, or 
habits of thought incident to the peculiarities of 

45 



46 INTRODUCTION 

any particular individual whatsoever. These 
fundamental ideas which seem to be the com- 
mon property of all rational creatures, and 
which, together with their relations and con- 
nections, form the determining factors in reduc- 
ing the crude material of sensation to a system 
of knowledge characterized by order and law, 
are the so-called categories, — such as the ideas 
of necessity, cause and effect, unity, plurality, 
and the like. 

The critical philosophy sets itself the task of 
testing the value of these categories in reference 
to their application to the sciences, to the sphere 
of metaphysics, and to our ordinary conceptual 
processes. It also seeks to determine the pre- 
cise nature and function of these categories so 
as to distinguish in our knowledge between that 
which is subjective and that which is objective. 
These terms " subjective " and " objective " play 
such an important r61e in philosophical discussions 
generally, and especially in the systems both of 
Kant and of Hegel, that it will repay us at this 
stage of our investigation to inquire somewhat 
in detail as to the meaning and usage of these 
terms. Hegel draws attention to three distinct 
senses in which the term " objective " is used : — 

In the first place, objective is used in a loose 






THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 47 

and rather popular manner to designate what- 
ever subsists externally, in contrast to which 
the subjective comes to be regarded as that 
which exists only in our fancy, hopes, or 
dreams. 

In the second place, the Kantian use of objec- 
tive consists in an application of the term to the 
elements in thought which are universal and 
necessary, — that is, what all men are constrained 
to think, in contrast to the subjective character 
attached to individual experiences which give 
them a certain particular and occasional color- 
ing. 

In the third place, the Hegelian use of the 
term objective has regard to the universal and 
necessary elements of thought in general after 
the manner of Kant, but in addition Hegel con- 
siders these universal and necessary elements 
of thought as representing at the same time 
the real essence of existing things. 

This latter distinction marks the point of 
departure of Hegel from Kant. For, as Hegel 
maintains, if the necessary and essential factors 
in the building up of our world of knowledge 
belong only to the processes of thought, then 
all thought must be forever separated from the 
thing itself as the object of our thought which 



48 INTRODUCTION 

perceives it, and as it exists apart from our per- 
ception of it. And although it is true that the 
categories as causality, necessity, universality 
and the like lie strictly within the province of 
thought, it does not necessarily follow that they 
must be ours merely in a subjective sense and 
not at the same time also the essential charac- 
teristics of things themselves. Hegel, moreover, 
will not allow that the convenient Kantian fic- 
tion of the thing-in-itself {das Ding an sicK) can 
possibly express the real nature of the object 
when we have eliminated all that is present in 
consciousness relative to it, — all the deliverances 
of feeling and all specific judgments concerning 
it as to its evident attributes and qualities. 
What is left, Hegel asks, but an utter abstrac- 
tion, a total emptiness ? 

When the balance between subjective and 
objective is struck by Kant, the totality of 
knowledge is found to be on the side of the 
subjective, while nothing at all remains to the 
credit of the objective. For when Kant speaks 
of the unity of consciousness as transcendental, 
he means by this phrase that our body of knowl- 
edge regarded as constituting a system possess- 
ing order and unity throughout has validity 
only for our thoughts, and not for objects apart 



THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 49 

from our knowledge. What they are in them- 
selves must remain, therefore, an unknown 
quantity, — the insoluble x of the equation of 
knowledge. 

It is characteristic, moreover, of the Hegelian 
method that the significance which he attaches 
to the term objective is in reality a synthesis 
of the two other views mentioned above. The 
first holds that objectivity refers to the exter- 
nal thing; the second that objectivity refers 
to the necessary and universal thought; while 
Hegel insists that the objective is the combina- 
tion of the two, being the true thought concern- 
ing the real thing. The subjective would signify, 
therefore, that which for the time being has a 
place in our thoughts but has no reference to 
reality, and which others under similar circum- 
stances might not be constrained necessarily to 
entertain. 

Kant's position is known as one of subjective 
idealism, — that is, the things which we know 
are appearances merely, and we possess no 
certitude as to the truth of what they are in 
themselves. Hegel's position, on the other 
hand, is one of absolute idealism, as lias been 
already mentioned, — that is, it is conceded that 
the objects of our knowledge are phenomena, 



50 INTRODUCTION 

but nevertheless must be regarded by us as the 
true representation of the things themselves. 
The warrant for such a belief lies in the postu- 
late that what thought discovers in phenomena 
is a manifestation of the divine and universal 
reason, of which the very thought itself is a 
kindred manifestation. To show how this 
must be so, and to indicate its significance as 
the corner-stone of the entire Hegelian system, 
is the purpose of the Logic itself, and can be 
appreciated in its fulness only after a mastery 
of the detailed exposition which the Logic con- 
tains. 

As to the special problems of the soul, the 
world, and of God, Kant's position may be out- 
lined as follows : — 

As to their teaching concerning the nature of 
the soul, Kant and Hegel are at one in their 
criticism of the old metaphysical definition of 
the soul as substantial, simple, selfsame, and 
maintaining its independence in its intercourse 
with the material world. Such a definition they 
both hold to be eminently unsatisfactory. The 
reasons assigned for this opinion, however, are 
quite different. Kant affirms that the meta- 
physical definition is unsatisfactory because the 
reason has no more of a warrant in making the 



THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 51 

transition from the soul as we think it to be, 
to the soul as it really is in itself, than in the 
procedure from the appearances of things as 
perceived by thought to the things as they are 
in themselves. Hegel, however, repudiates the 
metaphysical definition on the ground that these 
attributes enumerated as the elementary char- 
acteristics of the soul are totally inadequate to 
express the concrete wealth of content which 
our idea of the soul should embrace. 

As to the problem of the world, Kant draws 
attention to the fact that the thought in en- 
deavoring to comprehend the unconditioned 
nature of the world stumbles upon certain con- 
tradictions which are called antinomies, for it 
is frequently found necessary to maintain two 
contradictory propositions about one and the 
same object in such a way that each one of the 
mutually destructive propositions seems of itself 
to have the stamp of necessity and of universal 
validity. The Kantian antinomies are four in 
number and are as follows : — 

1. The world is limited as to space and time. 
The world is not limited as to space and 

time. 

2. Matter is indefinitely divisible. 
Matter is not indefinitely divisible. 



52 INTRODUCTION 

3. The will must be free. 

The will must be determined. 

4. The world is caused. 

The world is uncaused, eternal. 
Kant's explanation of these seemingly contra- 
dictory statements is that the difficulty is not 
inherent in the objects themselves which are 
under contemplation, but attaches only to the 
reason which fails to comprehend them in their 
true significance. At this point Hegel takes 
exception to Kant's explanation, and insists that 
there are not merely four antinomies, but that 
there is an indefinite number of such contradic- 
tions arising from the essential nature of all 
being itself. The difficulty, therefore, lies not 
in the defects of reason. On the contrary, it is 
the peculiar office of reason to show that these 
contradictions attach to the things themselves 
and that they are necessary in order to assume 
a progressive development whose very essence 
consists in overcoming contradictions and in 
establishing a higher unity in the midst of all 
differences. It is only the absolute reason, 
according to Hegel, which is capable of con- 
structing such a unity, and so far forth as the 
reason of man partakes of the divine reason 
is he capable of comprehending it. Here, again, 



THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53 

we obtain a characteristic glimpse of the fun- 
damental Hegelian conception, and a sugges- 
tion as to the working of his dialectic method. 

As to the final problem, the theistic question, 
it would be well to examine briefly the Kantian 
criticism of the proofs concerning the being of 
God. These proofs may be divided into two 
kinds according to one or the other of two 
methods of procedure : — 

We may begin, on the one hand, with an 
analysis of being and through that process 
reach the idea of God. 

Or, on the other hand, we may begin with 
an analysis of the idea of God, and through 
that process reach the ground of His being. 

The former of these methods of procedure 
will give either the cosmological or the physico- 
theological proof of the being of God. The 
cosmological proof reasons from the variously 
related and interconnected phenomena of the 
universe to a first cause as necessarv to account 
for their origin and their sustained existence. 
This proof turns upon the concept of causation. 
The physico-theological proof reasons from evi- 
dences of design manifested in phenomena to 
the existence of One who is the great architect 
of them all, and this proof turns upon the con- 



54 INTRODUCTION 

cept of final cause. Kant's criticism of these 
proofs is based upon the fact that in the transi- 
tion from the world which is finite to God who 
is infinite, there is in the conclusion far more 
than is contained in the premises, and therefore 
the inference is an unwarranted one. For if 
we may not logically pass from the crude mate- 
rial of the sensations to the ideas of universality 
and necessity, neither may we pass from the 
same beginnings to the idea of God. Hegel 
contributes two thoughts of special significance 
to the general conclusions of Kant ; the first is 
concerned with a question of form, the second 
with the question of matter or of content. 

As to the first, that of the formal process 
involved in our reasoning; if we regard the 
transition from the finite to the infinite as rep- 
resented by a syllogistic process, the starting- 
point must involve some theory of the world 
which makes it an aggregate either of contin- 
gent facts, or of relations implying design. 
But the world as thus conceived is no longer 
a world of mere sensations. It is a world of 
sensations as they have been transmuted by 
thought, and as they contain the elements of 
necessity and universality ; for we have seen 
that it is the fundamental nature of thought to 



THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55 

exercise this function of transmuting sensations 
into these higher forms of the mind. But in 
such a process the crude sensation is destroyed 
as a sensation. This is what Hegel calls the 
element of negation in the process of transition 
from the world to God. The world regarded 
as an aggregate of sensations has disappeared. 
Out of its ashes rises the new world as inter- 
preted by the categories of thought, and such a 
world with its implications of universality and 
necessity is an adequate starting-point for the 
proof of the being of God. 

Hegel's second contribution to this general 
discussion relates to the matter or body of truths 
to which the transition from the world to God 
at first leads, such truths as concern the nature 
of the world's substance, its necessary essence, 
and the cause which regulates and directs it 
according to design. These ideas express but a 
very partial and inadequate knowledge of God, 
and yet they are necessary to a complete con- 
ception of Him. Hegel insists that while they 
should not be overlooked, they must nevertheless 
be supplemented by higher truths, and that while 
inanimate nature gives us intimations of God, 
there is a higher revelation of Him when we 
start with living organisms. Thence we reach 



56 INTRODUCTION 

the idea of God as the source of life. In a 
similar way, there is still a higher level which 
may be taken as our starting-point. This higher 
level is that of mind itself ; it is through mind 
alone that we reach the highest possible con- 
ception of God. His nature, therefore, can be 
adequately defined only when we regard Him as 
the absolute mind. 

The second general method of proof is the 
inverse process of the first. It starts with the 
idea of God and reaches His being as the con- 
clusion. It is the so-called ontological argu- 
ment for the being of God. Beginning with 
the idea of God as the most perfect being con- 
ceivable, it proceeds to the belief in the actual 
being of God. Kant's criticism is that we may 
not reason from the thought in the mind to the 
actual existence of the object of that thought 
outside of the mind, and he illustrates this point 
by showing that a hundred thalers as conceived 
in the mind does not put a hundred thalers in 
one's purse. Hegel's criticism of Kant, how- 
ever, puts the matter in a very different light. 
He insists that no such analogy as drawn by 
Kant can discredit the ontological argument, 
because the idea of God which we are con- 
strained to entertain is wholly unique. The 



THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 'u 

very nature of any finite thing is expressed 
by saying of it as Kant does that its being in 
time and space is very different from our notion 
of it. But of the idea of God it must be said, 
and of Him alone can it be said, that He can be 
thought of only as existing. He, the infinite 
One, occupies in our thoughts a position, there- 
fore, accorded to nothing that is finite. In God 
and in God alone is the idea of Him and His 
being one and the same. Here is the supreme 
illustration that the rational is the real and the 
real is rational. 

In the Critique of the Practical Reason Kant 
indicates his position in reference to the moral 
life. The free control of its own activity 
which Kant denied to the pure reason, he has 
vindicated for the practical reason which mani- 
fests itself in the various phases of human con- 
duct. By practical reason he means the will 
that determines itself according to universal 
laws, and these universal laws he claims pos- 
sess objective validity, — that is, they are recog- 
nized by the human intellect everywhere and at 
all times, and they impose a common obligation 
upon all mankind. Kant's special contribution 
to ethical thought consists in his protest against 
the prevailing ethical theory of his day, — that 



58 INTRODUCTION 

of eudaemonism, the philosophy which finds 
man's chief end in some form of happiness, and 
fundamentally happiness as interpreted in the 
gratification of the selfish appetites and desires 
which are dictated by the pleasures and pains 
of life. Hegel's criticism of Kant is that his 
theory gives the form of morality in a universal 
law of conduct, but that the formal expression 
of the law of conduct to do that which is right 
by no means determines the content of that 
law, and thereby does not definitely inform us 
as to what is the right in concrete cases. 

It is thoroughly characteristic of the Hegelian 
method that it always criticises a one-sided view 
of things, and then seeks to correct it by show- 
ing the other and complementary side. So here, 
Hegel agrees with Kant completely, only he 
adds that the Kantian system is inadequate and 
needs to be rounded out in some way that will 
provide, not merely for the basis of a formal 
ethic, but for a material ethic as well, so that 
the two may be regarded as mutually related 
elements which together form the complete 
whole. 

In the third division of Kant's great work, 
The Critique of the Judgment, the reflective 
power of judgment is declared to be equiva- 



THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 59 

lent to the function of the intuitive under- 
standing. In this position Kant, in a dim 
way at least, approaches the Hegelian concep- 
tion of reason as the basis of all things, in 
affirming that everything which exists manifests 
its nature according to its inner idea, if we may 
here use an Hegelian phrase. Thus in the in- 
tuitive judgment of beauty in nature or in art, 
in the judgment of an ideal end which is being 
realized in all the living organisms throughout 
the vast range of nature, — in all this man rises 
to the height of comprehending in some measure 
that the mere phenomena of the universe reveal 
in themselves an ideal and a purpose. The 
universe is thus to be regarded as the incarna- 
tion of reason. 

Hegel's system marks a point of departure in 
that he holds that this ideal, this incarnate reason, 
is not merely revealed to the artistic instinct of 
the genius or of the poet, but may be made 
manifest to humbler minds through the simple 
operations of pure thought alone. 

Kant went so far towards the Hegelian posi- 
tion as to assert that the natural purposiveness 
seen in nature was not an external principle of 
finality, but was immanent within each organ- 
ism, wherein the final cause is active as a mold- 



60 INTRODUCTION 

ing principle, forming a constructive dynamic 
centre. He fails, however, to attain to the 
Hegelian doctrine in its completeness, because 
he says that, at the last analysis, the idea of an 
immanent finality can be affirmed with positive 
assurance only of our thought of things and not 
of the things themselves. Whereas Hegel 
insists that there is an objective finality as well 
as a subjective, or rather that the subjective and 
the objective are here one and the same; the 
finality is both in our thoughts and also charac- 
teristic of things as well. 

In the summary of his review of the critical 
philosophy of Kant, Hegel assigns to it two 
points of merit, in that, positively, it emphasizes 
the independence of reason, and, negatively, it 
insists that the categories of the understand- 
ing are finite. Kant's weakness, on the other 
hand, lies in affirming that what is false or inad- 
equate in knowledge is due solely to the limi- 
tations of our mental faculties. Hegel insists, 
on the contrary, that the defects of knowledge 
must be ascribed to the finite nature of the 
objects of thought themselves and not to the 
categories by which they are constructed into 
a system of knowledge. 



CHAPTER V 

THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE 

THE chief representative of the doctrine 
of immediate or intuitive knowledge is 
Jacobi, who insists that all knowledge obtained 
through the categories of the understanding is 
derivative and therefore finite and conditioned, 
and because finite and conditioned, therefore un- 
satisfactory. Moreover, through any process 
of reasoning whatsoever, it is impossible to rise 
to the high level of apprehending the true, the 
infinite, the unconditioned, that is, God Himself. 
But by an immediate revelation of the reason 
we may know God intuitively. The being of 
God cannot be proved, but it can be immediately 
recognized. The words " knowledge," "faith," 
"intuition," are the terms used to indicate this 
immediate deliverance of the consciousness. 
Hegel's criticism of this position is somewhat 
as follows : Although the knowledge of God may 
be regarded as an immediate intuition, never- 
theless, it is an intuition which must be con- 
sidered as an intellectual product, that is, it 

61 



62 INTRODUCTION 

must rise above the things of sense. It must 
deal with facts which have special reference to 
our thinking mind, with facts of inherently 
universal significance. Pure and simple intui- 
tion, therefore, is nothing more or less than 
pure and simple thought. The distinction 
between thought and intuition is merely a ver- 
bal one. The fundamental difficulty with the 
position of Jacobi is this, that while he claims 
the intuition to be immediate, he overlooks the 
possibility that what may seem to be complete 
in itself is nevertheless a product, though it be 
a finished product, and as a product, therefore 
the result of some process which has produced 
it. Hegel's position is that in all immediate 
knowledge the elements which are immediate 
have behind them somewhere a process, and by 
that process they are mediated. For instance, 
a seed is an immediate existence as regards the 
flower and fruit which may spring from it. As 
we hold the seed in our hand, we have no hesi- 
tancy in calling it a finished and complete thing 
in itself. The flower and fruit, however, are 
mediated by the processes which are started by 
the vital force latent in the seed. And yet 
from a similar point of view, the seed itself 
may be regarded as a product resulting from a 



THE THEOKY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE 63 

process by which it has been mediated, and 
comes to be what it is in its seemingly complete 
and independent state. We may further illus- 
trate the Hegelian idea of mediation by the 
knowledge which we may have of a book whose 
title, author, and general point of view we know 
only by common report, but we ourselves have 
never read the book itself. Such knowledge 
Hegel would call immediate in a general and 
abstract sense, and that kind of immediate 
knowledge would have no special significance 
or value. However, after reading the book and 
marking the relation of step to step in the grad- 
ual unfolding of the author's conception, and 
the bearing of each part to the whole as it 
finally reaches its complete expression, we find 
that our knowledge has grown in definiteness 
and consequent value through this process which 
is one of mediation. And then also the book 
as a whole will be found to leave upon our 
mind a certain final impression as a summary 
of its total significance, which in turn we 
would call immediate knowledge ; for in the 
course of time the various steps of the process 
of mediation become merged in the very result 
of the process itself, and we come to retain in 
consciousness only the finished product as B 



64 INTRODUCTION 

whole. Such immediate knowledge, however, 
which is the result of a mediating process, is 
vastly different from the vague and indefinite 
knowledge which goes before and is indepen- 
dent of all mediation whatsoever. This distinc- 
tion gives a deep insight into the Hegelian 
method and general point of view. 

So also religion and morals contain, of course, 
as their most marked characteristics, the ele- 
ments of faith, or immediate knowledge, and 
yet from another point of view they must be 
regarded as conditioned on every side by the 
mediating processes of development, education, 
and the formation of character. Hegel holds 
that everything from one point of view is imme- 
diate, but from another point of view is to be 
regarded as mediated. The relation between 
mediation and immediacy is one of the keys 
to a thorough understanding of the Hegelian 
system. It need be only referred to here in 
passing by way of anticipation, inasmuch as this 
relation is developed at length in the second 
part of the Logic. His doctrine of essential 
being as there expressed is made to rest upon 
the unity which underlies the seeming antithesis 
of mediation and immediacy. 

Hegel further criticises the theory of immedi- 



THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE 65 

ate knowledge on the ground that the criterion 
of truth is found not in the character of that 
which purports to be true, but in the bare fact 
that it has found a place in consciousness. 
This makes subjective knowledge the sole basis 
of truth. Whatever is discovered as a fact in 
the individual consciousness is thereby declared 
to be a fact evidenced by the consciousness of 
all, and to be regarded even as the very essence 
of thought itself. This, however, does not neces- 
sarily follow ; and if granted, it proves too much, 
for as a result of such an argument there may 
be found as valid a warrant for the superstitions 
of savage peoples as for the doctrines of the 
Christian religion. As Hegel remarks, "It is 
because he simply believes in them and not 
from any process of reasoning or argument that 
the Indian finds God in the cow, the monkey, 
the Brahmin, or the Lama." * 

It must also be acknowledged that the im- 
mediate knowledge of God merely tells us that 
He is. Thus the idea of God as an object of 
religion is narrowed down to an indefinite, 
vague, supersensible being devoid of all posi- 
tive attributes. From this point of view He 
must ever remain the Unknown God. Such 
i Hegel's Werke, VI, § 72. 



66 INTRODUCTION 

an idea of God is upon the same level as Her- 
bert Spencer's characterization of God as " the 
Unknowable." 

Moreover, the abstract thought of the meta- 
physician and the abstract intuition are one and 
the same thing. From either point of view, 
God is conceived as a being vaguely indefinite 
and undetermined. To call God a spirit and to 
say that we know Him as a spirit immediately, 
Hegel insists, is only an empty phrase ; for the 
consciousness, or better the self-consciousness, 
which the idea of spirit implies, w r ould neces- 
sarily render that idea more specific and defi- 
nite by analyzing it in such a way as to 
show the various elements which constitute 
its essence and by separating it from all else 
that might be confused with it. But such 
an act of thought is itself a process of media- 
tion. Thus all strictly immediate knowledge 
is vague and indefinite, and the very act of 
making it definite and distinct necessitates the 
subjecting of its immediacy to a process of 
mediation. Without such a process all knowl- 
edge is both unscientific and unphilosophical. 

The results which have been reached through 
Hegel's criticism of the various attitudes of 



THE THEORY OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE 67 

thought to the objective world may be briefly 
summarized as follows : — 

The metaphysician has his abstract forms of 
thought, but they prove to be empty. 

The empiricist has a vast wealth of material 
but no thought forms in which to express the 
same. 

The critical philosopher has his thought 
forms, but that which seems to be the material 
at hand ready for the casting, proves, upon in- 
vestigation, to be shadowy and unsubstantial. 

The intuitionist possesses thought forms but 
they lack any distinctive pattern ; and therefore 
whatever may be the material which is run into 
them, the casting which results is always the 
same, possessing no specific characteristics and 
therefore without significance or value. 

The evident defects of these various types of 
philosophy Hegel seeks to obviate by uniting 
into one system the partial truths which they 
severally contain. By what method this is 
attempted and with what success it is attended, 
we shall hope to see in the detailed exposition 
of the Logic, — the task which lies immediately 
before us. 



CHAPTER VI 

A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 

THE Logic is divided into three parts : — 
I. The Doctrine of Being. (Die Lehre 
vom Seyn.*) 

II. The Doctrine of Essence. (Die Lehre 
vom Wesen.*) 

III. The Doctrine of the Notion. (Die 
Lehre vom Begriff.^) 

These divisions represent the successive stages 
in the progressive unfolding of our knowledge 
through which the various processes of thought 
come to their complete and final expression. 
They are to be regarded as successive stages 
only in the sense that by our analysis we sepa- 
rate them in our thoughts, and think of one as 
following the other. But in reality we should 
conceive of these elements of knowledge in such 
a manner as to regard one as lying within the 
other, and this in turn within the third. The 
progress indicated in their development is one 
not of advance so much as a deepening insight 

68 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 69 

into more and more fundamental attributes and 
relations. 

The doctrine of being is the result of an 
answer to the question as to what a thing is. 

The doctrine of essence, in answer to the 
question of what is it composed and hy what 
is it constituted. 

The doctrine of the notion, in answer to the 
question, to what end is it designed and is it 
capable of progressing. 

The complete knowledge of a thing, therefore, 
embraces the categories of its being, the ground 
of its being, and the purpose of its being. 

It will be readily seen that the first category 
involves the second, in order to complete its 
meaning, and that the second involves the third 
in a like manner, and that the third underlies 
the other two. For the being of a thing 
becomes definitely known to us only when 
we are able to refer it to its appropriate ground, 
and when we possess some insight as to whence 
it came and by what processes its being is main- 
tained and perfected ; also the ground of its 
being finds its full significance only in the con- 
sideration of the end which it is realizing and 
which its being subserves. Thus, the question 
what implies the question whence; and the ques- 



70 INTRODUCTION 

tion whence leads irresistibly to the question 
whither. 

We may call the category of being the logic 
of description ; that of essence, the logic of 
explanation; that of the notion, the logic of 
the final cause. 

The first category, that of being, represents 
knowledge when reduced to its simplest terms. 
The affirmation of all others that possesses the 
least significance is that merely of being pure 
and simple when it stands without further quali- 
fication or specification, so that were anything 
less asserted of an object, knowledge would be 
reduced to zero. 

There are certain terms by which Hegel is 
wont to characterize being, and an understand- 
ing of which will give us an insight into the 
meaning of the doctrine of being and at the 
same time prepare us for the appreciation of 
the fundamental distinction which he draws 
between being and essence. Being, for instance, 
is referred to by Hegel variously as abstract, as 
identity, as absolute identity ; again as abstract 
identity, as immediate, as undetermined, and as 
being in itself {an sich). 

By " abstract " is meant that which is partial 
and incomplete. The category of being is always 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 71 

spoken of as abstract, representing as it does 
the first rough draft of knowledge, and neces- 
sarily marking the beginning of that which as 
yet is incomplete and undeveloped. 

The term " identity " as applied to being means 
a uniform sameness or homogeneity, which shows 
no distinction of parts or diversity of elements 
within itself, and which sustains no relations, 
as far as known, to anything beyond itself. It 
is, therefore, a term used to imply that mere 
being as regards any definite characteristics or 
qualities which it may possess is colorless, and 
as regards any relations which it may sustain 
to other things, is completely isolated. 

The phrase "absolute identity" is only an 
emphatic expression for the term " identity," 
and is equivalent to the phrase " mere identity " 
or mere " sameness." 

The phrase " abstract identity" is a combina- 
tion of the two ideas, abstract and identity. It 
is equivalent to the phrase " an incomplete and 
colorless view of things." 

The term " immediate," as we have already 
seen, when applied to knowledge, signifies that 
which is given as a totality, without any reference 
to the elements which constitute it, or to the 
processes by which it is produced. Immediate 



72 INTRODUCTION 

knowledge is that which is not subjected to any 
analysis whatsoever, and such is the nature of 
mere being. 

The word " undetermined " signifies the lack 
of any definite qualities or attributes, and has the 
force of the adjective " indefinite " when applied 
to being. 

The phrase " in itself " (an sicTi) means that 
which is implicit or potential; it is used in 
distinction to the phrase " of itself " (fiir sicTi) 
which signifies that which is explicit. While 
the former applies to being, the latter applies 
to essence, indicating that the one is explicitly 
what the other is implicitly. Thus, being is to 
be regarded merely as a transition state of 
knowledge, the veriest beginning of knowledge 
in fact, inasmuch as that which may become 
definite and determined as essential being, is 
still indefinite and undetermined as mere being. 
It, however, does contain the potential of all 
that appears explicitly in essence. 

We come now to consider the chief char- 
acteristics of essence in contrast to those of 
being. The essence is the result of a deeper 
insight than is represented by mere being. The 
essence of a thing is what it is, regarded no 
longer as an isolated fact, but as a part of a 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 73 

system of interrelated elements. The idea of 
system is closely associated with a technical 
term which Hegel uses constantly in connection 
with the category of essence ; it is the word 
" reflection." The essence of a thing is revealed 
only when we see the thing in its complete 
setting, and when we possess a thorough knowl- 
edge of the relations which it sustains to every 
part of the system to which it may be referred. 
The thing, therefore, does not shine in its own 
light so much as in the light reflected from all 
the coordinate elements with which it is related. 
We know a thing only when it is in the focal 
point of the illumination due to its complete 
setting. It is in this sense that Hegel says 
that the essence of a thing is known by means 
of the category of reflection. 

Moreover, in order to understand fully the es- 
sence of a thing we must analyze the total mass 
of surface appearances, and disclose the underly- 
ing elements and processes which have given rise 
to its being. As mere being, the thing appears as 
an unanalyzed whole, a simple product without 
any reference to the processes which have pro- 
duced it. In this analysis into constituent ele- 
ments and formative processes we employ in 
our thought the category of mediation. Media- 



74 INTRODUCTION 

tion is the process by which a thing comes to 
be what it is as regards its inherent nature and 
essential characteristics ; it emphasizes especially 
the means by which the end in question is 
attained. 

Again, while being is always referred to as 
indefinite and undetermined, essence, on the 
contrary, is being which has become definite 
and determined. The definiteness which is char- 
acteristic of essence is reached through a process 
called negation. To make definite, means to 
mark off distinct limits, beyond which the thing 
in question ceases to be what it is. The process 
of negation is therefore the setting up of bounds 
about a thing, forming an enclosing line which 
we may call the line of negation, as beyond that 
line there is nothing which can be regarded as 
properly belonging to the essence of the thing 
which is thus limited. Mere being, as we have 
seen, is homogeneous throughout, lacking all 
characteristic color and determination, and this 
defect of being is obviated by disclosing its 
various parts and their reciprocal relations. 
But in doing this the several parts must be 
distinguished one from another, and the accom- 
plishment of this is one of the functions of the 
process of negation. Negation, therefore, may 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 75 

be defined as the process of revealing the specific 
differences between things, or between the sev- 
eral elements and functions of one and the same 
thing. It is, in a sense, a twofold process, — the 
discrimination of a thing from all that is external 
to it, and also the analysis of a thing into its 
component elements and functions. It is a term, 
as used by Hegel, which is equivalent to the term 
" differentiation," which has entered so largely 
into the terminology of biological investigation 
and theory. The differentiation, for instance, of 
an egg in the process of development is the break- 
ing up of its initial homogeneity, which we 
might call its mere being, into the related parts 
revealed in the living organism of the bird 
newly hatched. It is in this differentiation that 
the essential nature of the bird is fully disclosed. 
The Hegelian idea of negation is embodied in 
the dictum of Spinoza: Omnis determinatio est 
negatio, that is, we determine the characteristic 
and essential feature of a thing by a sharp dis- 
tinction between that which it is and that which 
it is not. When no line of distinction is drawn, 
knowledge is a blur. It is without definition ; 
just as we say a photographic plate is without 
definition when we mean that the lines are not 
clear and clean-cut. 



76 INTRODUCTION 

As essence may be regarded as the develop- 
ment and completion of the category of being, 
in like manner the category of the notion is the 
development and completion of that of essence. 
Each stage marks a deeper penetration, and a 
progress towards the fulness of knowledge. 
If we inquire as to the nature of the process 
which necessarily underlies anything regarded 
merely as a product, we have raised the ques- 
tion as to its essence; and if then we probe 
deeper and inquire as to the thought which has 
devised the process, and is at the same time 
both the dynamic source of the process itself 
and its complete realization as well, we have 
raised the question as to its notion, — that is, 
creative and sustaining reason. The notion, 
therefore, embraces the truth, both of being and 
of essenpe. 

It has been before remarked that the cate- 
gory of being represents immediate knowl- 
edge, — that is, the acceptance of an object of 
knowledge as a fact merely while yet unana- 
lyzed and unexplained ; and that the category of 
essence represents mediated knowledge, — that 
is, knowledge analyzed and explained. The cate- 
gory of the notion, therefore, may be regarded 
as the combination of these two kinds of 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 77 

knowledge. It embraces immediate knowledge 
in the sense of comprehending, from the begin- 
ning, the end to be realized as a finished prod- 
uct ; it is mediated knowledge as well, in the 
sense of its being the knowledge of the process, 
which is necessary in order to realize the end in 
question. It possesses at the same time the 
capacity of originating and directing that 
process. 

Moreover, being has been represented as 
knowledge which is indefinite and undeter- 
mined, and essence as knowledge definite and 
determined; the notion, therefore, in this con- 
nection may be defined as the principle of 
reason which has the capacity of determining 
itself, — that is, of transforming the indefinite 
and undetermined into the definite and deter- 
mined, by its own inherent self-activity. 

Again, being has been represented as homo- 
geneous, without any differentiation of its parts, 
and essence as the breaking up this dull level of 
sameness into distinct parts ; the notion, there- 
fore, may be regarded as the capacity for self- 
differentiation or self-specification. 

As being is the potential, and essence the 
actual, the notion may be regarded as the ca- 
pacity for effecting the transition from the 



78 INTRODUCTION 

potential to the actual, or the capacity of self- 
realization. 

These ideas of self-realization, self-determi- 
nation, and self-specification, characterize the 
notion under the several aspects of develop- 
ment, freedom, and individuality. Such a prin- 
ciple as this, which is able freely to realize its 
own ends, is, according to Hegel, to be consid- 
ered not so much in the light of a substance, 
underlying and constituting the essential being 
of all things, as a subject, because every manifes- 
tation of which it is the ground is a self-manifes- 
tation. The first and second parts of the logic, 
the doctrines of being ^nd of eSspn.ce, Hegel char- 
acterizes as objective, and the third, tfie ddctrrne. v 
of the notion, as subjective. Being and essence 
represent the manifestation in the world of 
reality, the notion represents bpth the basis of 
that manifestation and the ekd of it as well. 

It will be seen that the Hegelian system, as a 
whole, represents a progressive evolution, and 
it is of some interest to note that as a process 
of evolution it is characterized by Hegel in 
almost the same terms as Mr. Spencer employs 
in his well-known definition of biological evolu- 
tion. " Evolution," says he, " is a change from an 
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 79 

coherent heterogeneity, through successive dif- 
ferentiations and integrations. " 

The change which is indicated by the Spen. 
cerian definition occurs between two states of an 
organism; the first corresponds to that of mere 
being, the second to that of essence. The same 
terms, "indefinite" and "incoherent," are used 
by Hegel to characterize the state of mere being. 
The term " homogeneity " has a significance simi- 
lar to the Hegelian phrase of abstract identity, 
that is, without distinction and characterization 
of its parts. So also the opposite terms " defi- 
nite" and "coherent" permit of an exact ap- 
plication to the state of essence. The term 
" heterogeneity " indicates, moreover, the state in 
which the initial sameness has been resolved into 
separate elements possessing distinctive charac- 
teristics, and may in all propriety be applied to 
the Hegelian conception of essence. The transi- 
tion from the one state to the other is regarded 
by Spencer as a process which is mediated 
through successive differentiations and inte- 
grations. " Differentiation " corresponds to the 
process of mediation by negation in the Hegelian 
terminology, and "integration" to the synthesis 
which is the resulting product of such a process. 
As every integration, according to Spencer, 



80 INTRODUCTION 

implies a previous differentiation, so according 
to Hegel every so-called immediate element of 
knowledge must be regarded as a product 
implying a previous mediation or process which 
has produced it. Or, to use another character- 
istic phrase of Hegel's, while the Spencerian idea 
of differentiation corresponds to the process of 
negation, integration may be regarded as corre- 
sponding to the process which Hegel calls abso- 
lute negation, — that is, the negation of a former 
negation, which produces the effect of a new 
synthesis or affirmation. 

There is, however, a marked point of depar- 
ture in reference to the Hegelian conception of 
evolution in contrast to that of Mr. Spencer. 
The latter's definition contains nothing which 
corresponds to the Hegelian category of the 
notion. As to what may underlie the series of 
never ceasing changes, as to the origin of the 
series itself and its final consummation, there 
is in the philosophy of Mr. Spencer only the 
great Unknowable. Here, Mr. Spencer would 
insist, is reason's barrier ; beyond lies the region 
of conjecture, of sentiment, and of hope but not 
of knowledge. To an agnostic position such 
as this, Hegel would enter a vigorous protest, 
and would urge that, given being and essence, 



A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LOGIC 81 

the thing and its historical evolution, forming 
a part of the cosmic series of progressive 
development, the thought is then necessarily 
constrained to postulate a constructive and 
determining principle of reason, as the intelli- 
gent source and end of it all. Hegel maintains, 
moreover, that this principle of reason which is 
sufficient to account for the cosmic evolution 
from the beginning to the end, which is a self- 
contained, free activity, creating and sustaining 
all things within its power, its wisdom and its 
goodness, can be no other than that which is 
the Absolute, which is God. When Hegel 
takes the position, as we have already noticed, 
that the underlying ground of all things must 
be regarded as a subject rather than a sub- 
stance, thence the transition to the identifica- 
tion of this subject with the Absolute or God 
seems a most natural one. And it will be seen 
as we advance in the further exposition of the 
Logic that the momentum of the entire dialecti- 
cal movement renders such a conclusion neces- 
sary. 



PAET I 
THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 



Das Seyn ist nicht zu empftnden, niclit anzu- 
schauen und niclit vorzustellen, sondern es ist der 
reine Gedanke und als solcher macht es den Anfang. 
— Hegel. 



PART I 
THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

CHAPTER VII 

QUALITY 

HEGEL discusses the doctrine of being 
(Die Lehre vom Seyri) under its three 
aspects of quality, quantity, and measure. 
Before entering upon the exposition of the 
Hegelian conception of quality, it would be 
well to examine somewhat more in detail the 
general doctrine of being. Such an under- 
taking will serve at the same time as an 
introduction to his more specific teaching con- 
cerning the quality of being. 

If we are agreed to regard knowledge as 
an evolution, then the beginnings of that ev- 
olution must represent the minimum of knowl- 
edge. Such a beginning is found in the 
category of being. In ascribing to an object 
mere being without any further characteriza- 
tion, we render our assertion as indefinite as 

85 



86 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

it can well be made. The knowledge which 
ranges upon so low a level is equivalent to 
no knowledge at all, or as Hegel tersely puts 
it, "Being is the same as non-being." The 
identification of being and non-being when 
thrust upon us as a bare statement and with- 
out commentary upon it, not only startles us 
but also arouses a very natural feeling of 
protest, and perhaps of indignation. We say 
to ourselves "Is Hegel a mere juggler with 
words? Is it possible that behind this abrupt 
formula he is secretly laughing at us, and 
that his whole system is merely a keen satire 
upon the limitations of the powers of reason?" 
So it would seem, at least after a rapid and 
superficial glance at such a proposition. But 
when we come to analyze the statement that 
being and non-being are the same, we find 
that it is only an epigrammatic expression of 
that which we have always believed most 
thoroughly ; for we are accustomed to say 
that any statement which is indefinite and 
non-committal is of no value or significance 
as knowledge. If it should be put to us in 
the form of a promise, it would carry with 
it no weight of assurance that the promise 
would ever be fulfilled. For us it would 



QUALITY 87 

amount to nothing. This is expressed in the 
proverb : " Some time is no time." We see, then, 
that Hegel's identification of being and non- 
being is equivalent to the statement that 
whatever is presented to us as wholly in- 
definite, ranks in reference to its worth as 
knowledge as though it were not. If it is 
put in this way, the Hegelian epigram wins our 
assent immediately. The critics of Hegel have 
sought to entrap him by asking the ques- 
tion, "Do you mean to tell us that a house 
is the same as no house? that a man is the 
same as no man? that a God is the same as 
no God?" Such questions indicate a radical 
misunderstanding of Hegel's conception of the 
relation of being to non-being. For in the 
examples cited, the house, man, God, we have 
something more in each case than mere be- 
ing; we have being which has already been 
rendered definite and explicit, and possesses 
the whole concrete content which these terms 
severally connote. These cases, therefore, fall 
wholly outside of the sphere of mere being, 
and hence are irrelevant to the point which 
has been raised. What Hegel affirms is this : 
that being, mere being, without any character- 
ization whatsoever, absolutely indefinite and 



88 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

undetermined as regards its essential qualities, 
— that such being is as nothing. 

But while being, from one point of view as 
abstract being, is the same as non-being, from 
another point of view, however, it is quite 
different from non-being. For being in the 
Hegelian system is regarded as the first term 
in a series of development. It marks a be- 
ginning, therefore, and while it is so far 
nothing explicitly (filr sicK), still it must be 
regarded as something implicitly (an sicK), — 
that is, it must contain the potentiality of some- 
thing which is to appear later on in the actual 
development. In it must be the " promise and 
potency " of all that is to follow throughout 
the subsequent stages of its evolution. It 
would be a correct statement to assert con- 
cerning a stone placed upon a parapet at the 
top of a house : " This stone is at rest. It 
has no motion." And yet if it should be 
pushed away from its support, it would fall 
to the ground below, because of the gravity 
potential which it possessed by virtue of its 
position alone. And so it would be correct 
to state of it in the first instance that it is 
both at rest and, nevertheless, potentially at 
least, possesses motion. The motion is not 



QUALITY 89 

actual, it is true, but it is potential, and so far 
forth its motion is real in a very true sense. 
If being is to be regarded, then, as the initial 
term in a series of development, we must 
think of it as embodying a high potential in 
reference to its latent qualities. 

Suppose, therefore, that the being which we 
have conceived as the starting-point in this evo- 
lution begins to develop its potential qualities 
into actual. We will find that whatever has 
been indefinite now tends to become more and 
more definite, and whatever has been undeter- 
mined will now grow more and more deter- 
mined, as the process advances. The very 
idea of development itself implies that each 
succeeding stage of the series is a manifestation 
of something which in the preceding stage had 
as yet no actual being. It is in this sense that 
Hegel affirms that becoming (Werden) is the 
unity of being and non-being, — that is, a 
transition from that which is not to that 
which is. 

Let us suppose, for instance, that there is an 
object barely discernible in the twilight. Our 
knowledge of it is completely exhausted by the 
bare statement that something is there. What 
its nature may be more specifically, its charac- 



90 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

teristics, as to form, color, and the like, — what 
it is in fact, that is unknown ; it is nothing. 

But while it is so indefinite as far as our 
knowledge of its true nature is concerned that 
we correctly designate it as nothing, neverthe- 
less, it contains at the same time the poten- 
tiality of something which under proper 
circumstances may be revealed. And so we 
may imagine that the light gradually grows 
brighter, penetrating the darkness which sur- 
rounds it ; and with the growing illumination 
the object becomes clearer, and all that a mo- 
ment before was indefinite and unknown 
becomes definite and known. Such a process 
is one of becoming, and it consists of a transi- 
tion from the unknown to the known, a revela- 
tion of all hidden qualities; and this process 
may be appropriately characterized as the unity 
or the uniting of that which is not to that which 
is, or as Hegel puts it, the unity of non-being 
and being. 

Hegel maintains that his system of thought- 
evolution brings together in one all the differ- 
ent phases of philosophical speculation which 
in turn have emphasized exclusively some one 
stage of the total process of development, and 
which have overlooked the relation of each par- 



QUALITY 91 

tial point of view to the whole. In a similar 
manner, for instance, several persons might 
describe a plant, one by referring to the kind 
of seed from which it sprang, another by draw- 
ing attention to its blossom, or another, to its 
fruit, and still another, to its possible use for 
medicinal purposes. Each would represent a 
stage in the complete process of its growth. 
Each is partial, and all should be brought to- 
gether in order to form one complete descrip- 
tion. Thus, in the system of Parmenides the 
idea of being was regarded apart from its rela- 
tion to non-being and becoming. The conse- 
quence was that his system represented the 
world as consisting of rigidly unalterable ele- 
ments, mere products ready made and un- 
changing, from which the idea of any process 
whatsoever was completely excluded. Heracli- 
tus, on the other hand, held that the truth of 
being consisted of a perpetual becoming, irdvra 
pel, he said, — all things flow. Thus the cate- 
gory of becoming in his system excludes all 
others. Heraclitus, however, marks an advance 
upon Parmenides, inasmuch as his idea of be- 
coming carries with it also the implication of 
being, so that while he destro} r s the being of 
Parmenides with one hand, he restores it with 



92 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

the other, regarding it as an essential factor 
in the process of becoming. It is of interest 
to note that this historical difference of opinion 
has followed, as it were, the lines of a dialec- 
tic movement, inasmuch as the seemingly con- 
tradictory positions from one point of view 
are brought together in a higher unity, and 
from a more comprehensive point of view, as 
the being of Parmenides is absorbed in the 
becoming of Heraclitus. Hegel's dialectic, as 
he himself claims, is only a following of the 
lines of development which philosophical thought, 
as a whole, has described in its path of progress. 
The process of becoming, moreover, in any 
concrete instance, must result in some defi- 
nite product. The process of becoming Hegel 
likens to a fire which is constantly consuming 
its material, and yet, nevertheless, does not 
leave an empty nothing as a result. That 
which is destroyed in one form is conserved in 
another. The result which is attained by the 
process of becoming Hegel calls Daseyn, — that 
is, being which has been rendered definite 
through the manifestation of its characteristic 
qualities. The term Daseyn has the force of the 
phrase "definite being," and may be so trans- 
lated. 



QUALITY 93 

That which renders being definite is its quality 
(die Qualitat). It is that which constitutes it 
what it is. Modify its quality, and being itself 
is likewise modified. It is Hegel's plan to dis- 
cuss the bare idea of quality in general and not 
to enter upon the discussion of the nature of 
any specific qualities in particular. The ques- 
tion which he puts is this, " What do we under- 
stand by the idea of the quality of a thing in 
respect to its most general aspects ? " 

He, at the outset, draws a distinction between 
the categories of quality and of quantity (die 
Quantitat). Quality may be defined as the 
internal determining factor of being ; and quan- 
tity as the external determining factor. Any 
variation in that which makes being what it is 
will, of course, affect the nature of being itself ; 
but a variation may occur in that which deter- 
mines how much or how little of the being in 
question may be taken, and yet this need not 
necessarily affect the nature of that being itself. 
A drop in the ocean does not differ in quality 
from the entire body of which it is but an in- 
finitesimal portion. It is obvious that being 
and its quality are identical, when we seek 
illustrations in the sphere of nature. It is not 
so obvious when we seek them in the sphere of 



94 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

mind. The various mental functions, for 
instance, cannot be so accurately described as 
consisting of certain definite and invariable 
qualities. The very complexity of the phe- 
nomena of mind render their simplification 
by means of definite qualities a more difficult 
if not an impossible task. There is, for exam- 
ple, no specific memory or volitional quality 
attaching to consciousness as such. 

The category of quality is to be regarded 
as having a positive and a negative aspect. 
Positively, the quality of a definitely determined 
being constitutes its reality, — it makes it what 
it is. Negatively, the quality of being is deter- 
mined by a certain natural limit beyond which, 
if we proceed in thought, there is immediately 
a marked change in quality and consequently 
in the very nature of being itself. There are, 
however, two kinds of limit (die Grranze), — a 
qualitative and a quantitative limit. Of course 
the reference in this connection is to the quali- 
tative limit; the qualitative is essentially a 
limit as to kind, and its bounds mark a definite 
change of kind. The quantitative, on the other 
hand, is naturally a limit as to magnitude, and 
marks a purely quantitative change. In the 
purely qualitative limit we have a form of 



QUALITY 95 

negative determination, in the sense that if its 
bound is transcended, the being in question 
suffers a radical change in its nature. Such 
a limit is, therefore, the determining point of 
being. To understand the nature of the being 
which we have in any particular instance, we 
must know, not only in a general way what 
kind of being it is, but we must know definitely 
at just what point a variation in its quality 
will subject it to a complete transformation into 
some other kind of being altogether. Hegel 
wishes to emphasize especially the thought that 
the very idea of a limit signifies that it marks 
a line of boundary between two kinds of being. 
It is impossible to conceive of a limit which 
would be the boundary of only one thing, for 
while it bounds one, it separates at the same 
time from something else. Therefore, every 
determinate being necessarily implies that some- 
thing lies beyond its limit; this something 
Hegel calls its other. This conception of an 
other (ein Anderes), the obverse face, as it were, 
of every definite being, plays a very conspicuous 
and significant r61e in the Hegelian system. 
The other which stands over against every 
definite being is not any other thing whatso- 
ever which happens to lie outside the sphere 



96 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

of the definite being in question; but it must 
be that particular other which is, as it were, its 
next of kin. It would be incorrect to regard 
a triangle and a horse as an example of a cer- 
tain definite being and its other. The other is 
that which not only lies outside of the sphere 
of some definite being, but at the same time it 
must lie within the boundaries of some com- 
mon system to which both may be referred. 
For instance, a true example of an other in 
the Hegelian sense, would be that of the ellipse, 
which is naturally related to the circle as its 
other. The cultivated fruit which grows on 
a branch grafted upon a wild stock would be 
regarded as the other in reference to the main 
tree. 

As Hegel puts it, every definite being in 
the process of development has a certain mean- 
ing an sich, — that is, considered merely within 
its own sphere ; but this meaning is always par- 
tial because undeveloped, and for its completion 
necessitates a consideration of the nature of 
the limit, and this in turn can be known only 
as we pass over into the adjacent sphere of its 
other. The full meaning, therefore, of any 
definite being can be grasped only when we 
consider it not merely an sich but also filr 



QUALITY 97 

Anderes as well, — that is, in reference to its 
corresponding other. 

This conception lies at the basis of the idea 
of evolution, which is a continuous change in 
such a manner that every advancing stage is 
the necessary other of that which immediately 
precedes it. As the great cosmic system is one 
of evolution, every determinate being in it must 
show inherently this tendency to a continuous 
alteration (die Veranderlichkeit) a passing over 
into its other. But when we pass from any 
definite being to its other, this other, itself pos- 
sessing definite being, must also have its other 
to complete its meaning, and so on without 
limit. We thus find ourselves launched upon 
an infinite series that can never be satisfactory, 
because never complete. It is an endless pro- 
gression, and can only bring weariness unutter- 
able to the mind which attempts to follow it. 
Such an idea of an infinite series, Hegel styles a 
false or negative infinity (die schlechte oder 
negative Unendlichkeif) . It represents merely 
a tedious multiplication of finite terms in a 
never ending process. The finite, according to 
Hegel, may be defined as that which contains 
within itself its own contradiction. Its very 
incompleteness is the cause of its breaking down 



98 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

of its own weight. As Hegel characteristically 
describes it, it negatives itself. It needs always 
to be referred to some other being as its cause 
and explanation, its necessary other. But such 
a process is without limit, as we have seen. 
Hegel's idea of the true infinite is that, in spite 
of this indefinitely continued process of referring 
on and on always to some other beyond, there is 
at each stage of such a process an intimation 
that the underlying ground not only of the 
particular stage of the process in question, but 
of the entire evolution itself of which it is but 
a very small phase, rests upon some absolute 
basis. Therefore, every cross-section, as it were, 
of the continuous process of development is to 
be regarded as a manifestation of the eternal 
reason, of the Absolute, of God. This is in full 
accord with Hegel's fundamental principle of 
absolute idealism. In every change, therefore, 
from any imperfectly determined being to some 
other there is nevertheless a something which 
remains unalterable, which when it passes over 
into its other is still itself. This Hegel calls Fiir~ 
sichseyn, or being for itself, — that is, a concep- 
tion of being as possessing a certain constant 
core of self-identity in the midst of all variation, 
and which preserves its own integrity as definite 



QUALITY 99 

being in spite of all modifying forces to which 
it may be subjected. This essentially perma- 
nent element in being partakes, according to 
Hegel, of the nature of the Absolute, and en- 
closes within its finite appearance a spark of 
divinity. It is the true infinity (die wahrhafte 
Unendlickkeit). 

Inasmuch, therefore, as the quality of any 
definite being is determined by a process of 
negation which assigns to it a definite limit, 
when we conceive of being in its developed 
form of being-for-self, we must regard this limit 
as in a certain sense obliterated, because the 
being thus conceived and its other fall together 
within one and the same sphere of common 
reference. This obliteration of a limit or 
boundary line is a process of negation ; but 
the fixing of the limit in the former process is 
also a negation. The obliteration of the limit 
is therefore to be regarded as the negation of a 
negation, or, as Hegel calls it, an absolute nega- 
tion, and has, therefore, the force of an affirma- 
tion. Thus the seed develops the first shoots 
which appear above the ground, these change 
into the stalk and twigs, these put forth leaves, 
blossoms, and finally bear fruit. Each stage of 
the growth changes into its other, but they are 



100 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

all embraced in one ; for the various limits which 
mark the stages of transition disappear com- 
pletely in our thought of the plant as a whole, 
which perdures in its integrity throughout the 
whole process, even in the seed itself. The best 
illustration of the Hegelian significance of being- 
for-self is, however, not found in the sphere of 
plant life. It is found in the higher sphere of 
consciousness, in the nature of personality, of the 
Ego. The personality of selfhood remains un- 
changed amidst the innumerable alterations of 
its manifold activities, and so far forth partakes 
of the nature of that absolute permanency which 
is an essential attribute of the infinite. The 
idea of the Ego, of consciousness apart from its 
concrete manifestation in any particular individ- 
ual (the Kantian Bewusstseyn uberhaupf) may 
be regarded as the most comprehensive type of 
the Absolute. And every individual Ego must 
therefore partake of the nature of the Absolute 
whose image it bears, and in whom "it lives 
and moves and has its being." 

We find, moreover, in the category of being- 
for-self an intimation of ideality. Ideality, 
according to Hegel, is that elemental principle 
in all being which is dynamic and construc- 
tive, working out its ends from within. It is 



QUALITY 101 

the immanent reason within all being. It is 
the architectonic principle which is self-direct- 
ing and self-manifesting. As we have seen, 
determinate being is to be referred to the 
category of reality; but we are constrained to 
regard being-for-self under the category of 
ideality. The two are not contradictory, how- 
ever, for the category of ideality represents 
merely a deeper insight and implies the cate- 
gory of reality as its necessary correlate. 
Hegel draws attention to the fact that the 
term "reality" is one which is used in two 
senses. In one sense, as has already been pointed 
out, reality is conceived as identical with the 
positive side of determinate being, — that is, the 
manifestation of some definite quality which 
renders being what it is. Thus we speak of 
the reality of a plan or of a purpose, when it 
remains no longer merely an inner and subjec- 
tive thought, but has been realized in some 
definite form of actual being. The second 
sense in which the term reality is used, is to 
signify that anything is in a state completely 
conformable to its essential nature, or, as Hegel 
would put it, when it conforms completely to its 
notion or essential idea. For instance, when we 
say, "That is a real man," we mean by such a 



102 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

characterization that he is one who has perfectly 
realized the ideal of manhood. It is in this 
sense that Hegel insists that reality and ideality 
are to be regarded as inseparable correlates. 
The real, therefore, is the ideal, and the ideal 
is the real. 

Inasmuch as being-for-self and being-for-its- 
other are brought together by our thought 
through the underlying unity which embraces 
them both in one and the same system, — it may 
be, for instance, in one and the same organism, — 
we consequently may regard these two phases 
of being as constituting a closed sphere. While 
the unit thus formed is complex, it is neverthe- 
less to be regarded as one by itself, and separate 
from all others. To be for self, signifies to be 
some one individual thing or person. This 
marks the final stage in the development of the 
category of quality, and at the same time it 
suggests a natural transition to the category of 
quantity. For the very idea of anything which 
we can designate as one and individual implies 
that there must be others of the same kind. 
The idea of one necessitates the complementary 
idea of the many. The idea of one would be 
meaningless were it not for the suggested con- 
trast between the one and the many. 



QUALITY 103 

As now we can conceive of many ones grouped 
together, each one may be regarded as excluding 
every other one from itself, and a relation such 
as this is one of reciprocal repulsion. But at 
the same time it must not be overlooked that 
though in a sense reciprocally repelling, the 
many ones nevertheless are all of the same kind 
and consequently fall together in a single 
system. There must be consequently some 
bond of attraction which thus holds them 
together in an underlying unity. 

If, now, in this complex unity we emphasize 
the idea of the separate individuality of each of 
its elements, we bring to the fore the concept of 
repulsion (die Repulsion). If, however, we 
emphasize the fact that each one is grouped with 
many others of the same kind, then we give 
prominence to the concept of attraction (die 
Attraktion) which constitutes their common 
being. 

The concept of the reciprocal repulsion of the 
many is found in the ancient atomic philosophy. 
But there the common bond was regarded as 
that of chance. The falling into the same group 
of a number of atoms was considered to be wholly 
fortuitous. In the Hegelian system, on the 
contrary, the common bond which gives unity to 



104 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

each and every system of being, and also unites 
all systems ultimately into one, is that incarnate 
reason, the universal creator and organizer. 

If the one in any particular system of being 
is regarded as one merely of many where all are 
of the same kind, then the idea of quality 
becomes irrelevant, and may be regarded as sus- 
pended altogether. It is thus that the transition 
is made to the pure idea of quantity, in which 
the idea of the quality of a number of objects is 
wholly eliminated because reduced in every 
case to a dead level of identity. 

Hegel's development of being may be briefly 
summarized as consisting of three stages, and 
three corresponding processes. The three stages 
are : — 

1. Indeterminate being (Seyri). 

2. Determinate being (Daseyn). 

3. Being-for-self (^Fursichseyri). 

The three corresponding processes are : — 

1. Becoming (Werderi). 

2. Alteration (Veranderung^). 

3. Attraction and repulsion (Attraktion und 
Repulsion). 



CHAPTER VIII 

QUANTITY 

THE idea of quantity, as we have seen, is 
that aspect of mere being from which the 
idea of all quality has been eliminated. The 
category of quantity is described by Hegel from 
three points of view : — 

1. Quantity in general (die Quantitdf). 

2. Determinate quantity (das Quantum}. 

3. Degree (der Grrad). 

It will be seen in the following exposition 
that these three aspects of quantity correspond 
to the three general divisions of quality : — 

1. Being in general. 

2. Determinate being. 

3. Self-determined being. 

As regards quantity in general, it may be re- 
marked as a matter of terminology that Hegel 
applies the term magnitude (die Grrosse) to 
determinate quantity rather than to the general 
notion of quantity. Quantity in general, how- 
ever, may be considered apart from any refer- 

105 



106 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

ence to definite magnitude, just* as quality in 
general was considered apart from any reference 
to specific qualities. While quantity in general 
may be regarded by itself as an essential mo- 
ment in the evolution of the universal reason, it 
must not, however, be regarded as an exclusive 
category. Hegel has no sympathy with the 
tendency to reduce all phenomena of the uni- 
verse to a quantitative basis, including even the 
phenomena of mind. He insists that a purely 
mechanical view of the universe, which such a 
quantitative reduction of all things implies, is 
by no means a complete or comprehensive 
view. The mechanical view may seem to 
suffice in its application to the inorganic world, 
but it falls short of an adequate explanation 
when we come to the organic world, and espe- 
cially when we seek to explain the phenomena 
of free activity in the sphere of mind. 

Inasmuch as the category of quantity is to be 
regarded as a necessary evolution from the cate- 
gory of being, and also marks a definite charac- 
teristic of being, it may be regarded from this 
point of view, according to the general method 
of Hegel, as an attribute of the Aibeolute in one 
of its manifold phases of manifestation. To 
define the Absolute merely as quantity would 



QUANTITY 107 

represent, of course, a very one-sided and exceed- 
ingly limited conception ; but if, on the other 
hand, it were omitted altogether, the idea of the 
Absolute would prove wanting so far forth in an 
essential element of its characterization. 

When we come to a more specific inquiry as 
to the nature of our idea of quantity, we find 
that it may be conceived from two points of 
view. Quantity may be either continuous 
(kontinuirlicK) or discrete (diskret). If we re- 
gard quantity as an aggregate of many parts, — 
or, as it may be put, the one which is composed 
of the many, — and if, moreover, we emphasize 
the unity into which the many blend, then we 
have quantity represented as continuous. If, on 
the other hand, we discount, as it were, in our 
thought the connecting bond, and emphasize the 
isolation and reciprocal exclusiveness attaching 
to the several parts, then quantity will appear 
as discrete. A line may be taken as an example 
of continuous quantity. On the other hand, a 
bushel of apples would be considered as a dis- 
crete quantity. The terms, however, " continu- 
ous " and " discrete," are not mutually exclusive. 
Quite in keeping with the Hegelian point of 
view, either one of these terms apart from the 
other, and excluding the other, represents a 



108 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

mere abstraction, — that is, a partial and there- 
fore misleading conception. Truth is found 
always in the unity of the two. Every contin- 
uous quantity is in a sense discrete ; and in like 
manner every discrete quantity is continuous. 
A line may be regarded as discrete in the sense 
that it may be viewed as composed of an in- 
definite number of separate points, or divided 
into several distinct sections, each containing 
a definite number of centimetres or millimetres. 
And on the other hand, a bushel of apples may 
be regarded as a continuous quantity when, for 
instance, we compare the price of apples per 
bushel this year with that of last year. Here 
the unit which is emphasized is the bushel and 
not the single apple. The bushel regarded as a 
whole from this point of view represents there- 
fore a continuous quantity. The Kantian an- 
tinomy in reference to space and time, or the 
constitution of matter, may be resolved by an 
application of these considerations. The truth 
is, that regarded as continuous magnitudes they 
are indefinitely divisible, but regarded as discrete 
magnitudes they are not indefinitely divisible. 
The seeming contradiction arises from a differ- 
ence in point of view. 

When we come to the idea of definite quan- 



QUANTITY 109 

tity, or quantum, as Hegel styles it, we find that 
it is an idea which arises necessarily in answer 
to the question, How much ? It bears the same 
relation to quantity in general that definite 
being does to being in general. Every quan- 
tum, or definite magnitude, may be conceived, 
moreover, as composed of a number of parts 
which are themselves quanta of lesser magni- 
tude. Every definite magnitude, regarded as 
distinct from all others, forms a unity, a closed 
sphere, as it were, apart and by itself, but sub- 
jected to further analysis within its own limits ; 
it is a manifold made up of its constituent parts. 
From these considerations it will be seen that 
the idea of quantum involves that of number. 
For number may be regarded as a concept 
which comprehends the two momenta or factors 
which are found in the idea of quantum. These 
two factors are the idea of a sum or total, which 
corresponds to that of a discrete quantity, and 
the idea of unity, which corresponds to that of 
a continuous quantity. Out of the various com- 
binations and reciprocal relations of these two 
factors we may develop the various modes of 
reckoning which obtain in arithmetic. We 
may regard all arithmetical operations as based 
upon the principle of putting numbers in the 



110 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

relation of unity, and sum or total amount; 
and of establishing the equality of these two 
functions. 

Thus the simplest arithmetical operation is 
that of counting. This may be defined as a pro- 
cess which aims to construct an aggregate or sum 
total by putting together the separate units, one 
after another. In this operation each unit 
ranks the same in value as every other. There 
is no distinction of any kind between them. 
But it is possible to conceive each unit in 
question as possessing a value different from 
every other, — that is, each unit may be con- 
ceived as itself an aggregate or sum, possessing 
varying values, as 3, 7, 9, 4, etc. When we 
come to enumerate these sums in order to find 
the total value in simple units, we are perform- 
ing the operation of addition. 

In multiplication each unit is also an aggre- 
gate, but they are all alike and do not vary in 
value, whereas in addition they are ordinarily 
unlike. However, multiplication maybe repre- 
sented as a kind of addition. We may have the 
following aggregates to count : 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8 ; 
and we may do this by addition, regarding it 
merely as a special case in which the aggregates 
are all alike. Or we can obtain the result 



QUANTITY 111 

directly by taking eight seven times, which is 
the process of multiplication. In multiplication 
it is a matter of indifference as to which of the 
two factors we regard as the aggregate and 
which the unit. 

The process of raising a number to a power is 
a special case of multiplication. To raise any 
number to the second power, for instance, the 
aggregate is taken as many times as it itself 
contains simple units. Thus 8 2 is 8 times 8, — 
that is, 8 taken 8 times. In such a process 
there is represented the equality of sum total 
and unity. To raise a number to a higher 
power requires only a continued repetition of 
the process. 

Addition, multiplication, and the raising to a 
power give an exhaustive division of the vari- 
ous modes of arithmetical calculation. The 
three other processes of subtraction, division, 
and taking the root of a number do not repre- 
sent distinct types of arithmetical operations, 
but are to be regarded merely in the light of 
inverse operations respectively to addition, mul- 
tiplication, and the raising to a required power. 

As in reference to quantity in general we have 
found the distinction obtaining between con- 
tinuous and discrete magnitudes, so in reference 



112 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

to quantum or determinate quantity, there is a 
similar distinction expressed by the opposite 
terms of extensive and intensive quantity. 
Extensive magnitude corresponds to the idea of 
continuous quantity and intensive magnitude 
to that of discrete. This correspondence will 
be seen through the following considerations. 
Definite magnitude is such only as it possesses 
a definite quantitative limit. If the magnitude 
is regarded as a continuous quantity, then the 
limit is marked simply by the contour of the 
magnitude itself, — that is, its boundary line of 
definition. Moreover, from this point of view 
the separate identity of each part is lost because 
merged in the whole, which is one and not 
many, and all included within one and the same 
limit of circumscription. But if the magnitude 
is regarded as discrete, then any one of the 
distinct parts by its position may mark a defi- 
nite limit. Thus, when we take the temperature 
of any body, it is the limiting degree which is 
read off as significant. The quantity of heat 
which is thus measured is given in terms of 
intensity or degree (der Grad). 

In reference to the intensity of quantitative 
determination, the various discrete units may be 
regarded as arranged in order so as to form a 



QUANTITY 113 

series; they therefore do not all count alike. 
There will always be one which, by its position 
in the series, will mark the limit, and therefore 
have a particular significance attaching to it. 
And as such a series rises or falls, proceeds for- 
wards or backwards, as the case may be, the 
different units marking the varying limit in 
every case will indicate corresponding grades of 
intensity. 

As a continuous quantity may be regarded as 
discrete, so also an extensive magnitude may be 
conceived as intensive, and an intensive magni- 
tude as extensive. Thus, for instance, the 
intensity of heat may have an extensive signifi- 
cance as interpreted by the height of the column 
of mercury. This marks the extent which the 
mercury, as a whole, has risen in the tube. 
Hegel illustrates this feature of a change from 
an intensive to an extensive point of view as 
seen in the sphere of mind. He draws attention 
to the fact that a man who has accumulated a 
certain intensity of mental power is, at the same 
time, the man who touches life on many sides, 
so that his capacities have evidently an exten- 
sive manifestation as well. This application is 
somewhat fanciful, it would seem, and should 
be taken in a figurative rather than in a literal 



114 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

sense, which, however, Hegel himself evidently 
does not do. 

Hegel again enters a protest against those 
who would subordinate the idea of intensive 
magnitude to a mere form of extensive mag- 
nitude. He insists that while they are most 
intimately correlated in thought, nevertheless 
there is a real distinction between the two that 
should not be overlooked. The idea of intensity 
contains an element which is wholly lacking in 
the bare idea of extension. This, however, must 
not be interpreted as signifying that the idea of 
an intensive magnitude is wholly independent of 
that of extensive magnitude. The one, how- 
ever, must not be so merged in the other as to 
lose its individual characteristics completely. 

The very concept of quantity itself is such 
that the limit which is set to it so as to render 
its quantity a definite amount, or a definite 
degree of intensity according to the point of 
view, must be conceived as varying indefinitely 
without affecting the nature or quality of the 
magnitude in question. The limit which de- 
termines the amount or degree is purely an 
external determination, and the concept of quan- 
tity carries with it the idea of the possibility 
of pushing out and beyond itself indefinitely. 



QUANTITY 115 

There is no natural or necessary restriction 
upon a quantitative limit, and therefore the 
continuous breaking down in our thought of 
any assigned limit necessitates the conception 
of an infinite quantitative progression. In this 
connection Hegel quotes Zeno, who has put this 
idea in an enigmatical form : " It is the same 
to say a thing once, and to say it forever." 

Such an infinite series gives, however, a false 
idea of the true significance of infinity. It is 
false for the same reason that the qualitatively 
infinite progression is false, as we have already 
seen. It is what Spinoza calls the imaginary 
infinity. As an instance of this conception, 
Hegel quotes the lines of Haller 1 : — 

" Ich h'aufe ungeheure Zahlen 
Gebirge Millionen auf, 
Ich setze Zeit auf Zeit 
Und Welt auf Welt zu Hauf , 
Und weun ich vou der grausen Hob' 
Mit Schwindel wieder nach Dir sen', 
1st alle Macht der Zahl 
Vermehrt zu Tausendnial, 
Noch nicht ein Theil von Dir." 2 

1 Hegel's Werke, VI, § 104. 

2 I pile up numbers immense, mountains of millions. I 
add time to time, and world to world. And when I turn 
from the awful height with reeling brain and look towards 
Thee, all the power of number increased a thousand fold is 
not yet one part of Thee. 



116 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

In commenting upon this passage, Hegel 
remarks : " The same poet, however, well adds 
to that description of the false infinity the 
closing line 

i Ich zieh sie ab, und du liegest ganz vor mir.' x 

This means that the true infinite is not to be 
regarded merely as another world which tran- 
scends the finite ; and if we are ever to appreci- 
ate its significance, we must disabuse our minds 
of all notions of a progressus in infinitum. 2 

The doctrine of number, as is well known, 
was magnified by the ancient Pythagoreans into 
a complete system of philosophy. While in 
that school there was an undue exaggeration of 
the concept of number as expressing the essence 
of being, it must not be overlooked, however, 
that Pythagoras touched upon an important 
truth in his teaching when he insisted that 
there are certain states of things, certain phe- 
nomena of nature, the character of which seem 
to vary according to a scale of number relations. 
This may be illustrated in the variations in 
tone and harmony which, according to common 
tradition, first suggested to Pythagoras the con- 
ception of the essence of all things as number. 

1 These I sweep away, and Thou liest fully revealed be- 
fore me. 2 § 104. 



QUANTITY 117 

Hegel, according to his general method, adopts 
the teachings of this school not in the light of a 
complete system of philosophy, but merely as 
one phase among many in the development of 
the universal reason. The Pythagorean doc- 
trine corresponds roughly, at least, with Hegel's 
conception of quantitative relation, which idea 
marks a natural transition to the third division 
of quaStfty, known as measure. 

Quantitative relation (das quantitative Ver- 
hdltniss) may be defined as that relation which 
obtains between numbers of such a nature that 
the numbers themselves may vary indefinitely, 
provided only the relation itself remains con- 
stant. Thus the relation of 2 : 4 is the same as 
that of 3:6. In the midst, therefore, of vary- 
ing quantities, there is a constant which retains 
its own specific character through a process that 
may be indefinitely continued without limit. 
This idea of certain constant features in the 
midst of quantitative variation would seem to 
indicate that this constant value has the force 
of a qualitative character; for, as we have 
found, it is the quality which remains un- 
changed in the midst of quantitative altera- 
tion. Thus in pushing forward the concept of 
quantity in the development of all its possible 



118 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

implications, we find between coincident altera- 
tions in magnitudes which form a ratio a con- 
stant relation obtaining of such a nature that 
the concept of quantity will not explain it sat- 
isfactorily, and we fall back again upon the idea 
of quality in order to account for it. Thus the 
idea of quality was found to be partial, and when 
developed to its utmost limit, carried our thought 
over into the sphere of quantity. Then the idea 
of quantity when fully developed brought us 
back again to that of quality. Is the move- 
ment of thought only a circle that merely brings 
us back to the starting-point? According to 
Hegel's method, the incompleteness of thought 
at this stage is overcome by the dialectic process 
which combines these two ideas of quality and 
of quantity into one complete relation repre- 
senting an advanced and higher point of view. 
This relation Hegel calls that of qualitative 
quantity, or of measure (das Maass}. This is 
the third and last stage in the development of 
the idea of quantity, and represents, as Hegel 
insists, both the unity and the truth of quality 
and of quantity combined. 



CHAPTER IX 

MEASURE 

WE have seen how the category of being, 
when allowed to develop fully its own 
inherent nature, discloses the phases of quan- 
tity and of quality. There now remains to be 
considered the relation which obtains between 
quantity and quality, and which in itself con- 
stitutes a distinct category. It is an extremely 
abstract view of quantity which regards it as 
having no qualitative significance whatsoever. 
In the concrete which embraces the totality of 
elements which constitute the significance of a 
concept, there are some quantitative differences 
at least which must be regarded as having 
marked qualitative equivalents. For instance, 
the general size of any given species of animals 
is intimately associated with the complex of 
properties which form its qualitative determi- 
nants. This is true to such an extent that the 
element of magnitude ranks in itself as a quali- 
tative characteristic. For instance, the size of 

119 



120 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

an elephant is regarded as one of its determin- 
ing qualitative marks; so also the size of a 
mouse is regarded as one of its essential prop- 
erties. The idea of an elephant having the 
dimensions of a mouse, or a mouse bulking 
large as an elephant, would do violence to the 
essential features which constitute the concepts 
of these animals. 

There is, of course, a margin of variation 
which is allowable, so that the difference in 
size within certain limits is to be regarded as an 
accidental property of an animal, having no spe- 
cific significance whatsoever. Beyond certain 
well-defined limits, however, this is not the case. 

This relation of quantity to quality, which 
indicates for every quantitative change a corre- 
sponding qualitative value, Hegel calls measure 
(das Maass). The term is used in almost the 
same sense as the word standard, or type. 
To translate das Maass literally as measure does 
not convey the full significance of the term as it 
is used by Hegel. It would be better to translate 
it as the standard measure, or type. Illustra- 
tions of its meaning in the Hegelian sense are 
found throughout the organic world where a 
definite species is associated with a typical or 
a standard size. It finds abundant illustration 



MEASURE 121 

also in the inorganic world wherein each ele- 
ment possesses its own definite specific gravity, 
so that the quantitative coefficient becomes in 
each case a distinctive mark of a definite group 
of correlated qualities which are constantly 
present with it. Thus, for instance, the specific 
gravity of gold is inseparably associated with all 
the essential properties of gold which give it 
the specific quality by virtue of which it is 
constituted as it is. The illustration which is 
the most perfect is found in the scale of rela- 
tive differences in the two corresponding series, 
— on the one hand the variation in lengths of 
the chords in a musical instrument, and on the 
other the accompanying variation in differences 
of tone. The former represent purely quanti- 
tative differences, and the latter, qualitative. 
Between them there exists an exact correspond- 
ence. This may be further illustrated by the 
correlation which obtains between the wave- 
lengths of light, and the corresponding differ- 
ences in color. All these illustrations emphasize 
the essential relation which exists between a vari- 
ation in quantity and the corresponding varia- 
tion in quality. 

In accordance with Hegel's general method 
of procedure, it will be remembered, every 



122 



THE DOCTKIKE OF BEING 



phase in the progressive development of being 
is to be regarded as a manifestation of one of 
the various attributes of the Absolute. In this 
connection, therefore, the Absolute, or God, may 
be defined as das Maass, — that is, He is the abso- 
lute standard of measure, the ideal, or type, of all 
creation. This signifies that God must contain 
within His own nature the norm or standard of 
all things. This is essentially in accord with 
the Hebrew conception of God as One who 
has appointed to everything its proper bound 
and typical form, — to the sea, and land, to the 
rivers and mountains, to plants and animals, and 
also to man himself. In his description of 
wisdom, Job exclaims : — 

" God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth 

the place thereof. 
For he looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under 

the whole heaven ; 
To make the weight for the winds ; and he weigheth 

the waters by measure. 
When he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the 

lightning of the thunder : 
Then did he see it, and declare it ; he prepared it, yea, 

and searched it out." ( x ) 

Moreover, in the religion of the Greeks this 
idea is frequently expressed, especially in the 

1 Chapter xxvin. vv. 23 ff. 



MEASURE 123 

doctrine of Nemesis, as Hegel points out. 
According to this conception there is a natural 
bound to all things, to riches and honor, to 
power and pleasure, even to pain ; and when the 
definite measure allotted to each is exceeded, 
there must inevitably follow its corresponding 
opposite. It is characteristic of Hegel's general 
method in this connection to gather from the 
ancient forms of religion, both an illustration 
and at the same time a justification of his own 
point of view. The religious and philosophical 
teachers of all ages have in Hegel's opinion 
touched upon important truths which it is his 
peculiar task to gather together in the unity of a 
philosophical system that will embrace them all. 
Moreover, since there is some form and size 
which may be regarded as the standard or type 
for any given species, to take an illustration 
from the organic world, then this type may be 
departed from within certain limits without 
affecting the integrity of the species, as has 
already been pointed out. Variations from the 
type within such limits are to be regarded merely 
as natural departures from what Hegel calls the 
rule. The term " rule " {die Regel) is used to 
denote the standard form or size in reference to 
any given class. It has the same significance, in 



124 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

the Hegelian usage, as the term " mode," which 
is employed to signify the prevailing type in 
curves showing the relative distribution of varia- 
tions, the curve itself indicating the manner in 
which the variations in question are distributed 
about the type itself. In these curves the mode 
is represented by the maximum ordinate, the 
varying lengths of the other ordinates indicat- 
ing the relative number of cases corresponding 
to the different variations. 

It is a significant fact, however, that the range 
of possible deviation from the prevailing type is 
necessarily limited, so that if it is departed from 
in any way the type itself is so far changed 
as to constitute an essentially new type, or a 
distinct species. It appears, therefore, that 
there may be a continued alteration of quantity 
by increasing or decreasing the given magnitude 
up to a certain definite limit, and the various 
changes will have no appreciable effect upon the 
corresponding quality. Thus, while the quantity 
may be regarded as a variable, the quality never- 
theless remains a constant. But in this process 
of variation some point must always be reached 
at which a quantitative change begins to pro- 
duce a qualitative change as well. Hegel 
illustrates this by calling attention to the fact 



MEASURE 125 

that the temperature of water seems to be quite 
independent of its qualitative state of liquidity, 
but as we increase the temperature through a 
wide range of variation there nevertheless is 
reached finally a degree of heat which marks a 
decided qualitative change as the liquid becomes 
transformed into vapor ; and at the other limit, 
where the freezing-point is reached, the liquid 
of course changes into the solid state. Between 
these limits the various changes of temperature 
seem to have no qualitative significance whatso- 
ever ; and, as Hegel remarks, in the approach 
toward either limit, the advance is made with- 
out any accompanying circumstances to antici- 
pate it as far as our observation goes, so that the 
point which marks the beginnings of a corre- 
sponding qualitative change is reached, as it 
were, by stealth. The illustration of Hegel's in 
reference to the variations in the temperature of 
water may be further supplemented in the fol- 
lowing manner, which may possibly shed some 
additional light upon Hegel's exposition. It 
is a well-known phenomenon of physics that 
before reaching the freezing-point, at 32° F, the 
decreasing temperature causes a proportional 
decrease of bulk in the water. This decrease 
in bulk is continuous to about 39°. At this 



126 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

point, however, a decided change is noticeable, for 
the bulk of water now begins to expand instead 
of contracting as before, and so continues until 
the fluid passes into the solid state at the freez- 
ing-point. This change seems to be a warning 
note which is sounded to indicate that even a 
more radical change may be anticipated. 

The points which mark in a series of con- 
tinuous changes the beginnings of a qualitative 
corresponding to a quantitative difference, Hegel 
calls the "nodes," or "nodal points," — a term 
which he has borrowed from astronomy. The 
line which may be conceived as indicating the 
continuous changes which may occur between 
these points without effecting any qualitative 
difference he calls, " the line of nodes." To 
understand this reference, it may be well to 
give the technical definition of a node, which 
Hegel, of course, has adapted to his purposes. 
The node as used in astronomy is one of the 
points at which any celestial orbit cuts the plane 
of the ecliptic, the latter being a great circle of the 
heavens in the plane of the earth's orbit. The 
node, therefore, is a point having a double signifi- 
cance by virtue of its being the intersecting 
point of two circles, and therefore it may be 
conceived first as belonging to one and then 



MEASURE 127 

to the other. This idea of a point having a 
twofold significance, Hegel has seized in 
order to indicate that particular point in 
quantitative variation which has at the same 
time a qualitative significance as well. Such 
a point possesses the combined characteristics 
which constitute both its qualitative and 
its quantitative features, just as a point which 
is common to two circles possesses the charac- 
teristic features of each. Between these nodes, 
however, or beyond them in either direction, the 
various quantitative differences seem to have no 
significance whatsoever as far as producing any 
change of definite qualitative nature. When- 
ever, therefore, quantitative changes possess no 
qualitative significance, they cannot be re- 
garded as constituting any standard or type of 
measure, for the magnitude which they repre- 
sent has no quality or complex of qualities 
corresponding to it. Such magnitudes Hegel 
designates as measureless (Maasslos), — that 
is, lacking the essential characteristics of a 
standard or a type. Thus it will be seen 
that the concept of quantity in itself does not 
determine qualitative differences, inasmuch as 
some magnitudes have no corresponding quali- 
tative characteristics at all. The category of 



128 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

quantity, therefore, proves unsatisfactory as an 
ultimate explanation of qualitative differences. 
Inasmuch as it falls, as it were, of its own 
weight, it seems to necessitate by its very 
inefficiency some additional category which 
can satisfactorily explain the relation between 
quantitative and qualitative variations. 

A similar situation has developed at every 
stage of progress in the evolution of the 
thought processes from the simplest beginnings 
in mere being to the present condition under 
discussion. Throughout, each category that 
has been reached in the progress of thought 
has proved insufficient to explain itself and 
all which have gone before, and has laid upon 
thought the necessity of proceeding to some 
further stage of development in order to supply 
its defects and complete its meaning. This is 
essentially the Hegelian dialectic movement 
of thought. 

We have seen that the idea of mere being 
carried with it the necessary implication of a 
complex system of attributes designated as the 
quality of determinate being. 

This concept in turn has been found to 
necessitate the idea of oneness of being, — that 
is, being-for-self, an individual separate in a 



MEASURE 129 

sense from all others. This idea of the one, 
the individual, was then found to suggest by 
necessary implication the idea of the many, — 
a purely quantitative concept. 

Starting then, with the idea of quantity, its 
highest expression was reached when it was 
regarded as correlated with the idea of quality. 
Thus the quantity-quality relation which Hegel 
calls measure, or better the standard measure, 
would seem to be the consummation of the 
entire process. 

The relation however being unstable, — that is, 
existing for certain quantitative values and not 
existing for others, — the thought is consequently 
constrained by the very nature of its own proc- 
esses and its own demands to press onward to 
a further stage of development, and to ask the 
question, What is it which underlies these 
various relations of quantity to quality, render- 
ing them significant at certain coincidental 
points, the 6 nodes ' according to Hegel, and 
at others attaching to them no significance 
whatsoever? This category of a standard meas- 
ure is by its verj' limitations a challenge to 
thought, that it produce something of a more 
ultimate nature as its underlying ground. That 
which is demanded is some satisfactory explana- 



130 THE DOCTRINE OF BEING 

tion of the various distinct types which are found 
in nature, each determined according to its own 
definite standard of measure. 

The most complete expression of the category 
of being, and the final term in the development 
of that idea, the concept of standard measure, 
has been found wholly insufficient to rank as 
a self-contained and self-explaining category. 
This last term, therefore, can no longer be re- 
garded as a last term ; it suggests rather addi- 
tional terms in the process of development 
which will form its natural complement and 
explanation. 

The immediately complementary term in the 
line of the logical unfolding of the universal 
reason is that of essence (das Weseri)^ which 
forms the second main division of the Logic. 
The category of essence is to be regarded as 
the ground which underlies the various changes 
which characterize the progressive development 
of the idea of being. What being is in its 
essence determines its qualitative characteristics 
and correlates them with certain definite quan- 
titative changes by the fundamental law of its 
own nature. The magnitude does not deter- 
mine the quality, nor does the quality determine 
the magnitude, but the roots, both of the quan- 



MEASURE 131 

titative and qualitative elements in being, lie 
deeply concealed in the fundamental essence. 
Hegel expresses this in his epigrammatic man- 
ner, " Essence is the truth of being." 



PART II 

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 



Diess ist also uberhaupt der Unterschied der For- 
men des Seyns und des Wesens. Im Seyn ist Alles 
unmittelbar, im Wesen dagegen ist Alles relativ. 
Der Standpurikt des Wesens ist uberhaupt der Stand- 
punkt der Reflexion. — Hegel. 



PAKT II 

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

CHAPTER X 

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE IN ITS GENERAL 
FEATURES 

THE doctrine of essence (Die Lehre vom 
Weseri) forms the second part of the Logic. 
The transition from the concept of being to 
that of essence marks a decided advance in 
thought, and involves the introduction of sev- 
eral new ideas. Although these ideas have not 
been explicitly manifest in the category of simple 
being, they have been, nevertheless, implicitly 
present, so that their appearance at the begin- 
ning of the exposition as to the nature of 
essence is to be regarded as the developed ex- 
pression of a potential factor already present in 
the preceding stage of being. 

The concepts which form the constituent 
elements in the category of essence are as 
follows : — 

135 



136 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

(1) Mediation; (2) Negation; (3) Reflec- 
tion ; (4) Permanence ; (5) Systemic inte- 
gration. 

We will discuss these in their order. First 
as to the idea of mediation, which we have 
already referred to in a previous chapter. We 
found that Hegel regards mere being as imme- 
diate (unmittelbar), — that is, as something which 
is unaccounted for, that which is to be accepted 
as a fact, but no reason assigned to it, and not 
referred to any other thing as its explanation, 
or by which it might be conceived as being 
brought about by any process whatsoever. 

If, however, a raison d'etre is given for any 
determinate being, this at once connects the 
being in question with its underlying ground, 
and this is in itself a process of mediation. It 
is that by which something comes to be what it 
is (vermittelt'). Being cannot explain itself, 
and although we come to accept as a matter 
of course the various attributes of being, as 
quantity, quality, degree, measure, etc., never- 
theless they are not sufficient to explain or 
justify themselves. Being, pure and simple, 
bears upon its face the stamp of derivation. It 
comes from something more fundamental than 
itself. It has had an origin, a life history, a 



IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES 137 

destiny, all of which lie concealed. To disclose 
these sources and the processes depending upon 
them is the office of mediation ; and when medi- 
ation has completely fulfilled its offices, the 
true essence of being will stand revealed. 
The difference between mediate and immediate 
knowledge may be more explicitly exhibited by 
noting the different adjectives which Hegel 
employs in describing the two concepts. 

While the immediate knowledge is unrelated, 
mediate knowledge is related. 

The immediate is simply given ; the mediate 
is explained. 

The immediate is elementary ; the mediate is 
developed. 

The immediate marks the beginning of knowl- 
edge ; the mediate its development and resulting 
product. 

In the next place, the idea of essence implies 
the negation of being. Hegel, in the opening 
paragraph upon the doctrine of essence, defines 
his conception of essence as " being coming into 
mediation with itself through the negation of 
itself." x The technical terms which this defini- 
tion contains may be elucidated by the following 
considerations. While the idea of being may at 
1 § 112. 



138 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

first seem to be quite independent and imme- 
diate, yet as we have seen in the examination 
of the necessary relations and connections which 
such an idea involves, it is found to be depen- 
dent upon something else out of which it has 
arisen, and by which the integrity of its com- 
position is conserved. This is in itself a proc- 
ess of mediation, and this is what Hegel means 
by the phrase that " being comes into mediation 
with itself." The category of being, therefore, 
regarded as self-constituted and self-sufficient 
falls to the ground. It cannot bear its own 
weight, and thus undermines itself. This is the 
meaning of the phrase that the idea of being 
contains the " negation of itself." Nevertheless, 
while dying as an independent, immediate, self- 
contained form, it regains another life in the 
underlying ground to which it is necessarily 
referred and by which it becomes specifically 
determined. In its essence, being — that is, mere 
being, as such as Hegel puts it — is aufgehoben. 
This is a very significant word in the Hegelian 
terminology and cannot be adequately trans- 
lated by any one English word, for it conveys 
three distinct ideas which must be taken to- 
gether in order to express its full significance. 
The verb aufheben possesses the threefold mean- 



IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES 139 

ing with Hegel, — to destroy, to re-create in a 
new form, and at the same time to elevate. 
To speak of anything as aufgehoben means 
that it disappears in its given form, but that it 
reappears in a new form, and that the new form 
always represents a higher point of view and a 
substantial progress in thought. The one single 
English word which comes nearest to express- 
ing this meaning is the word transmute. When 
Hegel affirms that in essence being is aufgehoben, 
he means that it has lost its independence only 
to find it again in a dependence which has this 
peculiar characteristic, that it is not subordi- 
nated to anything which is foreign to its own 
notion or idea, but which is at the last analysis 
one with the initial being itself. That which 
being rests upon as its basis must be a part of 
being itself; otherwise the relation would be 
external and valueless. While, therefore, the 
independence of being is in a sense denied, it 
is in another and a higher sense reaffirmed. 
The primary denial is a negation : the reaffirma- 
tion is brought about by the negation of the 
former negation. This last is the absolute 
negation, as Hegel calls it, which is equivalent 
always to an affirmation. The independence 
of being which is first denied gives way to a 



140 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

dependence, but this in turn is denied, because 
when it is analyzed it is found to be in reality 
a dependence of being upon its own ground, 
which is equivalent to a self-dependence; and 
a self-dependence is the same as independence. 
Thus this second negation is a reassertion of the 
original independence; but, in the process of 
thought through which it has passed, it has 
acquired a richer and fuller significance ; for it 
is an independence which has been fully justified. 

The process of negation with Hegel, it must 
be remembered, is never extinction or annihila- 
tion : it is only a sublimation into a higher form ; 
and the absorption of being in essence is one 
of the best illustrations of the process of nega- 
tion, which plays such an important and con- 
spicuous r61e in the Hegelian dialectic. It is 
in this way that negation is to be regarded as a 
means of more precise characterization and 
determination in the progressive development 
of thought. The nature of negation as a proc- 
ess may be summed up most completely in the 
term aufheben, — the overthrowing, and the 
restoring upon a higher plane, as has already 
been described. 

The category of reflection presents a point of 
view from which the doctrine of essence may 



IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES 141 

be best understood and appreciated. This has 
been referred to in a previous chapter, but is so 
important an idea in the general scheme of 
Hegel that an additional reference may not 
be out of place at this stage of the exposition. 
Being is regarded by Hegel as a category which 
is not self-illuminating. It receives its light 
from something else which is its ground. The 
idea of expressing this thought by the term 
reflection was suggested to Hegel through an 
analogy with the well-known physical phenome- 
non of reflection. As a substantial form before 
a glass is seen through reflection as an image 
of itself, so being may be regarded as the reflec- 
tion of that which is its ground. The image in 
the glass has an immediate reality in a certain 
sense, but as regards its self-determination it 
is illusory. Its reality is due to its reflection 
of the object to which it stands related, and to 
which it must be referred in order to explain 
and to justify its own being. Thus the ground 
of being, and the being as manifested, are 
related to each other as substance and show, 
— the underlying essence and the reflected 
appearance. There are two phrases which 
are used frequently by Hegel in this connec- 
tion, and their meaning should be precisely 



142 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

determined. They are the phrases Reflexion-in- 
sich and Reflexion-in-Anderes. The signifi- 
cance of these phrases will always be brought 
out clearly in their Hegelian usage, if we 
translate the former as that which shines in 
its own light, the latter as that which shines 
in the light of another. 

We may say, therefore, that the various 
attributes of being do not shine in their own 
light, but in the light of some other, which 
forms their necessary complement, and consti- 
tutes their essence or substantial ground. 

Essence is, moreover, to be distinguished 
from mere being, in that it is the permanent 
basis (das Bleibende), which underlies that which 
is only the transient manifestation. The sev- 
eral changes which the dialectic movement has 
been seen to produce among the attributes of 
being allow no resting-place for our thought. 
We pass from quality to quantity, and from 
quantity back again to a quality which pos- 
sesses at this stage of development the addi- 
tional characteristic of being quantitatively 
determined; and thence on to a quantitative 
determination which has no qualitative signifi- 
cance whatsoever, and through it all the idea 
of being is not able to show any basis of a per- 



IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES 143 

manent nature which it can call its own. 
Nevertheless, the nature of thought is such that 
we are constrained to demand some permanent 
underlying ground to which these various 
changes may be referred. It is in the idea of 
essence, the necessary complement of being, that 
we find the solid foundation which underlies 
and supports all the changing manifestations 
of being. While everything may be regarded, 
according to Heraclitus, as ceaselessly chang- 
ing, yet nevertheless something remains. That 
which remains, regarded as a constant, is in 
itself the explanation of all change, and 
through which all variation may be reduced to 
law and uniformity. The significance of the vari- 
able lies in the fact that it may be referred to 
some underlying constant. Where there is no 
constant, variables possess no significance. 

The idea of permanency which thus char- 
acterizes essence is regarded by Hegel as having 
an etymological warrant. Being is the German 
Seyn, and essence, or its German equivalent 
Wesen, is the same as past being, that is vergan- 
genes Seyn, as seen in the past participle g ewe- 
sen. This signifies that whatever has being, 
is thus declared to be by virtue of that which 
has been before, and which is therefore related 



144 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

to it as its Wesen, or ground. The priority 
which seems to be expressed in the Wesen is, 
however, not asserted as a priority in time nec- 
essarily ; it is merely a logical priority. The 
past, that which has been before, and which is 
to be regarded as the ground or essence of that 
which is, of being, is not past in the sense of 
having been set aside, or of disappearing ; it is 
rather to be regarded as conserved, and living 
again in the present being. The past as the 
logical prius of being is therefore merely auf- 
gehoben, as Hegel would express it, — past and 
yet perduring. 

Hegel's derivation of the word Wesen, and by 
this means establishing its significance, fur- 
nishes a characteristic illustration of his general 
habit of thought, and his conviction that the 
most valuable thoughts of mankind are often 
found crystallized in language. As to the sug- 
gestiveness of language in this particular, Hegel 
says : " Language has compressed within it 
what man has made his own ; and what he has 
fashioned and expressed in speech contains, 
either embedded or elaborated, a category : so 
natural does logic come to him, or rather it is 
his own very nature." * 

i Werke, I, 10 f . 



IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES 145 

Essence is to be regarded, moreover, as a con- 
stituted system of relations. It is a complex 
consisting of a manifold of various elements 
which are throughout interrelated, and coordi- 
nated. This conception of essence also appears 
in the German, as seen in such words as das 
Zeitungswesen, the newspaper system; das Post- 
wesen, the postal system; das Steuerwesen, the 
revenue system. We have a similar usage in 
our phrase, the railway system. In such a con- 
nection the word Wesen, or essence, emphasizes 
the truth that everything which is, which has 
being, must be referred to its appropriate place 
in the particular system to which it belongs and 
in which is to be found its true ground and proper 
explanation, and that, moreover, there is no kind 
of being in the universe which is unrelated to 
others, or which can remain apart and by itself. 

This idea of the ground of being conceived 
as a system of coordinated and necessarily re- 
lated elements is in complete accord with the 
modern theory of logic, which lays special em- 
phasis upon the order and uniformity which 
characterizes the world of knowledge and the 
systematic relation which every element must 
sustain to every other and to the whole. 1 These, 
1 Hibben's Inductive Logic, p. 7 f. 



146 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

then, are the chief factors, or, as Hegel would 
call them, moments which constitute the con- 
cept of essence, — the ideas of mediation, ne- 
gation, reflection, permanency, and systemic 
integration. 

It is in keeping with Hegel's general point 
of view that he should define the Absolute as 
essence. Although we speak of finite essences 
such as man, nevertheless the term itself in 
the Hegelian system implies that we have passed 
beyond finitude, and that there is at the last 
analysis one supreme essence which is the true 
infinite and which embraces all other so-called 
essences within itself. Therefore, according to 
this conception, all else outside of the Absolute, 
outside of God, would possess no essentiality. 
God is not to be regarded merely as a being 
among many others, or as an essence, even the 
highest. He is preeminently the being and the 
essence underlying all others. Hegel draws 
special attention, however, to the truth that 
the nature of God is by no means exhausted 
in the ascription to Him of essence. If God is 
regarded as essence only, His universal and 
irresistible power is thereby assured, but His 
other attributes are overlooked. He is merely 
the Lord, God Almighty, and his more personal 



IN ITS GENERAL FEATURES 147 

relations to the world in general, and to man 
in particular, are not recognized in such a 
definition. This may be said to be the com- 
mon defect in the Mohammedan and Jewish 
religions alike, in which the creator is removed 
by an impassable gulf from the creature. 1 

In the subsequent development of the dialec- 
tic movement it will be seen that the category 
of essence will, by its limitations, necessitate the 
complementary and final category of the notion, 
or universal reason. The conception of God, 
therefore, as essence merely, must also be com- 
pleted by the addition of those attributes which 
are involved in the category of the notion. 

In the discussion of the category of essence 
Hegel divides the subject into three parts which 
will be treated in the three following chapters. 
They are : — 

1. Essence as ground of existence (Das 
Wesen als Grrund der Existenz). 

2. Appearance (Die Erscheinung*). 

3. Actuality (Die Wirklichkeif). 

1 Caird's Evolution of Religion. 



CHAPTER XI 

ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 

THE first aspect under which Hegel treats 
the category of essence is that of the ground 
of existence. The conception of the ground of 
existence implies the idea of something which is 
fundamental and permanent. We find ourselves 
in a world of changing phenomena. The ele- 
ments which form their constituent parts are 
indefinitely various, and it is a natural impulse 
to seek for some constant factor that will give 
determinateness to the great world problem. 
Hegel's view is that every phenomenon in the 
universe is the manifestation of its own underly- 
ing ground, and that on this account it preserves 
always its identity with itself; also that the 
phenomenal appearance must be regarded merely 
as a reflection of the underlying essence, and 
that the fundamental law of identity connects 
essence and appearance as one and the same. 
The concept of identity is one of the so-called 
categories of reflection (die Meflexionsbestim- 

148 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OP EXISTENCE 149 

mungen). As illustrations of his conception of 
identity, Hegel cites that central integrity of 
being which characterizes the Ego, the logical 
notion, and God. God is to be regarded as a 
self-identity, inasmuch as He is the all-embrac- 
ing constant, the underlying essence, of whose 
eternal attributes all the glory and splendor of 
the world are reflections. Man in his conscious 
life as a personality, as an Ego, also represents a 
self-identity, inasmuch as his self-consciousness 
forms a centre to which all the variety of his ex- 
periences may be referred, and which forms the 
one constant factor in the equation of life. 
Man's activities are thus a reflection of his inner 
personality. This self-identity alone serves to 
differentiate man from the brute which possesses 
no such underlying ground of continuity, and 
lives in each present experience with no thought 
before or after. There is, moreover, in every 
logical notion, also a constant element, the uni- 
versal, which maintains its identity in the midst 
of the indefinite variety of its particular mani- 
festations. It is this constant element which 
forms the underlying ground of our thought 
processes and gives them definiteness and sta- 
bility, and of which they are essentially the 
reflection. 



150 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

The laws of formal logic which refer to the 
principle of identity, Hegel interprets in a 
manner quite in accord with his general method. 
These laws are commonly enunciated as fol- 
lows : — 

The law of identity proper states that every- 
thing must be identical with itself, or briefly ex- 
pressed, A = A. The law of contradiction which 
is merely the negative expression of the law of 
identity is that A cannot be at the same time 
both A and not A. 

As thus expressed, Hegel insists, these laws are 
merely products of the abstract understanding, 
— that is, a partial and one-sided view of things. 
As formulated above, these laws allow for no 
progress of thought whatsoever. They form 
hard and fast concepts corresponding to a world 
in which there can be no change, no interrelation 
of parts, no variety, and above all no life and 
thought. Instead of an abstract identity, Hegel 
insists upon a concrete identity, — that is, an 
identity which exists in the midst of a diversity 
and whose significance is due to the very diver- 
sity with which it is brought into contrast. The 
formula which expresses the law of identity is 
not A = A. It should be A = A', that is, A 
differs from A', and yet in spite of the difference 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 151 

is one with it. The former equation, A = A, 
expresses merely an absolute identity which is 
wholly stripped of all differences, and as such is 
without significance and value. 

Hegel defines identity, therefore, as an iden- 
tity which reflects its own self in every changing 
variety of manifestation, and in such a manner 
that the reflection of self is different from it, 
and yet so intimately connected with it as to 
be the same. It is a paradox, as thus expressed ; 
but with Hegel, truth lies in paradoxes. The 
idea of identity, if it is to possess any true sig- 
nificance, implies the correlated idea of differ- 
ence; and in the progress of thought Hegel 
proceeds to discuss the concept of difference 
(der Unterschied) as the second category of re- 
flection. The concept of difference appears in 
its most elemental form as immediate difference, 
for so Hegel characterizes it. By immediate 
difference he means mere diversity or variety 
(die Verschiedenheit). By diversity is meant 
that the various objects are each individually 
what they are, and that the only connection 
between them is an external one. When ob- 
jects which are thus externally related are 
compared, they are identified to the extent of 
affirming their likeness, and failure to identif}- 



152 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

signifies that their likeness is denied. At this 
point Hegel's conception of the relation be- 
tween identity and difference is brought out 
most clearly, and considerable emphasis placed 
upon it. He asserts in his characteristically 
paradoxical manner that objects which are 
judged to be alike are such only by virtue of 
an underlying difference, and that objects which 
are judged to be unlike are such only by virtue 
of an underlying identity. The one idea reflects 
its light upon the other. Thus, if we say that 
a triangle differs from a tree, the assertion has 
no point, because the two objects compared 
have nothing in common by which they may 
be brought together in thought; their differ- 
ences are not illuminated by the light of any 
identity. Or, if we should say a man is a man, 
the assertion would have no significance, for 
the identity which is stated is not illuminated 
by the light of any difference. But in this 
case suppose that the difference is suggested, 
as in the lines of Burns, — 

" A man's a man for a* that." 

The thought has become significant, for the 
phrase " for a' that " introduces an implied dif- 
ference, and this at once reflects its meaning 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 153 

upon the original assertion, which without this 
contrast of thought would remain a meaning- 
less repetition. Again, if we compare a beech 
and an oak, or electrical and steam power, the 
elements of likeness and unlikeness appear as 
significant because these objects represent con- 
cepts which are fundamentally connected as 
species of one and the same genus, so that the 
significance of the one is reflected in the light 
of the other. The difference in such a case 
which appears upon a background of an iden- 
tity underlying all species of the same genus 
may be appropriately called specific difference, 
or difference of reflection (Unterschied der Re- 
flexion oder Unterschied an sich selbst, bestimm- 
ter Unterschied). These differences occurring 
within the area of a common ground serve to 
separate and distinguish one species from all 
others. Cognate species admit of comparison, 
and their differences are always significant for 
this very reason, that however various the spe- 
cies may appear, they all belong to one common 
genus. Thus, the idea of mere diversity or vari- 
ety has been found to develop into a difference 
which is significant only in the sphere of cog- 
nate species, — that is, determinate or specific 
difference. 



154 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

There is still another aspect of the idea of 
difference, which is that of opposition (der 
Gregensatz). Here the kindred elements which 
enter into the same area of being are arrayed 
over against each other as positive and negative, 
and yet in the characteristically Hegelian man- 
ner of viewing such opposites, they are to be 
regarded as constituent elements in one and the 
same essence. Their opposition is stated only 
to be resolved in a higher unity according to 
the logical demands of the dialectic movement. 
The traditional law of logic known as that of 
the excluded middle (namely, that, of two oppo- 
site predicates, one, and one only, can be assigned 
to one and the same subject) must be regarded 
as true merely of the abstract understanding, 
but not of the reflective reason which regards 
all things in the concrete, — that is, in the full 
light of all that they are and of all that they 
imply. The truth of the idea of essence, accord- 
ing to Hegel, lies in the very opposition of the 
ideas of positive and negative which finds 
universal expression in the fact that everything 
in the universe has its significance only in its 
connection with that which confronts it as 
its other. For every positive there is a corre- 
sponding other which may be regarded as its 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 155 

negative. The terms positive and negative do 
not express an absolute difference. The two at 
the last analysis are found to spring from the 
same root. The terms positive and negative 
may, under all circumstances, be transposed, and 
the meaning of the terms not in any sense 
altered. If we agree to designate distance east 
as +, then distance west would be designated 
as — ; but we might as well have called dis- 
tance west +, and distance east — . The sig- 
nificance of the terms employed lies wholly in 
their relation one to the other. 

In the concept of opposition it must be dis- 
tinctly understood that the term which is 
regarded as positive must not be conceived as 
opposed to any other whatsoever, but only by 
that which is peculiarly its other by virtue of 
some common basis underlying them both. 
According to a crude conception of the world, 
it would seem to be composed of a multitude of 
different objects, and each one wholly indepen- 
dent of every other. This is, however, a most 
erroneous conception. All elements in the great 
cosmic process must be regarded as parts of a 
systematized whole, so that each one is related 
to that which is peculiarly its other in one and 
the same underlying system. Thus the north 



156 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

pole of the magnet is opposed to and yet con- 
nected with its south pole ; so also positive and 
negative electricity are essentially related ; every 
acid, moreover, is related to its corresponding 
base. The opposite may be defined, therefore, 
in general, as that which embraces both itself 
and its corresponding other within one and the 
same area of determination. If it is asked what 
this one and self -same area of determination 
may be, it would be characterized in the Hegel- 
ian terminology as the ground (der GrruncT). 
This is the third of the categories of reflection, 
and forms the basis of the other two. Ground 
is defined by Hegel as the unity of identity and 
difference. It is the determining factor which 
renders objects sufficiently alike so that we can 
observe their differences, or sufficiently unlike 
so that we can note their resemblances. Thus, 
the idea of ground contains the truth of all 
that attaches to the complementary ideas of 
identity and difference. It is the unity under- 
lying diversity ; it is the essence underlying 
specific difference ; it is the connecting bond 
which unites in one every element of being 
with its corresponding opposite, or other, within 
the area of a common system. 

The logical maxim in reference to the con- 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 157 

cept of ground is expressed in the fourth law of 
thought, which is associated with the name of 
Leibniz and is known as the law of sufficient 
reason, viz. : " Everything must have its suffi- 
cient ground." This means that the true and 
essential being of any definite object of thought 
is not to be conceived merely as a constant 
underlying element which always preserves its 
strict identity, nor is it to be conceived solely 
as the underlying source of variability which 
produces manifest differences ; it is not merely 
positive, nor is it merely negative ; it must be 
conceived as the synthesis of both these ideas, 
so that it has its being in its other, which, how- 
ever, falls within the area of its own essence, 
and the two opposite thus become one. The 
relation may be illustrated by the analogy of 
two circles which lie wholly outside of each 
other and may therefore be regarded as oppo- 
sites ; but then we can conceive the two circles 
also as lying wholly within a third, and as such 
may be regarded as parts of one and the same 
surrounding area. 

From another point of view, to use the Hegel- 
ian figure, essence as ground is not to be con- 
ceived as merely the abstract reflection-in-self 
(that is, as shining merely in its own light), but 



158 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

as a reflection-in-its-other (that is, as receiving 
illumination from that which by the very nature 
of things stands over against it, and yet at the 
same time is essentially connected with it as 
its necessary complement). Every truth has its 
obverse side; and this must always be recog- 
nized if we are to attain knowledge in its ful- 
ness. The ground and whatever depends upon 
the ground must be regarded, therefore, as one 
and the same content, that is, the same matter 
of fact. The ground is a simple reference to 
itself ; and what is grounded combines a refer- 
ence to self with a reference to its other as well. 
Such a reference involves the idea of mediation, 
or relativity, that is, the process of explaining 
a given thing by a reference to something else 
with which it is essentially related. 

The law of sufficient reason, therefore, asserts 
that all phenomena are so related in an all-em- 
bracing system that every phenomenon must be 
referred to some other as its sufficient ground. 
There is throughout a complete interrelation 
and interdependence. The essence of anything, 
from this point of view, cannot be revealed by 
showing merely what it is in itself, or, as Hegel 
would put it, in a purely abstract sense ; but it 
must be shown what it is in reference to some- 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 159 

thing else which is related to it as its other. 
To know a thing, therefore, we must know it 
in reference to all of the possible relations 
which it may sustain to all other things by 
which its own essential being is mediated. 
The most perfect example of what is meant 
by ground is found in the third part of the 
Hegelian system, the doctrine of the notion, 
or the active and universal reason. In such a 
conception, the idea of ground attains its com- 
plete expression inasmuch as it presents a con- 
tent which is determined in itself and for itself, 
and hence may be regarded as self-originating 
and self-constructive. Such must be the essen- 
tial ground of all things, some form of super- 
intending reason which is freely working out 
its own purposes. This is the interpretation of 
Leibniz in reference to the meaning of sufficient 
ground. His conception especially emphasizes 
the function of final cause in reference to the 
connection of phenomena with their ground, 
and it is in the self-activity of the universal 
reason that the fullest scope is allowed to the 
play of final causes. But at the present stage 
in the development of the concept of ground it 
cannot be regarded as having as yet attained 
this capacity of determining itself. It is only 



160 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

when we reach the third and final stage of the 
Hegelian system that the conception of a self- 
directing and self-determining ground emerges 
in its complete form. The idea of ground, 
therefore, at this stage of its development must 
not be regarded as the equivalent of final cause. 
It is not as yet consciously active, nor does it 
produce anything, working purposefully towards 
some definitely conceived end. Being, there- 
fore, regarded as existence, is said by Hegel to 
issue or proceed from the ground. Hegel's con- 
ception of the term " existence " (die Uxistenz) 
he derives etymologically from the verb existere, 
the literal meaning of which is, to go forth, or 
to proceed. It would follow, therefore, that ex- 
istence is merely that which proceeds from the 
ground. As such it may be regarded as hav- 
ing left the ground behind, just as the product 
as determinate being was said to leave behind 
the process of becoming which preceded it. 
The difference, however, between determinate 
being and existence is that the latter represents 
a far deeper insight and an advanced stage of 
development. Determinate being is accepted 
as immediately given, no inquiry being started 
as to its explanation or justification. Existence, 
on the other hand, is regarded as mediated, — 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 161 

that is, as referred to its appropriate ground, 
and thus accounted for and duly explained. But 
although having issued from the ground, ex- 
istence nevertheless contains its own ground 
within itself, so that the ground is not merely 
a phase in the process of mediation which has 
been passed through and completely left behind. 
The ground may properly be characterized as 
aufgehoben, — that is, suspended, and yet trans- 
muted into the more developed form of existence. 
This relation may be illustrated in our modern 
conception of the conservation of energy, wherein 
any given energy seems to be destroyed only 
to reappear in some changed form, and although 
the ground of the result, nevertheless it pre- 
serves its own identity in the result itself. It is 
a false view of existence which regards it as 
related to its ground in an external manner, 
so that the world comes to be regarded as a 
collection of different objects, having each 
a separate existence, and related to each other 
as ground and consequence, wherein everything 
bears an aspect of relativity, conditioned by and 
conditioning something else. In such a world 
there would be nothing fundamental and final. 
Such a conception must be supplemented by 
the doctrine of the notion which, as will be 



162 THE DOCTKINE OF ESSENCE 

seen, supplies an unconditioned basis of ration- 
ality and purposiveness for all that is contin- 
gent and relative. 

The existent conceived as having absorbed 
its ground within itself is in a sense relieved 
of all dependence upon anything outside of 
itself; for whatever seems to lie outside of itself, 
and yet is at the same time related to it, must 
be regarded as falling within the area of its 
own being. In other words, the circle which is 
drawn about any object which has existence, to 
mark the bounds of its being, is to be drawn 
with so generous a sweep as to embrace every- 
thing by which the being in question is itself 
mediated, or to which it is essentially related. 
Whatever exists in this sense, Hegel calls a thing 
(das Ding). He very stoutly disclaims, however, 
any reference in this connection to the Kantian 
thing-in-itself Qdas Ding an sicK). He con- 
siders this phrase an empty and meaningless 
abstraction ; for if we in imagination take away 
from a thing its specific characteristics and its 
relations to all other things, absolute emptiness 
remains. Hegel's interpretation of the sig- 
nificance of the phrase, the thing-in-itself, is 
quite characteristic. He maintains that the 
thing-in-itself, if it is to have any meaning at 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 163 

all, signifies the thing, whatever it is, in its 
potential state, — its specific characteristics as 
yet undeveloped and unrealized. Thus, the 
child may be considered as the man-in-himself, 
in the sense that the child is indeed the father 
of the man. So also the patriarchal state takes 
rank as the state-in-itself. The germ of the 
seed is the plant-in-itself. In the developed 
form the thing is not merely the thing-in-itself, 
it is also the thing-for-itself (das Ding filr sicK), 
— that is, the thing whose specific qualities are 
no longer implicit, but have become explicit and 
fully developed. 

The thing is variously characterized by Hegel : 

(1) As possessing properties. 

(2) As composed of material elements. 

(3) As a synthesis of matter and of form. 
That which we call a thing is said to possess 

properties (die Eigenschaften). These proper- 
ties have an internal connection. The various 
properties do not constitute a diversity among 
themselves such as that which has already been 
described, wherein the different terms have no 
connection with each other except that which is 
given by a comparison whose basis is external 
to them. The properties, however, which in- 
here in one and the same thing are brought 



164 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

together by a bond which forms an internal 
connection and a stable centre of reference. 

Again, a thing is composed of material ele- 
ments {die Materieri). The several properties 
of a thing may be regarded from one point of 
view as each inhering in its own material stuff 
and as therefore possessing a quasi independence 
of the thing itself. From such a point of view 
the thing is conceived as only the sum total of 
these various qualitative stuffs ; so that we might 
describe a given thing as composed of so much 
color stuff, of so much saccharine stuff, vege- 
table stuff, etc. This seems to be a sufficiently 
correct account of certain inorganic things, 
especially chemical compounds. Common salt 
may be reduced to its constituent material ele- 
ments, muriatic acid and soda. Gypsum may 
be reduced to sulphuric acid and calcium. Sul- 
phuric acid may be reduced to sulphur, hydro- 
gen, and oxygen. Such are the illustrations 
which Hegel cites in this connection. 

But when we come to organic nature and 
the more complex forms of being, an analysis 
into the elemental parts falls far short of a 
true and adequate account of what a living 
organism essentially consists. All parts may 
be revealed ; but the vital bond is lacking, — 



ESSENCE AS THE GROUND OF EXISTENCE 165 

that which gives form and specific characteris- 
tics to the material substratum, whatever it may 
be. It is the form as distinct from the matter 
of being. It would be well in this connection 
to remark in passing that the term form, as 
Hegel uses it, signifies not the completed form 
which might be conceived as imposed upon 
the thing, but rather the active formative 
principle which, like the architectonic princi- 
ple of the plant, operates from within, pro- 
ducing out of its own material its particular 
form and qualities. To arrive at the true 
conception of the term thing, we must regard 
it as the synthesis of matter and of form. 
The thing is not a meeting-point merely of a 
number of related material elements, each of 
an ultimate nature ; for the fundamental mate- 
rial elements out of which the various things 
in the universe are constituted Hegel con- 
ceives as reducible at the last analysis to one 
and the same kind of matter, and he insists 
that the specific differences of the various 
kinds of things arise from the variety of the 
formative principles or agencies at work upon 
and within this fundamental matter. To go 
so far, however, as to say that the form, or 
constructive principle, operates externally upon 



166 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

the matter, or that the matter is independent 
of the form in any sense, would do violence 
to the Hegelian conception. Form and matter 
must not be separated in thought; it is in 
their unity that the thing has its essential 
being. 

Form, or formative principle, operating there- 
fore within matter, produces many varied re- 
sults which appear as the essential properties 
of the thing. The totality of these properties 
represents the outshining of that which is the 
essence of the existing thing itself. This out- 
shining of the characteristic features of a thing 
constitutes its so-called appearance, or its 
phenomenal manifestation (die Urscheinung'). 



CHAPTER XII 

APPEARANCE, OR THE PHENOMENAL WORLD 

HEGEL'S doctrine of the thing unites two 
seemingly contradictory points of view. 
On the one hand, a thing may be regarded as 
that which is one and individual, as we would say, 
a single thing. On the other, however, a thing 
may be regarded equally well as the summation 
of its many parts and properties, coexisting and 
correlated in one and the same unified system. 
The thing is thus both the one and the many, 
the unitary ground and the varied manifesta- 
tion. Thus a plant is a single thing, but at the 
same time it is a complex of manifold elements, 
for into its composition are brought together 
light, heat, water, ammonia, potash, starch, and 
an indefinite number of material elements which 
are completely coordinated in the single system 
which constitutes the essential being and life of 
the plant. Such an assemblage of these various 
elements which compose the properties of the 
plant in their concrete manifestation, is the 

167 



168 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

shining forth of the inner essence which is cen- 
tred in the one ground which forms their under- 
lying unity. This shining forth of the inner 
nature in its outer manifestation Hegel calls 
die Erscheinang. It is the actual revelation of 
the essence of a thing. The sum of such mani- 
festations gives us the world of phenomena. It 
is the world of scientific description and inter- 
pretation ; it is the world of inductive investi- 
gation, of observation and experiment ; it is the 
world of exact measurement and of computa- 
tion, the world of relations and coordinations, 
the world of uniformity and of law. 

The essence, according to Hegel, is constituted 
by its two principal moments or factors. The 
one is a reflection in itself (Reflexion in sicK), 
and the other is a reflection in something else 
(Reflexion in Anderes). The one represents the 
central core and organizing principle of being ; 
the other, all the correlated elements associated 
essentially with it. The reflection in itself 
refers, therefore, to that which constitutes the 
essence of a thing ; for example, in the case of 
a plant, it is that which constitutes the plant a 
single thing, its central, unifying ground and 
architectonic principle. The reflection in some- 
thing else refers to all the elements which con- 






APPEARANCE 169 

tribute to the being and life of the plant, and 
to all its several parts and its distinctive prop- 
erties. It is this second moment of essence, the 
reflection or shining forth in something else, 
which constitutes its phenomenal manifesta- 
tion. 

It is to be observed, however, that there can be 
no real separation between the essence and ex- 
ternal appearance, between the ground and the 
manifestation, between the noumenon and the 
phenomenon. Hegel defines the Erscheinung, 
therefore, as the essential manifestation. It 
is not the mere show (der Scheiri), as distin- 
guished from the substance ; it is not an un- 
reality as distinguished from reality ; but it is 
the complete revelation of all that is essentially 
immanent within. It is wholly misleading, 
therefore, to speak of mere phenomena as though 
phenomena were only the passing shadow with 
no corresponding substance underlying them. 
It will be seen in the subsequent development 
of the dialectic that every phenomenon in the 
universe represents an underlying reality, and 
so the category of phenomenal appearance (die 
Erscheinung^), as will be seen, must lead of 
necessity to that of actuality (die Wirklickkeif), 
which forms the third stage in the development 



170 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

of the category of essence; they are treated 
separately for convenience of exposition, but 
not in reality or in thought. Hegel's position 
in this connection is directly opposed to that of 
Kant. The latter insists that the phenomenal 
has a subjective significance merely, and he 
postulates an abstract something lying behind 
phenomena and beyond the range of our cogni- 
tion, the indefinite Ding an sich. Hegel, on the 
contrary, maintains most stoutly that all phe- 
nomena of the universe are so bound up with 
their immanent essences, that in knowing the 
outer manifestation we must know also the 
essential ground. We cannot separate one 
from the other, and therefore to state that we 
know only phenomena does violence to the 
essential nature of the phenomena themselves. 

The doctrine of the phenomenal as developed 
by Hegel may be presented in several pairs of 
correlative terms. It is due to the fundamental 
principle of reflection which lies at the base of 
the category of essence, that its phenomenal 
manifestations should fall together in pairs, 
representing each characteristic in its own light 
and also in the light reflected upon it by that 
with which it stands in essential relation as 
its other. 



APPEARANCE 171 

These pairs of correlatives are as follows : — 

(1) Form and Content. (Intialt und Form.) 

(2) The Whole and its Parts. (Das Granze 
und die Theile.^) 

(3) Force and its Phenomenal Manifestation 
(Die Kraft und die Aeusserung .) 

(4) Inner and Outer. (Das Innerliehe und 
das AeusserlicheS) 

As to the relation of form to content, while 
we may refer all phenomena to the underlying 
material elements as the ground of their subsist- 
ence, yet a deeper insight recognizes a forma- 
tive principle immanent in the matter, so that 
at the last analysis the phenomena of the world 
must be referred to the activity of the inner 
constructive principle resident within the ma- 
terial substratum of the phenomena themselves. 
It must be remembered that while this inner 
principle may be called simply the form of 
phenomena, it means that which produces the 
form rather than merely the form which is pro- 
duced. We must not lose sight of Hegel's 
conception of the essence of phenomena, — that 
is, an active principle fundamentally dynamic 
in its nature. There are two senses, however, 
in which form is used according to Hegel, and 
which it is necessary to keep distinct in our 



172 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

minds. It is used in the sense already noted 
as an immanent constructive principle such as 
the architectonic principle which fashions the 
plant after its kind. Form in this sense is 
synonymous with the phrase "the law of phe- 
nomena." It is used also in a different sense, 
however, as signifying that which in a negative 
manner determines from without the bounds of 
phenomenal manifestation, by assigning to them 
definite limits, such as the form, for instance, 
which is given to a casting by its enveloping 
mould. 

It is in the former of these two senses, that 
of a dynamic constructive principle, that the 
term form must be conceived if it is to be 
regarded as one with the content. For in- 
stance, that which makes the plant what it is, 
the sum of its elements and its properties, its 
content in fact, cannot be separated from the 
immanent architectonic principle which forms 
and coordinates these elements into one com- 
plex whole. Phenomena are what they are by 
virtue of the inner working of the fundamental 
laws of their being. The form, therefore, is the 
content, and the content is the form. Separate 
them, and unrelated they lose their significance. 
Form without content is empty. Content with- 



APPEARANCE 173 

out form is so indeterminate that it cannot be 
grasped as an object of knowledge. A true 
work of art is one in which form and content 
are identical. The style is the man. The 
Iliad has no poetic content, Hegel insists, if 
we regard it apart from its form. This is true 
of all great literary creations. A further illus- 
tration may be drawn from the present-day dis- 
cussion in reference to the relation between 
formal and material logic, — that is, between the 
form which our judgments and inferences may 
take, and their significance as determined in the 
light of actual experience. Form in this con- 
nection, without material significance, is barren 
and without value. In logic the form gives 
significance to the content, and the content in 
turn determines the form. There can there- 
fore be no real distinction between formal and 
material fallacies. They must be regarded at 
the last analysis, and apart from verbal and 
superficial distinctions, as one and the same. 
But the content must be conceived not only 
as form which has developed from within, but 
also as that which has been determined to a 
certain extent externally by other forms with 
which it stands in some essential relations. Ac- 
cordingly a phenomenon may be regarded as 



174 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

composed of externally related parts, each 
having its peculiar form, and yet all parts co- 
ordinated by means of a common bond which 
constitutes an underlying unity. This concep- 
tion leads us to the second pair of correla- 
tives, — -the relation of the whole to its parts. 

The concept of that which we call the whole 
of anything has its significance in the relation 
which the parts sustain one to another, and each 
to the combined aggregation. The whole dis- 
appears when we divide it into its component 
parts. This is especially true of organic life. A 
living body cannot be divided into its separate 
parts, and restored at will to its original form 
and functions. It is only the dead body that 
admits of dissection. The significance of all 
the parts lies in their inherence in one and the 
same organism and their coordinated functions 
in reference to each other and to the whole. 
The eye is an eye so long as it is a member of 
the body. An organ severed from its organism 
becomes at once a meaningless and worthless 
thing. 

Hegel draws attention to the fact also that 
psychologists often speak erroneously of the 
parts of the soul, or the parts of the mind, as 
though endowing such parts with a quasi inde- 



APPEARANCE 175 

pendence. It is of interest to note that he is 
here emphasizing by way of protest a truth 
which modern psychology has most fully en- 
dorsed, — namely, that psychical phenomena 
must be regarded as a unity, complex in the 
variety of functional manifestation, it is true, 
but nevertheless one and not many. The 
traditional theory of separate psychological 
faculties is here discarded by Hegel. He pro- 
tests that there is not any separate faculty of 
memory, or of reason, or of imagination, any 
more than there is a separate organ of the body 
whose life and function are independent of the 
other members, and of the organism as the 
central unity of them all. 

It may be said in general, therefore, that 
the form, or formative principle, is essentially 
a principle of organization, uniting the many 
into one and producing a symmetry of parts, 
a harmony of functions, and a congruence of 
relations, so that the world of phenomena, 
whether of nature or of mind, may be conceived 
by us as a world of order and of law. 

Hegel's conception of form, being essentially 
dynamic, the bond of unity which underlies the 
relation of the whole to its parts must be con- 
ceived as a formative principle, also dynamic. 



176 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

The relation of the several parts in any complex 
system one to another, and all to the whole, 
must therefore be mediated — that is, brought 
about — by the outputting of some energy. 
This dynamic element Hegel calls force (die 
Kraft) ; its outputting is called its external 
manifestation (die Aeusserung'). This pair of 
correlatives will be found necessary to complete 
the idea of an underlying dynamic basis. Any 
phenomenon whatsoever from the standpoint of 
its reflection in itself,— that is, regarded simply in 
its own light, — presents as its most evident char- 
acteristic a central and essential unity. The 
phenomenon appears, therefore, as an undivided 
whole. But from a different standpoint, and 
one that we dare not overlook, the phenomenon 
appears immediately to break up into a diversity 
of interrelated and coordinated parts. This is 
the standpoint of a reflection into something 
else, or the illumination of the central unity by 
the light reflected from each of its component 
parts and their several functions. Consequently, 
that by which the one breaks up into the many 
and the many in turn become unified in the one, 
must be referred to some underlying force which 
produces the specification of parts, and at the 
same time holds them together in an all-embrac- 



APPEARANCE 177 

ing unity within one common system. Thus 
the separate organs of an animal are developed 
through successive differentiations and integra- 
tions, separated into many, yet combined as 
one, and this is attained by the concerted 
action of the vital forces which are constantly 
operative in the organism, and which constitute 
it what it essentially is. 

Force, conceived of as mere force, and with- 
out the additional considerations which will be 
advanced later under the category of the notion, 
must be regarded merely as a blind force work- 
ing without purpose or intelligence. As thus 
conceived, it would require for its activity, accord- 
ing to Hegel, a special vehicle, as magnetic force 
seemed to require the presence of iron ; it would, 
moreover, be brought into activity only by some 
special solicitation, such as the presence of some 
other force upon which it is dependent. Thus, 
every force would seem to be dependent upon 
some other, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, force 
from this point of view must be regarded as 
essentially finite, because it is necessarily de- 
pendent and restricted. 

To speak, therefore, of God as force merely, 
though it may be writ large, FORCE, is never- 
theless an extremely impoverished conception of 



178 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

the fulness of the divine attributes. This was 
the fundamental error in Herder's general concep- 
tion of God. For the category of force must be 
complemented by the category of a final cause, 
thus introducing the conception of an activity 
that is self-determining and purposeful. 

Moreover, Hegel insists with characteristic 
consistency as regards his method and general 
point of view that the idea of force must not 
be divorced in our thoughts from its outer 
manifestation. It is of the very essence of force 
to manifest itself. Force and its manifestation 
are one and the same. It is misleading, there- 
fore, to state that force in itself is unknowable. 
It is knowable, but only in its manifestation ; but 
the manifestation is the essential expression of 
what the force itself really is. 

The final relation, that of the inner to the 
outer, is a relation which follows logically from 
that of force and its manifestation. Force in 
its essential nature represents the inner, and 
its manifestation of course represents the outer. 
The two are essentially identical. Mere exter- 
nality or mere internality are expressions which 
represent an empty and meaningless abstraction, 
and nothing more. 

It is customary to regard the essence of a 



APPEARANCE 179 

thing as merely that which is inward. It must 
be remembered, however, that it is of the in- 
herent nature of the essence to reveal itself in 
some form of external manifestation. As an 
illustration of this erroneous point of view, 
Hegel cites the poet Haller. The lines of Hal- 
ler, which, by the way, Hegel quotes incorrectly, 
are : — 

" Ins Innere der Natur 
Dringt kein erschaffener Geist 

Zu gliicklich wann sie noch die aussere Schale 
weist." 1 

With these words of Haller there may be 
compared the indignant comment of Goethe, 
which runs as follows : — 

" 6 Ins Innere der Natur ' — 
OduPhilister! — 
1 Dringt kein erschaffener Geist.' 
Mich und Geschwister 
Mogt ihr an solches Wort 
Nur nicht erinnern ; 
Wir denken : Ort fur Ort 
Sind wir im Innern. 
* Gluckselig wera sie nur 
Die aussere Schale weist ! ' 
Das hbre ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen 
Ich fluche darauf , aber verstohlen. 
Sage mir tausend tausend Male : 
Alles giebt sie reichlich und gem ; 

i § 140. 



180 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

Natur hat weder Kern 

Noch Schale, 

Alles ist sie mit einem Male ; 

Dich prlif e du nur allermeist 

Ob du Kern oder Schale seist." x 

Thus, as a man seems to be outwardly, so is 
he inwardly. What a man is, he does ; and what 
he does, manifests what he is. If his morality, 
Hegel insists, is a matter of inner intention 
merely, and if it never bears fruit in any exter- 
nal word or deed, then the inner purpose, how- 
ever noble it may be, loses its significance and 
worth. It is the understanding again which 
seeks to separate the inner from the outer. 
Thus conceived, they become merely empty 
abstractions. 

Hegel draws attention in this connection to 
a tendency which seems to operate in ignoble 
minds to decry and belittle the great and heroic 

1 " ' Into the inner depths of nature ' — oh ! thou Philistine 
— ' no created mind can penetrate. ' To me and mine it is 
hardly necessary to recall such a thought. We think that 
place for place we are in the inward parts. * Happy the 
man to whom nature merely shows her outward shell.' I 
have heard this repeated for sixty years and curse it withal, 
— but in secret. I say to myself a thousand thousand times : 
Nature gives everything lavishly and with good will. She 
has neither kernel nor shell. She is at the same time both 
the one and the other. Only, above all things, test thyself 
whether kernel or shell thou may'st prove to be." 



APPEARANCE 181 

deeds of history by insinuating that the ex- 
ternal action may not have a corresponding 
motive of nobility within. " If the heroes of 
history," says Hegel, "had been actuated by 
subjective and formal interests alone, they 
never would have accomplished what they have. 
And if we have due regard to the unity between 
the inner and the outer, we must own that 
great men purposed to do what they did, and 
that they did what they purposed." 1 

From any point which we may choose to 
view it, the distinction between inner and outer 
is resolved in a higher unity into which they 
are merged as one and the same. It is through 
the manifestation of force that every inner is 
necessarily constrained (gesetzf) to show itself 
as outer. Their distinction is to be regarded 
only as a necessary moment in the expression 
of their absolute identity. We speak of the 
relation of inner to outer as though they were 
contrasted terms of a ratio. Their relation is, 
however, that of a unity, in which the seem- 
ingly contrasted terms merge into one. Their 
distinction merely serves to emphasize the 
dynamic process, by which the manifestation of 
the essence is mediated, and yet this is in no 
»§14L 



182 THE DOCTKINE OF ESSENCE 

wise contradictory to their underlying unity as 
embraced in one and the same system. 

The identity of inner and outer, of force and 
its manifestation, constitutes the category of 
actuality (die WirklichJceit). This brings us 
to the final and most complete expression of 
the nature of essence; and this will be dis- 
cussed in the following chapter. 






CHAPTER XIII 

ACTUALITY, OR THE REAL WORLD 

ACTUALITY is defined by Hegel as the 
unity of essence and its manifestation, or 
the unity of inner and outer. It is incorrect 
to conceive the inner as the actual, and the 
outer as merely the phenomenal, the fleeting, 
the unreal. The actual is the essence as it 
reveals its innermost being through external 
manifestation ; it is the noumenal as it discloses 
its nature in the phenomenal. It is a false con- 
ception, also, to regard the external expression 
of that which is actual as the result of a transi- 
tion from a preceding state of quiescent being 
to its outer manifestation, though the mediation 
of some force which acts in an external manner. 
The actual is not something which is produced, 
turned out as if by a machine, and therefore to 
be regarded as a mere product. It is rather 
that which is self-producing. It is not merely 
the result of a process of development. It 
is the energizing force which underlies that 

183 



184 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

process as well. We have already seen that, 
according to Hegel's general conception of his 
system, the complete cosmic process is to be 
conceived as the expression of reason, and that 
reason is essentially the creative, constructive, 
and sustaining force in the universe. But this 
conception may also be regarded as the essen- 
tial characterization of the actual, or the real. 
The two points of view are in reality one and 
the same, and their significance may be summed 
up in the Hegelian formula : " The real is the 
rational, and the rational is the real." 

It is absurd, therefore, to draw the distinc- 
tion between the unreality of thought and the 
reality of all objective phenomena. It is 
utterly misleading to say, therefore, that while 
an idea may be good, or true, that it cannot be 
realized in actual experience. Such a diremp- 
tion of the world of ideas from the world of 
reality, Hegel insists, can arise only in the 
sphere of the abstract understanding, — that 
separating function of the mind, which is devoid 
of all synthetic capacity and unifying power. 

There is a popular misconception that Plato 
recognized the idea and only the idea, as the 
truth, and that Aristotle, on the other hand, 
rejected the idea, and retained only the actual. 



ACTUALITY 185 

The true conception of the relation between 
these two masters of Greek thought is this: 
that while the actual is the fundamental prin- 
ciple in the philosophy of Aristotle, neverthe- 
less, the actual with him is not merely the 
brute fact immediately at hand, but it embraces 
the idea as actuality also, which serves both to 
interpret and explain the given facts of con- 
sciousness. Aristotle characterized the idea of 
Plato as a mere Svva/Acs, — that is, a mere poten- 
tiality, — and insisted that the idea must be con- 
ceived essentially as it reveals itself in its 
manifestation, — that is, as ivepyeta. He there- 
fore defines reality as an entelechy (ivreXe'xeia) — 
that is, the self-realization of the essence in the 
phenomena. 1 By this conception Aristotle rec- 
onciled the antithesis between the Eleatic and 
the Heraclitean points of view. Hegel's posi- 
tion is substantially the same as that of Aris- 
totle; for in his system throughout there is a 
fundamental recognition of the necessity of 
combining in one the complementary elements 
of potentiality and actuality. From this point 
of view the dialectic movement may be defined 
merely as a process of transition from the poten- 
tial to the actual. 
1 See Windelband's History of Philosophy, Eng. tr., p. 130 f. 



186 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

Approaching now a more careful analysis of 
the concept of actuality, we find that its primary 
and most fundamental element is the idea of 
possibility (die Moglichkeit). The possible, ac- 
cording to Hegel, is an essential moment in 
every actual phenomenon. It is, however, not 
to be confused with the barren possibility of 
mere fancy. In the world of the imagination, 
all things are possible. It is possible that the 
moon might fall into the earth. Caesar might 
not have crossed the Rubicon. Charles I of 
England might have been exiled instead of 
beheaded. Napoleon might have been killed 
at the battle of Waterloo. All such possibil- 
ities of the imagination must rank as footless 
speculations. The name given to them by 
Hegel is that of formal possibilities, that is, 
having the mere form or outer shell of reality. 
A possibility, however, to which some signifi- 
cance is attached, and which may be called 
a significant possibility to distinguish it from 
the merely formal possibility, must always be 
regarded as the preliminary stage of every form 
of development which in the very process of its 
unfolding reveals the necessity to which the 
potential must have been subjected in order 
to push itself forth into the actual. Such a 



ACTUALITY 187 

possibility may be called also with appropriate- 
ness, real or actual possibility. 

Actuality, however, considered apart from its 
inner potentiality as its essential ground, pre- 
sents to us only its external face. Looking at 
it from this point of view exclusively, we find 
ourselves confronted with the external aspect 
of actuality which immediately discloses the 
category of contingency (die Zufdlligheif) as 
its basal characteristic. The contingent refers 
to the external relation which obtains between 
phenomena. 

This relation may be such that one phenom- 
enon depends externally upon some other phe- 
nomenon so that the one forms the condition of 
the other. The idea of the contingent when 
definitely expressed in a concrete relation is 
thus to be regarded as the condition (die Be- 
dingung) upon the presence or absence of which 
depends the presence or absence of the phe- 
nomenon which is related to it. 

The r61e of a phenomenon which fulfils the 
function of a condition may be characterized as 
follows : It is a special existence, an imme- 
diate thing ; it has also a vocation, as it were, 
to be destroyed in its primary form in order to 
conserve the realization of something else. As 



188 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

such it fulfils its own destiny, and although 
dying in its own individuality, it lives in an- 
other, and the other form for which it was evi- 
dently designed by its own nature is so near 
of kin that it may be properly regarded as its 
own true self. In other words, to use an He- 
gelian expression, the condition is aufgehoben in 
the resulting phenomenon to which it gives 
rise, and into whose actuality its own essence 
enters and is there conserved. When, however, 
the point of view is not exclusively confined 
to the external manifestation, but when the 
external manifestation is regarded as the neces- 
sary development of an inner organizing activ- 
ity which has been characterized as the real 
possibility, or the possibility regarded as the 
potential of reality, then the potential, the 
process, and the resulting product may be con- 
ceived as constituting together the actual fact. 
The actual fact, moreover, embraces all the 
purely external relations of contingency, includ- 
ing all the conditions which both contribute to 
and are merged in the actual fact itself. 

In such a process, wherein on one side the 
potential tends to become actual, and on the 
other the purely external conditions themselves 
contribute to the process as essential factors, 



ACTUALITY 189 

and so far forth lose the external character of 
their relations, — in such a process the develop- 
ment reveals some underlying necessity which 
expresses itself as a law of uniformity and uni- 
versality. Hegel defines the idea of necessity, 
(die Nothwendigkeif) as the unity of the potential 
and the actual. The development of the one 
into the other we are constrained to believe must 
take place, and that it must take place in some 
one definite way rather than in any other. That 
is what is meant by necessity. Necessity signi- 
fies something more than that one thing has been 
derived from another. The idea of derivation 
does not exhaust the meaning of necessity. What 
is merely derivative is a product which is what 
it is, not through itself but through something 
else. That which is necessary contains the 
additional idea that it must be what it is 
through itself and through the activity of its 
own inner processes ; and even if it is deriva- 
tive, it must still contain the antecedent whence 
it is derived as a vanishing element within 
itself. The necessary is something which is 
mediated (yermittelt) and yet mediated through 
that which belongs to itself, — that is, mediated 
by the inner constraint of its own nature. Such 
an inner determination which arises from the 



190 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

very nature of a thing itself, Hegel refers to as 
gesetzt. Any characteristic, according to Hegel, 
is said to be gesetzt when it can be shown as the 
necessary outcome of the very nature of the 
object to which it is referred. Whenever that 
which is given in thought leads by the very 
necessity of the thought processes themselves 
to a conclusion dependent upon it as its 
premise, the resulting conclusion is always 
described by Hegel as gesetzt. All phases of 
the dialectic process are gesetzt in the sense of 
following by a necessary constraint of thought 
from the very nature of that which precedes 
them. This term is so intimately associated with 
the idea of necessity which underlies the whole 
dialectic movement of thought that it has seemed 
worth while to explain it somewhat at length. 

The contingent represented by an external 
condition of a fact is not merely a condition 
external to the fact and sustaining only a pass- 
ing relation to it ; it must be conceived also as 
an essential element of the fact itself. The 
condition and the fact fall together in one and 
the same system. It is the business of philoso- 
phy to reveal the necessity which, although at 
a far deeper level, nevertheless always under- 
lies the contingent. 



ACTUALITY 191 

It is again the work of the abstract under- 
standing which draws a sharp line of distinction 
between the idea of necessity and that of free- 
dom (die Freiheif). When we regard all 
phenomena as necessitated, ourselves included, 
we at first sight seem to occupy, as Hegel puts 
it, "a thoroughly slavish and dependent posi- 
tion." 1 It must be borne in mind, however, 
that any kind of freedom which is wholly devoid 
of the element of necessity is nothing more or 
less than mere caprice. There is such a thing 
as a perfectly free activity which nevertheless 
recognizes the inherent law of its own being, 
and endeavors freely to realize it. Such free- 
dom is the only true freedom. Were a man to 
feel that he is under the spell of an inevitable 
fate and that he is not in the remotest degree 
dependent upon his own exertions, then it 
would follow that all his activities would be- 
come paralyzed, and he would find himself out 
of harmony with the world system of which he 
is a part. To realize, on the other hand, that 
he is the architect of his own fortune and the 
master of his fate, is to inspire him with the 
earnest desire and strong purpose to realize 
the best that is in him. Hegel holds that the 
1 § 147. 



192 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

individuality of man is so embraced in the 
absolute universal as to be conserved and not 
destroyed. This conception will be more fully 
developed when we come to the exposition of 
the notion, which in its highest expression is 
the divine reason to which all personalities 
owe their being, and which constitutes at the 
same time the charter of their freedom. 

Necessity, then, is the expression of that 
binding connection which links together condi- 
tion, fact, and activity in one and the same 
system, and the question naturally suggests 
itself, What is the fundamental nature of 
that system which exhibits the underlying ne- 
cessity as a bond uniting all of its essential 
elements together? Hegel's answer to this 
question, as might be surmised, is a threefold 
one. He views the idea of necessity under the 
following categories : — 

(1) Substantiality. (Die Substantialitat.} 

(2) Causality. (Die Kausalitat.*) 

(3) Reciprocal activity. (Die Wechselwir- 
kung.} 

These categories express the several possible 
ways by which any fact is connected with its 
corresponding condition through some mediat- 
ing activity. 



ACTUALITY 193 

The category of substantiality is the immedi- 
ate and primary form which the relation of 
necessity assumes in connecting every potential 
state of development with its corresponding 
actual. The actual which is present as a fact, 
appears and then disappears ; for a fact regarded 
as a mere fact, and a separate existence re- 
garded merely as a separate existence, have no 
permanency. Such facts rise and fall again ; 
they are and again are not. There is a per- 
petual ebb and flow, growth and decay, through- 
out all nature. 

" Our little systems have their day, 
They have their day and cease to be." 

But underlying all these ephemeral forms and 
evanescent properties, there is nevertheless 
some underlying basis which remains absolutely 
constant. This is the fundamental substance. 
Upon its surface all things appear in their brief 
moment of individuality. They sink again 
into the all-absorbing element whence they 
arose. Their fleeting existence marks them as 
the veriest accidents of being in contrast to the 
stability which characterizes the substance of 
which they are but the passing modes. They 
are the many; the substance is the one. This 
distinction corresponds to that which was drawn 



194 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

between the whole and its parts already re- 
ferred to in the preceding chapter upon the 
nature of the phenomenal world. 

Hegel's conception of substance bears upon 
its face the stamp of Spinoza. There is, how- 
ever, a radical point of departure, inasmuch as 
Spinoza ascribes no reality to the phenomenal 
world. The Erscheinung is merely Schein^ — 
that is, the phenomenal is only an illusion, and 
possesses no separate individuality of its own. 
Hegel suggests that this is an oriental strain 
which has appeared in Spinoza's thinking owing 
to his Hebrew ancestry. Hegel himself enters 
a protest against the elimination of the idea 
of a real individuality. In this connection 
he introduces into his system the principle of 
individuality, as insisted upon by Leibniz in 
opposition to Spinoza. 

At this point Hegel also emphasizes the im- 
propriety of calling Spinoza an atheist. His 
infidelity is not toward God so much as toward 
the world. His system is essentially one of 
acosmism. He denied the reality of the world ; 
and in losing the world lost his own soul at the 
same time, for the unreality of the Ego follows 
logically from the unreality of the world of 
which it forms a part. 



ACTUALITY 195 

In the passage in which Hegel criticises the 
defects of Spinoza's system, 1 there is clearly 
revealed on Hegel's part the desire to save 
his own system from a pantheistic drift. He 
there disclaims most stoutly any profession of 
pantheism. It is a question, of course, whether 
his system as a whole may not logically lead 
to pantheistic conclusions, despite its author's 
protests to the contrary. Nevertheless, it is a 
fact which is most significant, that Hegel did 
not himself judge that his system necessarily 
demanded a pantheistic interpretation. And 
this fact should not be ignored in a criticism of 
Hegel's general position. In the third part of 
the Logic, moreover, Hegel maintains that the 
Absolute is more than mere substance, for in 
the doctrine of the notion the supreme reason 
or God is regarded as subject rather than sub- 
stance, a personality rather than an empty and 
indefinite abstraction. Without this qualifica- 
tion the substance of Spinoza would be, as 
Hegel puts it, " merely the universal all-devour- 
ing [negative] power, like a vast, dark, and 
boundless abyss, into which all things sink and 
are forever lost." 2 

Hegel's conception of substance marks but a 
J § 15 J, Zusatz. 2 § 151. 



196 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

preliminary stage which must be further devel- 
oped and supplemented. The Hegelian sub- 
stance, regarded merely as substance, while 
constant and abiding is nevertheless only static. 
The individual manifestations of the phenom- 
enal occur in connection with it, proceeding 
from it and again returning to it. But sub- 
stance, as such, lacks the dynamic power to 
initiate action, and to produce the results flow- 
ing from it. That which is thus connected 
with it is still only accidental in reference to 
it. And therefore the concept of substance is 
necessitated by the inner constraint of thought 
to develop the idea of causality inherently con- 
nected with it. The substance becomes cause ; 
the static passes over into the dynamic. The 
relation of substance and accident (that is, of 
substance to any one of the properties connected 
with it and which rank as accidents in reference 
to it) we may regard as corresponding to the 
relation already discussed, — that of the whole 
to its parts. In a similar manner, also, the 
relation of cause and effect may be considered 
as corresponding to that of force and its mani- 
festation. 

The German word for cause, die Ursache, 
indicates an original or originating element. 






ACTUALITY 197 

Cause in this sense is to be regarded as a causa 
sui. It possesses, from this point of view, the 
capacity of initiation, and of producing its effect 
as the necessary consequence of its own being 
and activity. From one point of view cause and 
effect are distinct terms. But this represents 
a finite and abstract view of their relations, 
such as is the result of the mere understanding. 
From a more comprehensive point of view the 
two terms, which seem to be distinct, in reality 
fall together as one. The cause reveals itself 
as a cause only so far as it is manifested in the 
effect. And the effect has significance as an 
effect only so far as it is seen to be connected 
with its cause. In a sense, we speak of the 
rain as the cause of the dampness of the 
ground, and yet a deeper consideration reveals 
the fact that the dampness is the rain itself, 
only in another form. The rain causes the 
dampness and it is the dampness. The effect, 
therefore, is merely the manifestation of the 
activity of the cause. The cause is conserved in 
the effect and the effect is potential in the cause. 
Although the relation which obtains between 
the cause and the effect may be regarded as a 
transition from one state to another, with an 
accompanying conservation of the former state 



198 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

in the latter, nevertheless there is nothing to 
limit this process and so render it thoroughly- 
satisfactory as a final account of the matter. 
Cause leads to effect, and the effect in turn 
becomes a cause, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, 
the causal relation may be traced backward 
from a given effect to its cause, and the cause 
of that cause, and so on without limit, or for- 
ward from effect to effect also without limit. 
There seems to be no starting-point and no end. 
As thus stated, the doctrine of causation is in- 
complete, and therefore most unsatisfactory. A 
natural complement to this conception of causa- 
tion is one that is found growing out of its 
very limitations, and is known as the doctrine 
of reciprocal activity, or the relation of action 
and reaction. 

Causation, therefore, is to be regarded, accord- 
ing to Hegel, as finding its most complete ex- 
pression in the concept of reciprocal activity 
(die WeehselwirJcung^), which represents the rela- 
tion obtaining between cause and effect as con- 
sisting of a mutual interaction. The cause 
produces the effect, and yet the effect in turn 
reacts upon the cause in such a manner that 
the cause is as much a product of the effect 
as the effect is of the cause. 



ACTUALITY 199 

This principle of interaction is best illus- 
trated by the reciprocal relations which parts of 
one and the same organism sustain to each 
other, — for example, in the human body the 
several organs are related in a reciprocal man- 
ner, so that they function in such a way as 
to act and react upon one another, in an 
indefinite variety of manifestations. Hegel 
draws attention also to the relation of the 
character and customs of a people to their 
constitution, and insists that this always is of 
the nature of a reciprocal relation. The con- 
stitution is in a sense the outgrowth and the 
expression of the national character, but from 
another point of view the national character is 
intimately affected and modified by the consti- 
tution. So also we often say that drunkenness 
causes poverty; it is quite as true that pov- 
erty causes drunkenness. There are instances, 
therefore, as indicated by these illustrations, 
wherein the cause in question does not lead 
to an endless causal progression or regression, 
but the causal series in such cases is to be 
conceived no longer as a line extending with- 
out limit in either direction, but as a line 
which bends backward upon itself, represent- 
ing the reacting influence of the effect upon 



200 THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE 

the supposed cause. This connection being 
established, the circulatory movement of causa- 
tion always works back again to the starting- 
point. Within the bounds of this circle there 
is disclosed a certain kind of self-sufficiency. 
Cause and effect fall together in one and the 
same area, and in their mutual dependence 
they are nevertheless independent of everjr- 
thing else. The cause finds in the effect, not 
merely its other, but its own real self. Cause 
is not one thing, and the effect something 
which is outside of the cause, and externally 
related to it. They together form one closed 
system. From this point of view, cause must 
be conceived as possessing in a measure the 
power of initiative, of self-direction, and self- 
construction. It ranks no longer as a mere 
force resident in some underlying substance. 
It rises to the higher dignity of proceeding 
from a source which partakes of the nature 
of a subject rather than a substance. The 
underlying necessity, a self-imposed necessity, 
is such as to form a natural transition to 
that which is, therefore, actually the expression 
of the truest kind of freedom. 

The highest form of substance we have 
found to be that of cause. The highest form 



ACTUALITY 201 

of cause is that of reciprocal action and re- 
action. The highest form of reciprocal action 
is that which passes over into self-directed 
and self-determined action. The transition 
now is a natural and easy one to the doctrine 
of the notion (der Begriff), the self-directing 
formative principle of reason which is the 
underlying and essential principle of all being. 
This transition from the category of essence 
to that of the notion may be expressed in a 
word, — it is a transition from the idea of 
substance to that of subject ; from the idea 
of necessity to that of freedom. 



PAET III 

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 



Der Begriff ist das Princip alles Lebens und damit 
zugleich das schlechthin Konkrete. Der Begriff ist das 
den Dingen selbst Innewohnende ; wodurch sie das 
sind, was sie sind. Die Idee ist die Wahrheit; denn 
die Wahrheit ist diess, dass die Objektivitat dem 
Begriffe entspricht. — Hegel. 



PART III 

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

CHAPTER XIV 

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION 

WE have followed the dialectic movement 
through the various stages of the cate- 
gories of being and of essence, and have found 
the development logically continuous and pro- 
gressive. Its most complete expression, as 
reached by our investigation thus far, has re- 
vealed a fundamental factor which is not merely 
a determining factor, but a self-determining 
factor as well. Hegel's Begriff, which we will 
translate by the word notion, is nothing more 
or less than this complete expression of all that 
is contained in the categories of being and of 
essence. Hegel calls the notion the truth of 
being and of essence. It is the underlying 
substratum of all things, needing no support 
itself because self-supporting ; requiring no 
further explanation of itself because self-ex- 

205 



206 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

planatory ; dependent upon no external deter- 
mination because it is self-determined. 

We have already discussed the category of 
form, and have seen that Hegel uses this term 
always to signify a constructive formative prin- 
ciple essentially dynamic in its nature. By the 
term notion he means not only that which is 
the source of this dynamic principle, but also 
that which is at the same time a self-sufficient 
source. He has advanced from the conception 
of form as the principle of activity to that of 
form as the principle of self-activity. 

The notion, moreover, is not to be conceived 
as merely a form of the understanding, ranking 
as a logical concept such as our idea of a uni- 
versal class or group of objects, as of man, dog, 
horse, and the like. Such a group or class idea, 
ranking merely as a formal concept, is the 
veriest skeleton of thought. It is dead, empty, 
— wholly abstract, as Hegel would put it. The 
notion, on the contrary, is most thoroughly 
concrete, — that is, it is thought as an active 
constructive and productive force. It has more 
than a mere subjective value. It is not a mere 
idea in the mind. The true thought is a force, 
and the true force is self-determining and self- 
active; all other thoughts and all other forces 



THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION 207 

are but the shadows of reality. The true 
thought manifests itself in some external man- 
ner, in the inventions of the mechanician, in 
the institutions of the state, in the charities of 
the church, in the paintings and statues of the 
artist, in the deeds great and small of human 
beings, who think, and plan, and act withal. 
Hegel regards the notion as the living spirit of 
all that is actual, pervading and dominating all 
forms of life and all phases of activity, from 
the simplest to the most complex, and from the 
lowest to the highest. The standpoint is evi- 
dently one of absolute idealism. The chief and 
most characteristic feature of the doctrine of 
the notion is that of subjectivity, for Hegel 
says again and again that the underlying sub- 
stance of the universe as conceived by Spinoza 
should be a subject and not a substance. The 
notion he calls, therefore, the Ego, — that is, the 
underlying power beneath, and in all things is 
also a personality. It is essentially self-conscious. 
It is not merely an intelligent force, but it is an 
intelligent force working both consciously and 
purposefully. There is in the Hegelian system 
no place for a force, as conceived by von Hart- 
mann, which works intelligently but uncon- 
sciously, and therefore blindly. 



208 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

The element of necessity, moreover, which 
lies at the basis of the concept of substance and 
of causation, is in the doctrine of the notion 
transmuted into freedom, inasmuch as the 
necessity is regarded as a self-imposed necessity. 
The self-determining power of the notion is 
to be conceived, therefore, as essentially a free 
activity. It is an activity not merely an szch, 
— that is, possessing the potentiality of activity, 
nor is it merely filr sick, — that is, the explicit 
realization of the potential activity; it is both 
an sich and filr sick, — that is, it possesses the 
self-sufficient power and capacity for self-deter- 
mined activity, an activity which consciously 
transmutes its potential into the actual. 

Thus conceived, the notion, being spontaneous 
and unconditional, may be regarded as the final 
and most complete characterization of the Abso- 
lute. The Absolute, therefore, may be most 
adequately defined as the notion. This is not 
only the highest expression of the nature of the 
Absolute, it is the all-comprehensive definition 
as well. The notion embodying the truth of all 
phases both of being and of essence, it follows 
that all the characterizations of the Absolute 
contained in the categories of being and of 
essence which the successive stages of the dia- 



THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION 209 

lectic movement have manifested, may now be 
completely summed up in the all-embracing 
nature of the notion. Hegel, therefore, defines 
the notion also as the totality of all things 
(die Totalitdf). It represents the fulness of 
all content, being both self-contained and all 
containing. The moments of all forms of activ- 
ity are embraced within it. It is the great uni- 
fying principle of the cosmos. It forms both 
the whence and the whither of all things. It 
must, therefore, be immanent in all things. 
The notion, moreover, contains all the earlier 
determinations of thought as conserved in itself. 
The contradictions which have been necessarily 
involved in the earlier stages of the develop- 
ment have been overcome by being sublimated 
in its higher unity. 

The dialectic movement from the standpoint 
of the notion is essentially one of development 
(die Entwickelung}. That movement in respect 
to the earlier category of being we found to be 
that of a transition, the passage from definite 
being to its corresponding other. In the cate- 
gory of essence, the dialectic process is mediated 
by the idea of reflection which marks no transi- 
tion from definite being to its other but rather 
an illumination of definite being by the light 



210 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

cast upon it by its other. The other thus func- 
tions as the complementary correlative of the 
original being in question, and gives to it point 
and significance. But when we come to the 
category of the notion, there is an actual devel- 
opment from that which is given into its other 
in such a manner that the unity of the two is 
completely preserved, and the former finds in 
its other only that which is the complementary 
part of itself. As such it forms the truth of 
the transition which characterizes the dialectic 
movement in being, and of the reflection which 
characterizes the dialectic movement in essence. 

The evolution which is due to the activity of 
the notion is essentially a self-development. It 
is of the very nature of the notion that it should 
manifest itself, and that, too, in all the various 
phases of its manifold possibilities. The idea of 
development, the continuous unfolding of all 
that is potential in the notion, demands a single 
unifying principle in the midst of the super- 
abounding diversity of content, manifesting it- 
self in a progressive process in which each 
succeeding stage is more completely realized 
than the one before. 

The manifestation of this principle takes place 
in time, producing the present cosmic order; 



THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION 211 

nevertheless, the truth of this principle in its ful- 
ness and in all the logically coordinated stages 
of its evolution must be regarded as uncon- 
ditioned and undetermined by time. The essen- 
tial nature of this evolution is primarily dialectic, 

— that is, each stage must be regarded as the nec- 
essary complement of the one before, in the 
sense that it overcomes its contradictions and 
supplies its defects. This is fundamentally a 
logical demand. As Hegel would put it, any 
given stage is gesetzt by that which precedes, 

— that is, from that which is contained in the 
former, the reason is necessarily constrained to 
infer the latter. Thought is thus under com- 
pulsion, — - the compulsion of its own nature to 
develop its concepts from the simplest to the 
more and more complex. Each stage of such a 
development, because unsatisfactory as the com- 
plete expression of truth, demands a fuller and 
more satisfactory stage which lies just beyond, 
which will in a measure correct its errors and 
supplement its defects, but which in turn will 
cause new questions to arise which it cannot 
answer and new contradictions which it cannot 
resolve. And thus the onward dialectic move- 
ment proceeds not from one period of time to 
another so much as from the idea of imperfec- 



212 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

tion to that of perfection, from the idea of in- 
completeness to that of completeness. When 
the temporal process has been completed, it fur- 
nishes a completed product. You cannot go 
backward, rolling it up again, as it were, into its 
closed potentiality, and then repeat the process 
at will. Movement in time is from the bud to 
the full-blown rose, but the rose cannot shut 
and be a bud again. But this reverse move- 
ment is always possible in reference to the 
thought relations which underlie any series of 
development. Given certain premises, the con- 
clusion must develop itself out of them ; and 
given the conclusion containing its major and 
minor terms, it is possible to work backward 
when once the proper middle term has been 
discovered to the original premises. It is the 
so-called process of reduction which reverses 
the forward movement of deduction. 

Moreover, the development in time is essen- 
tially finite; the dialectic development of 
thought is essentially infinite. The develop- 
ment in time represents a gradual change from 
stage to stage; the dialectic development is a 
fuller and fuller revelation of that which, in 
spite of its indefinitely varied manifestations, is 
ever one and the same, — the absolute. The 



THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE NOTION 213 

temporal development falls within the dialectic 
movement, and may be regarded as a moment in 
the larger process. * 

In the revelation of the full significance of 
the notion, or in other words, in its dialectic 
movement, three stages appear which are so 
related that either the first or the second taken 
by itself proves to be misleading and unsatisfac- 
tory, and has a final significance only when it 
unites with the other to form a complete syn- 
thesis which constitutes the third stage. These 
stages form the three divisions of the category 
of the notion. They are as follows : — 

(1) The Notion as Subjective. (Ber sub- 
jective Begriff.) 

(2) The Notion as Objective. {Ber objective 
Begriff.) 

(3) The Notion as the Synthesis of Sub- 
jective and Objective. (Bie Idee.') 

The fundamental thesis which Hegel endeav- 
ors to maintain is that the reality of thought 
consists in its productiveness. He regards 
thought, as we have seen, as a constructive, 
self-determining force underlying the universe 
of things, fashioning all creatures, and shaping 

1 See Bailie : Hegel's Logic, Chapter IX ; also McTag- 
gart : Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, Chapter V. 



214 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

all events. Now, if thought is merely subjec- 
tive, it appears, as regards its essential function 
as a force centre completely paralyzed. On the 
other hand, mere objectivity which is regarded 
as separated from any subjective thought what- 
soever is essentially irrational, and such a state, 
from the Hegelian point of view, must be con- 
sidered as unreal. The objective is not set over 
against the subjective, but the subjective is 
immanent in the objective ; and it is of the very 
nature of the subjective as a thought activity 
that it should strive to realize itself in the 
objective. As Hegel puts it, our "thoughts do 
not stand between us and things, shutting us 
off from things; they rather shut us together 
with things." The synthesis of these two 
moments constitutes the notion in its true 
form and function. The notion thus in its 
highest expression is the Idea (die Idee) 
— that is, the supreme Reason, the Absolute. 
The subjective notion and the objective notion 
are each indeterminate and incomplete. In the 
synthesis of subject and of object, the world of 
thought and the world of reality, we find the 
true type of notion, — not merely formal and 
abstract, but concrete, dynamic, conscious, all- 
controlling, all-embracing, free. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 

THE subjective notion, as we have seen, is 
the notion regarded merely in one of its 
aspects, as constituting the sum of the thought 
processes. These processes taken together form 
a system in which all of the thought relations 
are determined by the fundamental nature of 
thought itself. These relations divide naturally 
into three typical thought forms, and in this 
division Hegel follows the traditional logic. 
These forms are as follows: — 

(1) The Notion regarded simply as a formal 
Notion. (Der Begriff als soldier.*) 

(2) The Judgment. (Das Urtheil.) 

(3) The Syllogism. (JDer Schluss.) 

The primary type of thought which Hegel 
calls the notion, regarded simply as notion, 
corresponds in some of its main features to the 
ordinary concept of formal logic. It is treated 
in the Hegelian system without reference to its 
natural setting as one of the component parts 

215 



216 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

of the judgment and syllogism. This view 
of the notion is of course only a provisional 
one which represents merely an abstract 
analysis of the thought processes, preliminary 
to a subsequent synthesis, which will represent 
their component parts as properly coordinated 
and unified. The notion thus conceived as a 
separate thought element, is found to contain 
three essential factors, or as the Hegelian ter- 
minology goes, moments, — that of universal- 
ity, of particularity, and of individuality (das 
Allgemeine, das Besondere, das Einzelne). 

It should be noticed that Hegel does not 
divide notions into three kinds, the universal, 
the particular, and the individual, but he re- 
gards the one and the same notion as embrac- 
ing in a unity these three coordinated aspects. 
Hegel at the outset in the discussion of the 
notion evidently wishes to emphasize the truth 
that while the categories of reflection, such as 
appearance and ground, cause and effect, and 
the like, may be separately apprehended each 
apart from its correlative, this however is not 
the case concerning the categories of the notion. 
These categories must be conceived as insepa- 
rable moments of the one notion, and if they 
do not all appear in a complete synthesis of 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 217 

thought, the very integrity of the simple notion 
itself is essentially impaired. A notion regarded 
as representing a universal merely, that is a 
class or group idea, must rank in our thoughts 
as an absolutely empty genus unless it contains 
some suggestion at least of the capacity to real- 
ize itself in different kinds of species which 
would then represent its particularity. And a 
particular notion, representing a species, not 
only implies a higher genus which is its neces- 
sary universal, but it in turn must suggest also 
the capacity of realizing itself in definite indi- 
viduals. The relations of genus, species, and 
the individual, represent most clearly and ade- 
quately the three Hegelian moments of the 
simple notion, — universality, particularity, and 
individuality. Any one of them necessarily 
implies the other two. 

Hegel's criticism of the traditional logic is 
that its general term or class idea is a notion 
in only one of its aspects, that of its uni- 
versality, and that the other two moments 
of particularity and of individuality are over- 
looked. Thus it follows that the purely 
formal logician, the literalist, often ignores par- 
ticular instances which are not in accord with 
his general notions, or else wrests his individual 



218 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

facts so that they may conform to his precon- 
ceived theories. It is the moment of individual- 
ity in the notion which constitutes its actuality, 
which differentiates it from the mere fancy 
of the imagination. The individual object 
is always the most convincing proof as well 
as the clearest illustration of the universal. 
Nothing will so quickly reveal the emptiness 
of thought as a succession of glittering gener- 
alities which admit of no particular application 
or definite verification. And on the other hand, 
also, it must not be overlooked that if the sig- 
nificance of the individual is to be adequately 
interpreted, it must be possible to refer it un- 
erringly to some universal. The work of the 
scholar or of the man of science is not complete 
when he has collected facts, however numerous 
they may be; he must relate fact to law and 
rise above the particular results of his investi- 
gation to the appreciation of the universal 
which they embody. This relation of the in- 
dividual object to the universal, Hegel illus- 
trates by showing that it was only when the 
world came to recognize every man, whether 
Greek or barbarian, bond or free, as possessing 
an infinite and universal nature, that man's real 
significance for himself and for society was 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 219 

fully understood and properly valued. The 
recognition of a man as a person and not a 
thing is simply the recognition that the prin- 
ciple of personality is in reality a principle of 
universality. The universal is not to be con- 
ceived, therefore, as merely the sum total of the 
various elements which a number of individuals 
have in common ; it is rather that active princi- 
ple which specifies and determines the individ- 
uals, building them together in a unity with 
itself. As Hegel says, " Things are what 
they are through the action of the notion im- 
manent in them and revealing itself in them." x 
Thus every individual in the midst of all his 
particular traits of character and conduct re- 
veals the universal strain of humanity. 

Corresponding respectively to the three mo- 
ments of universality, particularity, and individ- 
uality are the three categories which were found 
to constitute the fundamental elements of the 
idea of essence, — namely, that of identity, of 
difference, and of ground. Thus the universal is, 
in its nature essentially self-identical, — that is, 
perfectly homogeneous throughout and without 
distinction as to the particular varieties which 
embody and illustrate it. It is, however, under 
1 § 163, Zusatz (2). 



220 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

an irresistible compulsion of thought (gesetzf) 
to break up into particular varieties or species, 
and this it does through the process of differ- 
entiation according to the category of difference. 
But in these particular manifestations it is the 
underlying universal which is always present. 
Moreover, the universal can manifest itself as 
an identity in the midst of all differences only 
in that which can form the common ground of 
such a union, — namely, in a series of differ- 
ent individuals. 

When the universal subjects itself to the 
natural compulsion of thought, and becomes 
more specific by manifesting the various aspects 
of its particularity, then we have the notion 
developed in the form of a judgment. To judge 
is to make definite and specific the complete 
nature of the notion. 

This specification of the notion which is the 
essential function of the judgment, is a process 
of breaking up the homogeneity of the notion 
in its purely universal features, and showing 
that it admits of a varied manifestation in 
respect to a number of particular instances of 
the universal, each ranking as a distinct species 
within the all-embracing genus. To specify these 
particular instances in detail, and give at the 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 221 

same time their differentiating characteristics, 
would necessitate a series of judgments whose 
sum, when complete, would exhaust the full 
significance of the universal notion as such. 
The German word for the judgment is das 
Urtheil, — that is, the primary division, — and 
thus signifies most strikingly the original break- 
ing up of the notion into the particular forms of 
its manifestation, which, as we have seen, con- 
stitutes the essential function of the judgment. 

The judgment when expressed in words 
naturally shapes itself in the following form, 
"The individual is the universal." This as- 
serts an underlying identity between the uni- 
versal, as such, and its particular manifestation 
in some concrete individual instance. 

Hegel's conception of the essential function 
of the copula will be found to be in complete 
accord with the view of the modern logic. 
The copula does not signify that the subject 
and predicate of a proposition have been brought 
together merely by a juxtaposition of thought, 
and thus connected by a convenient thought 
form. Its function is rather to emphasize the 
fact that the two seemingly separate elements, 
appearing as subject and predicate terms, respec- 
tively, are in reality identical, and that their 



222 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

fusion into one is indicated by their union in 
one and the same judgment through the con- 
necting copula. The subject and predicate 
terms must not be regarded as two independent 
extremes. Nor is the predicate to be conceived 
as a general characteristic, lying outside the 
subject, and having a separate existence some- 
where in our heads. It is an essential phase of 
the subject itsfelf. 

It must be remembered in this connection 
that the judgment is merely an expanded form 
of the notion. There is an obvious unity 
attaching to the essential nature of the notion. 
This unity is not lost, therefore, when the 
notion puts itself in the more explicit form of 
the judgment. The seemingly separate terms 
which the copula connects have no really sepa- 
rate subsistence apart from their underlying 
connection. When we say " This rose is red," 
we mean that the particular rose now in the 
field of perception partakes of the nature, and 
is a specific instance, of the universal red; and 
on the other hand, that the universal red, in 
connection with this particular rose, manifests 
itself in the specific shade of red which char- 
acterizes this special rose in question. 

In general, it may be said, that in every judg- 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 223 

merit the subject and predicate so blend to- 
gether that the particularity of the subject 
partakes of the nature of the universality ex- 
pressed in the predicate, and that on the other 
hand the universality of the predicate in turn 
partakes of the nature of the particularity ex- 
pressed in the subject. The identity of the 
subject and predicate, thus bound together in 
one, constitutes what Hegel calls the specific 
content of the judgment (der bestimmte Inhalt 
des Urtheils}, It is that which constitutes the 
judgment's essential significance. 

The relation, moreover, in which the subject 
and predicate become one is not due to our 
thinking, which, as it were, imposes this con- 
nection externally upon things. The relation, 
on the contrary, exists in the very nature of the 
things themselves, and our thought about them 
is only our discovery of a relation already exist- 
ing. If the notion is to be regarded, as Hegel 
insists, as the constructive force immanent in all 
things, then the judgment is merely the definite 
manifestation of the indwelling potentiality of 
the notion in an explicit manner and in certain 
specific instances. It is an actual manifestation, 
moreover, and one which is subjectively revealed 
to be that which it is in its objective reality. 



224 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

In this connection Hegel distinguishes be- 
tween a judgment and a proposition (der Satz). 
The proposition contains an assertion in refer- 
ence to a given subject, which does not stand 
in any relation of universality to its predicate, 
but expresses some single state or action which 
is the result of a contingent relation of subject 
and predicate, as the so-called narrative judg- 
ments, such as " Csesar crossed the Rubicon," or 
"It rained last evening." In the judgment 
proper, the connection between subject and 
predicate is freed from any disturbing element 
of contingency. This distinction does not obtain, 
however, in the formal logic, as the proposition 
is a term there employed to indicate merely the 
judgment as expressed in language in the form 
of a sentence. 

Hegel divides the judgment into three types, 
which correspond to the three main divisions of 
the Logic : — 

(1) The Judgment of Being. 

(2) The Judgment of Essence. 

(3) The Judgment of Notion. 

These types of judgment form a series of pro- 
gressive development. The distinctions between 
them are due in each case to the logical signifi- 
cance of the predicate. There is, for instance, 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 225 

a manifest difference in logical value between 
the two judgments : — 

The rose is red. 

The statue is beautiful. 

The former is the result of a simple percep- 
tion, while the latter is the result of a more 
complicated thought process which is based 
upon a comparison between the object of percep- 
tion and the kind of being which we conceive 
it ought to realize, — that is, its ideal or its es- 
sential notion. 

Corresponding to the category of being, we 
have the qualitative judgment (das qualitative 
UrtheiV). 

Corresponding to the category of essence, we 
have two judgments, — that of reflection, and 
that of necessity (das Reflexionsurtheil, das 
Urtheil der Nothwendigkeif). 

Corresponding to the category of the notion, 
we have the notional judgment (das Urtheil 
des Begriffs). 

The qualitative judgment, or the judgment of 
being, Hegel defines as one which ascribes to the 
particular subject a quality which is universal, 
and yet which does not characterize all the in- 
dividuals of the same class to which the subject 
belongs. For instance, when we say, " The rose 

Q 



226 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

is red," the universal quality of redness is 
ascribed correctly to the rose in question, but it 
is not possible to extend that ascription to all 
roses generally. Therefore, in asserting " The 
rose is red," we imply that some roses exist 
which are not red. Consequently, for every 
affirmative judgment of this kind there must be 
a possible negative judgment which parallels it. 
The predicate, in other words, belongs to the 
special subject under consideration, but not to 
the underlying universal notion of which the 
subject is a particular manifestation. 

It is proper, therefore, to characterize a quali- 
tative judgment as correct or incorrect, but 
never as true or untrue. For to affirm that a 
judgment is true means that the predicate is an 
essential element of the underlying notion to 
which the subject must be referred. Hegel 
says, " In the judgment of the notion the predi- 
cate is, as it were, the soul of the subject by 
which the subject as a body is characterized 
through and through." 1 

If, instead of starting with an affirmative 
judgment and deducing by necessary implica- 
tion a corresponding negative judgment, we 
should start with the negative judgment, such 
1 §112, Zusatz. 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 227 

as "This rose is not red," we are as necessarily 
constrained to deduce the implied affirmative ; 
for the negative statement that the rose is not 
red implies some other color. Inasmuch as the 
subject in such cases is not a universal, the 
negative either expresses an empty identity, that 
the rose which you see has the color which you 
see, or else it is to be regarded as a so-called 
infinite judgment in which an absolute incom- 
patibility is set forth such as might be expressed 
in the judgment " A circle is not a tree." In 
the formal logic, such a judgment is regarded 
as representing the reductio ad absurdum of 
irrelevant negation. But Hegel insists that a 
judgment of such a nature may possess some 
significance as the description of certain con- 
crete relations whose nature can only be thus 
characterized. For instance, death is the infinite 
negative as regards life, since death signifies 
a total negation of life. Disease, on the other 
hand, represents merely a simple negation, inas- 
much as certain functions may be only tempora- 
rily impaired, that is, contingently negatived ; 
and this negation is at once overcome when 
with returning health the normal functioning is 
resumed, but not so with the negation which is 
expressed by death. 



228 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

When we come to the judgment of reflection, 
we find that Hegel defines this type of judgment 
substantially as one in which the subject no 
longer appears as a special case or particular 
instance, but is represented as related to some- 
thing else which is implied in the predicate. 
The relation which is thus stated is true not 
only for the particular subject in question but 
for all others of the same class universally. 
The following is a judgment of this type: — 
a This plant is edible." This signifies a uni- 
versal connection between all plants of the same 
kind represented by the subject and a certain 
effect which it is possible for them to produce 
upon a definite part of the great world system 
to which they belong, — namely, the gustatory 
and digestive processes of man. It is called a 
judgment of reflection, because it is only in the 
light of something else brought into relation to it 
that the adjective edible can be applied to a plant. 
Its edibility is a characteristic which arises simply 
from its being brought into relation with man. 

This type of judgment in general breaks up 
into three varieties : — 

(1) The Singular Judgment. 

(2) The Particular Judgment. 

(3) The Universal Judgment. 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 229 

If we have a singular judgment such as the 
following, " This plant is wholesome," there is 
implied in this that there are some other plants 
also which are wholesome. This latter form 
would then be a particular judgment. In some 
cases, moreover, the nature of the particular 
judgment is such that it may be found possible 
upon further investigation to enlarge it to such 
an extent that it will embrace the universal as 
well. The progress of knowledge is from the 
singular to the particular, and then from the 
particular to the universal. For instance, we 
start with the judgment, " This metal conducts 
electricity." Then we advance to the larger 
statement in the form of a particular judgment 
" Some other metals conduct electricity." 
Finally we reach the universal, " All metals 
conduct electricity." These judgments repre- 
sent widening circles of knowledge. Thus the 
individual merges its seemingly individual char- 
acteristics with those which are common to the 
other members of the same species, to every 
one of which the same predicate may be applied 
as was primarily applied to the individual in 
the form of a singular judgment. There are 
predicates, moreover, of such a nature that, 
when ascribed to an individual subject, imply 



230 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

not merely an advance to a particular, but to 
an all-embracing, universal judgment. In such 
cases there are no negative instances, and there- 
fore the individual is to be regarded as a type 
of the whole class. As Hegel puts it, "The 
individual man is what he is in particular only 
in so far as he is before all things a man as man 
and in general." 1 Any property which belongs 
to the individual, and at the same time to every 
other member of the same species, ranks as 
a necessary attribute. It is universal for the 
very reason that it is necessary. The judgment 
of reflection which expresses a universal relation 
between an attribute and the subject as a whole, 
must be consequently a judgment of necessity 
as well. And thus the transition from the judg- 
ment of reflection to the judgment of necessity 
is a natural one. 

Hegel discusses the judgment of necessity 
under its three aspects, as, — 

(1) Categorical. (Das kategorische Urtheil.*) 

(2) Hypothetical. (Das hypothetische Ur- 
theil.) 

(3) Disjunctive. (Das disjunctive Urtheil^) 
In the categorical judgment, the predicate 

expresses the essential nature of the subject. 
1 § 175. Zusatz. 






THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 231 

It represents the essence of the subject, more- 
over, in respect to the most elemental of the 
categories of essence, that of substantiality. 
Thus, in the judgment of simple assertion, which 
is the characteristic feature of the categorical 
judgment, such as " Iron is a metal," the idea 
of metallity is regarded as the underlying sub- 
stance which constitutes the essential nature 
of iron. The categorical judgment, however, 
lacks completeness, inasmuch as it does not 
embrace in its statement the elements of par- 
ticularity, — that is, of definite and specific 
description. 

When we introduce the specifying element 
which renders a general statement more par- 
ticular and therefore more definite, we have 
always the hypothetical form of judgment, — 
if A is B, C is D, — that is, where the subject 
only under specified conditions leads to its 
necessary consequent. This specified condition 
gives to the subject a particular aspect. In the 
hypothetical judgment the relation which is set 
forth is that of cause and effect, the second of 
the categories of essence. 

When, however, the subject, regarded as a 
genus, is completely specified through an ex- 
haustive division into its component species, 



232 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

we have the disjunctive judgment. It is of the 
form, "A is either B, or C, or D." In such a 
judgment the predicate is coextensive with the 
subject, the genus always being equal to the 
sum total of its several species. Therefore 
the genus is expressed in its totality, and the 
totality of any genus is its notion. This marks 
the point of transition to the judgment of the 
notion. 

In this latter class of judgments the subject 
is regarded as conforming more or less ade- 
quately to its ideal, — that is, to its notion. 
The predicates which are available in this form 
of judgment are such as the adjectives good, 
true, beautiful, wise, perfect, and the like. 
Each one implies a norm which the subject in 
question is judged as completely illustrating; 
and in the negative judgments, of course, as 
failing to illustrate. 

The judgment of the notion divides into three 
classes : — 

(1) The Assertory Judgment. (Das asserto- 
rische Urtheil^) 

(2) The Problematic Judgment. (Das prob- 
lematische Uriheil^) 

(3) The Apodictic Judgment. (Das apodik- 
tische Urtheil.) 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 233 

The assertory judgment is one which contains 
the bare statement that a given subject is in 
full accord with its ideal. Such a judgment, 
however, may be challenged by one who holds 
an opposite opinion. This gives rise to the 
second form, the problematic judgment. 

The problematic judgment is one which is 
qualified by the modal copula, may be, implying 
obviously the possibility also that it may not 
be. However, if the relation between the sub- 
ject and predicate is reenforced by a subsidiary 
statement, either expressed or implied, which 
indicates the ground of their connection, we have 
the third form, the apodictic judgment. 

The apodictic judgment is one which asserts 
that the relation between subject and predicate 
is such that it must be true. It is no longer a 
matter of opinion, but of necessity. When the 
reason which reenforces the cogency of a judg- 
ment is fully elaborated, we pass by a natural 
transition to the syllogism. For example, the 
judgment that a certain law will prove harmful 
to the best interests of the community, can be 
shown to be an apodictic judgment, — that is, 
necessarily true, if we show that it is essentially 
unjust, — and our judgment would then be put 
in the following form : — 



234 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

" This law, being obviously unjust, must neces- 
sarily prove harmful to the best interests of the 
community." 

Expanded into the form of a syllogism, it 
would run as follows : — 

All unjust laws are harmful. 
This law is unjust. 
/. It must prove harmful. 

Whenever a judgment under challenge reveals 
its underlying ground as its justification, we have 
a syllogism. The statement that anything must 
be true is justifiable only when it can be shown 
that there is a sufficient reason to warrant it. 
The syllogism, therefore, is merely the expanded 
form of the apodictic judgment. 

A syllogism is a judgment which is accom- 
panied by its own proof. In the apodictic judg- 
ment, we have an individual subject whose 
particular characteristics warrant our reference 
of it to its universal. In its elaborated form, 
as expressed by the three terms which make up 
the syllogistic structure, the individual and uni- 
versal are brought together by means of a com- 
mon term, the traditional middle term of the 
formal logic, in such a way as to form together 
a logical unity. In the major and minor prem- 
ises we have separate judgments, their point of 






THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 235 

articulation being the middle term ; this separa- 
tion of the major and minor terms in the 
premises is completely overcome in the con- 
clusion, and we have a return to the unitary 
notion which holds the major and minor terms 
together in one judgment. Thus Hegel defines 
the syllogism as the unity of the judgment and 
the notion, 1 — that is, the separate judgments of 
the premises coalesce in the one notion which 
underlies the conclusion. The statements con- 
tained in the two premises are the result of the 
analytic function of thought. The fusion of 
the major and minor terms in the conclusion is, 
however, the result of the synthetic function. 

The syllogism should not be regarded as an 
arbitrary or artificial grouping of judgments 
together in thought. We do not, properly 
speaking, construct syllogisms. The syllogistic 
process is rather the universal mode in which 
the phenomena of the universe manifest them- 
selves. It is, moreover, a true description of the 
endless activity by which the Absolute ever 
manifests Himself. Hegel means by this that 
all being and all activity of the universe are to 
be regarded as the manifestation of a universal 
by means of certain particular and specific 
1 § 181. 



236 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

characteristics which it reveals in the sphere 
of some definite concrete individuality. The 
syllogism is merely an expression in general 
of the process which provides for the varied 
interplay of the universal, the particular, and 
the individual in their manifold relations. 
Every notion as a universal manifests itself in 
individual instances through particular charac- 
teristics which differ with the various species 
which it embraces. And on the other hand 
every individual reveals its full significance 
only when it may be referred to its correspond- 
ing universal by virtue of its particular charac- 
teristics. It seems to be of the very nature of 
thought to bind together in one the three ideas 
of universality, particularity, and individuality, 
which is nothing more or less than the syllogistic 
process. Therefore, reason by its very nature 
tends to express itself in the form of a syllogism; 
and as it is of the essence of reason, according 
to Hegel, to manifest itself dynamically as the 
essential constructive force of the universe, it 
follows that the syllogistic principle underlies 
the active processes of all nature and of all 
mind. 

Hegel discusses the syllogism under its three 
aspects as follows : — 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 237 

(1) The Qualitative Syllogism. (Der quali- 
tative Schluss.') 

(2) The Syllogism of Reflection. (JDer Reflex- 
ions- Schluss.} 

(3) The Syllogism of Necessity. {JDer Schluss 
der Nothwendigkeit.) 

In the qualitative syllogism the subject of the 
conclusion as an individual is referred to its 
predicate, a universal because of a certain 
quality which it possesses. 

The qualitative characteristics are expressed 
by the middle term, which is of the nature of 
a particular. 

Thus in the form of the syllogism the subject 
of the conclusion, which is always the minor 
term, is the individual. 

The predicate of the conclusion, which is 
always the major term, is the universal. 

The middle term, which does not appear in 
the conclusion but in each of the premises, is 
the particular. All this Hegel expresses in the 
formula I-P-U, which means that P, the par- 
ticular, is the middle term between I, the 
individual as minor term, and U, the univer- 
sal as major term. In similar formulae the 
same order is preserved to designate all possible 
varieties of syllogistic structure, — namely, the 



238 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

first letter always represents the minor term; 
the last, the major term ; and the middle letter, 
naturally, the middle term. 1 

Expanded into the form of a syllogism, the 
formula I-P-U would become : — 

An individual has certain particular charac- 
teristics. 

All such particular characteristics belong to 
a certain universal. 

.\ The individual belongs to this universal. 

It will be noticed in the above that the first 
premise stated is the minor, and the second the 
major. Reversing this order, and abbreviating, 
the syllogism runs as follows : — 
All P is U. 
I is P. 
.\ I is U. 

This will be recognized as a syllogism of the 
first figure, in which the middle term appears as 
subject of the major premise, and as predicate 
of the minor. Now, in this syllogism, each 
premise in turn must be regarded in the light 
of a conclusion which has been previously medi- 
ated by some other middle term. In other 
words, if the ground of each premise is fully 

1 Hegel uses the letters E,B,A for das Uinzelne, das 
Besondere, and das Allgemeine, respectively. 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 239 

expressed, it necessarily reveals a syllogistic 
structure. If, therefore, we should assume that 
the major premise, " All P is U," is the conclusion 
of a subsidiary syllogism, the middle term in 
that case must be of the nature of an indi- 
vidual. Putting it, therefore, as the middle 
term between the particular as minor and the 
universal as major, the formula for this new 
syllogism would be, P-I-U. 

If this formula should be elaborated so as to 
express fully the syllogistic structure, it would 
be as follows : — 

Certain individuals have particular marks. 

These individuals all belong to a certain uni- 
versal. 
•\ These particular marks characterize this uni- 
versal. 

This syllogism is in the third figure, — that 
is, the middle term appears as subject in 
each of the premises. It will be observed that 
such a conclusion is valid only when the indi- 
viduals examined are so numerous and of such 
a kind as to preclude the possibility of the dis- 
covery of any negative instances ; otherwise the 
third figure can prove only a particular state- 
ment. 

If in a similar way, we assume the minor 



240 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

premise of the original syllogism, " This I is P," 
to be the conclusion of a subsidiary syllogism, 
then the remaining term which does not appear 
in this conclusion, — in this case the universal, 
— would be the middle term, and the syllogistic 
formula would be I-U-P. In its expanded 
form it gives the following syllogism : — 
The individual is the universal. 
The particular is the universal. 
•\ The individual is the particular. 

This is in the second figure, — that is, the 
middle term appears as predicate in each of the 
premises. The conclusion is not valid unless 
we regard the major premise as having the force 
of a judgment in the following form, "Only 
the particulars in question are the universal." 
Otherwise, the second figure can prove only a 
negative conclusion. To secure from it an 
affirmative conclusion, the major premise must 
always be qualified in some such manner as is 
indicated above. 

These transitions, which Hegel thus effects 
from figure to figure may be seen more clearly 
perhaps in the following concrete illustrations. 
The syllogism in the first figure, corresponding 
to the formula I-P-U, may be expressed as 
follows : — 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 241 

This whale is a mammal. 
All mammals are vertebrates. 
.•. This whale is a vertebrate. 
In this syllogism 

I = whale (individual). 
P = mammal (particular species). 
U = vertebrate (universal genus). 
The syllogism in the third figure proves as its 
conclusion the major premise of the above, "All 
mammals are vertebrates." Its formula is P-I-U. 
It may be illustrated by the following : — 
Certain individuals (I) are mammals (P). 
The same individuals (I) are vertebrates (U). 
.*. All mammals (P) are vertebrates (U). 

This conclusion follows only upon the sup- 
position that the individuals examined warrant 
an inductive generalization upon the ground 
that the possibility of negative instances has 
been completely eliminated. Again, the syl- 
logism in the second figure, proving as its 
conclusion the minor premise of the original 
syllogism, " This whale is a mammal " may be 
illustrated according to the formula I-U-P as 
follows : — 

Only mammals (P) suckle their young (U). 
The whale (I) suckles its young (U). 
.\ The whale (I) is a mammal (P). 



242 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

In these syllogisms the judgments all express 
an identity in spite of differences, as when we 
say "The individual is the universal." Now, 
if in such judgments the element of difference 
is wholly eliminated, then the subject and pred- 
icate in every case may be simply equated, and 
all the terms in the syllogism will become strictly 
identical, giving us the quantitative or mathe- 
matical syllogism which would appear in the 
following form: — 

I =P. 
P=U. 
.-. I = U. 
The truth which is contained in such a syllo- 
gism may be expressed by the axiom, " Things 
which are equal to the same third thing are 
equal to each other." This may be regarded as 
the limiting case of the syllogism proper. 

In the qualitative syllogism the individual is 
represented under the aspect of some one of its 
attributes, and, therefore, an indefinite number 
of syllogisms may be formed in reference to any 
individual object of investigation or of interest, 
according as we choose to vary the several attri- 
butes which may for the time being happen to 
attract our attention. Thus we say that a cer- 
tain rose is red, or fragrant, or it is fading, or 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 243 

is not yet full blown, and so on indefinitely. 
When, however, we choose an attribute which 
is an essential property of all roses whatsoever, 
we have always the syllogism of reflection, — 
that is, the concept of a rose is illuminated by 
the light reflected upon it by one of its essential 
attributes. Or in other cases, it may not be a 
specific property so much as an essential rela- 
tion which the object of thought sustains; when, 
for instance, we fail to understand the essential 
significance of a certain tool until we discover 
the particular use to which it is adapted, and 
this is allowed to reflect its light upon the 
nature of the tool itself. In the syllogism of 
reflection, therefore, the quality which is taken 
as the middle term is not merely one of many 
attributes chosen at random, or through caprice, 
or suggested by some passing circumstance, but 
it should be an attribute of such a nature that 
it must necessarily belong to every other mem- 
ber of the same species which is represented by 
the individual, as well as to the individual itself. 
The significance of the species is thus reflected 
in its characteristic attributes which all its in- 
dividual members possess in common. It is the 
bond of unity which holds together all individ- 
uals of the same class in one group. 



244 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

The syllogism of reflection therefore may be 
divided into three subsidiary kinds : — 

(1) The Syllogism of Allness. (Der Schluss 
der Allheit.) 

(2) The Syllogism of Induction. (Der Schluss 
der Induktion.) 

(3) The Syllogism of Analogy. (Der Schluss 
der Analogic) 

The primary form of the syllogism of reflec- 
tion is a syllogism in the first figure, and is 
known as the syllogism of allness. It endeav- 
ors to show what distinctive attribute or attri- 
butes are common to all members of a class. 
Hegel illustrates this by the traditional syllo- 
gism : — 

All men are mortal. 
Caius is a man. 
.•. Caius is mortal. 
The weakness of this syllogism lies in the fact 
that the universality of the major premise, " All 
men are mortal," obviously depends upon the 
tacit assumption that the conclusion is true. 
The major premise implies that a previous in- 
duction of an exhaustive nature has been made. 

Thus a transition is effected by the necessi- 
ties of thought to the inductive syllogism, such 
as the following : — 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 245 

This man, and this man, and so on indefinitely, 

are mortal. 
This man and this man, and so on indefinitely, 

constitute all men. 
.•. All men are mortal. 
The formula for this syllogism would be 

I. 

U-I-P. 

I. 

etc., 

wherein is signified that the middle term (I) is 
indefinitely repeated, and is the sum of a number 
of individual cases. Passing from the individual 
instances, however numerous they may be, to the 
universal, which must necessarily transcend our 
experience, our reason rests upon the postulate 
that whatever is observed to be an essential 
property which a number of individuals have in 
common, will be found to obtain in all the indi- 
viduals which resemble them sufficiently to be 
regarded as members of one and the same class, 
or species. 

This gives us the third form of the syllogism 
of reflection, which expresses an underlying 
analogy as the warrant for the inductive gen- 
eralization previously performed. In this syllo- 
gism of analogy the inference is based upon the 



246 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

logical principle that inasmuch as some things 
of a certain kind possess a certain well-marked 
quality, therefore the same quality will be 
found in the case of other things of the same 
kind. The individual instance under investiga- 
tion may be regarded as a typical case, and, 
therefore, as standing for a class, it so far 
forth partakes of the nature of a universal. 
The common bond, moreover, which unites to- 
gether objects of the same kind, and by virtue 
of which they are what they are, cannot be 
merely the result of a fortuitous coincidence of 
similar qualities, but is a necessary and essential 
characteristic of the very nature of the things 
themselves. This forms a natural transition to 
the syllogism of necessity. 

The syllogism of necessity may be divided 
into three kinds : — 

(1) The Categorical Syllogism. 

(2) The Hypothetical Syllogism. 

(3) The Disjunctive Syllogism. 

In the categorical syllogism the individual is 
referred to its appropriate universal by means 
of the intermediate particular, or species to 
which it more proximately belongs. This 
syllogism would be in some such form as 
follows : — 



THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION 247 

A certain individual belongs to a particular 
species. 

The species belongs to a certain genus. 

.*. The individual belongs to that same genus. 

In the hypothetical syllogism the universal or 
the genus is represented as the ground of the 
particular or the species. Its major premise is 
of the form, "If A is, so is B." The minor 
premise represents the presence or the absence 
of the necessary condition, and the conclusion 
the resultant realization of the effect, or the 
failure to realize it, as the case may be. 

In the disjunctive syllogism the universal is 
resolved into its component parts. It is the high- 
est form of the syllogism, for it represents an 
exhaustive manifestation of the full concrete 
essence of the universal. The minor premise 
of this syllogism expresses what parts in any 
given cases are present or absent, and the con- 
clusion expresses the resulting presence or 
absence of the other parts as thus determined. 

This syllogism in its disjunctive form marks 
the natural transition also to the category of the 
notion in its second aspect, that of objectivity ; 
for an exhaustive manifestation of the universal 
shows not merely the sum total of its thought 
relations, — that is, in reference to its purely sub- 



248 THE DOCTKINE OF THE NOTION 

jective aspect, for then its manifestation would 
be partial and not exhaustive, but it furnishes 
as well scope for its external actualization in the 
world of reality. The notion represents a total- 
ity, and that, too, is the essential function of the 
disjunctive syllogism, — to represent the given 
object of thought in its totality. Moreover, 
there is no such thing as a totality which is not 
realized in all of its concrete fulness. The 
notion, therefore, as a fundamental constructive 
principle, is not to be regarded as a force opera- 
tive in vacuo, but in the concrete system of 
things, of persons and of events, in life and its 
wealth of inexhaustible possibilities. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 

AS we have seen, Hegel regards the disjunc- 
tive syllogism as the point of transition 
from the subjective to the objective notion. 
Let us examine this statement more in detail, 
in order that we may the more clearly under- 
stand the essential relation of the subjective to 
the objective notion. The disjunctive syllo- 
gism is merely the subjective notion expressed 
in its highest and most complete form. It sig- 
nifies as regards its syllogistic structure that 
the subjective notion is essentially an active 
process of thought, for this is the meaning of 
the syllogism in general ; and as regards its dis- 
junctive character, it indicates that the process 
in question is a complete unfolding of the total 
significance of the notion. Gathering together 
these characteristics in a single statement, we 
find that Hegel regards the subjective notion 
in its highest form of expression as an active 

249 



250 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

force, revealing its various phases through a 
process of mediation, in a manner which gives 
complete scope for the realization of all its 
possibilities. The subjective notion as thus 
conceived contains within the very conception 
itself the ground of its objectivity. In speak- 
ing of the transition from the subjective notion 
to the objective, we do not express correctly 
the significance of the Hegelian conception. It 
is not a transition properly speaking, for the 
objective lies within the subjective as a poten- 
tial moment of the same. Hegel insists as a 
fundamental postulate of his whole system that 
the syllogistic process is not merely an act of 
consciousness. We have seen that the sub- 
jective notion contains the implicit categories 
of being, essence, existence, substantiality, cause 
and effect, and the like. The subjective may, 
therefore, be regarded as the programme of cosmic 
evolution, while the objective is the historical 
evolution itself. Either would be incomplete 
without the other. Again, the idea of an active 
process which is the essential significance of the 
subjective notion, necessitates a resulting prod- 
uct ; and the product, which is the result of a 
mediation, it is true, is nevertheless as a product 
something immediate, and this immediacy is one 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 251 

of the characteristic features of objectivity. 
Hegel defines an object as that which is " in- 
dependent, concrete, and complete in itself." 1 
There is only one conceivable object which per- 
fectly fulfils the requirements of this defini- 
tion, — the Absolute, God. The totality of 
all things, the universe in its progressive un- 
folding in space and time, represents the one 
all-embracing object. And while within this 
totality, Hegel recognizes separate and indepen- 
dent objects, nevertheless their reality is assured 
only in so far as they partake of the nature of 
the unifying Absolute underlying them, whose 
essential nature and being are independent of 
space and of time. 

At this point Hegel refers to Kant's criticism 
of the ontological proof of the being of God, 
which is based upon the statement that the 
thought of a thing does not necessarily imply 
its existence, and insists that the highest expres- 
sion of the subjective notion is an altogether 
unique thought, of such a nature as to combine 
the notion of God and His being in one. Hegel 
says, in commenting upon the Kantian criticism, 
in the introductory part of his Logic : — 

"The unexampled favor and acceptance which 
1 § 193. 



252 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

attended Kant's criticism of the ontological 
proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration 
which he made use of. To mark the differ- 
ence between thought and being, he cited the 
instance of a hundred thalers which, as far as 
the notion is concerned, are the same hundred 
thalers, whether real or only possible, though 
the difference is manifest as regards their effect 
upon a man's purse. Nothing can be more 
obvious than that anything we only think or 
fancy is not on that account actual, and that 
a picture of the imagination or even a logical 
notion cannot attain to being. Setting aside 
the fact that it may not incorrectly be styled a 
barbarism of language to apply the term notion 
to things like a hundred thalers, it is still true 
that they who like to taunt the philosophic con- 
ception with the fundamental difference between 
being and thought, might have admitted that 
philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the 
fact. Can there be, indeed, any more trivial 
observation than this ? Above all, it must be 
remembered, when we speak of God, that we 
have an object of a very different kind than 
any hundred thalers, and unlike any particular 
notion, idea, or whatever we may choose to call 
it. The very nature of everything finite is 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 253 

expressed by saying that its being in time and 
space differs from its notion. God should be, 
however, expressly conceived to be that which 
can only be 'thought of as existing.' His 
notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion 
and being that constitutes the notion of God." 1 
The question which naturally suggests itself at 
this point is whether Hegel's system is not pan- 
theistic, whether the individuality of man is 
not completely lost in the universality of God. 
If man is only a spectator for a brief time of 
an extremely limited portion of the great world 
evolution which is solely the external manifesta- 
tion of God, which is in fact God, then the 
whole Hegelian system, as the product of the 
human mind, contradicts and stultifies itself by 
thus eliminating the human individuality as a 
real factor of the system itself. The question 
whether the system leads logically to pantheism, 
it is not in the scope and purpose of this work, 
as one simply of exposition, to discuss ; never- 
theless, it may be remarked in passing that 
Hegel himself stoutly maintains that individu- 
ality is not suppressed in universality, but is 
conserved (aafgelioben) in a higher state of 
being and existence, and he most emphatically 
l §51. 



254 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

disclaims for his system this imputation of a 
pantheistic taint. 1 

It has been seen that the warrant for the 
notion of objectivity is contained at the last 
analysis in the notion of the Absolute, " the 
only true being." So also, in a similar manner, 
the warrant for the notion of human personality, 
Hegel declares, is to be found only in the un- 
derlying, all-embracing personality of God. It 
is a thought similar to that of St. Paul, u In 
Him we live and move and have our being." 

The notion of objectivity, as developed by 
Hegel, manifests itself in three forms : — 

(1) Mechanism. (Der Mechanismus.') 

(2) Chemism. (Der Chernismus.) 

(3) Teleology. (Die Teleologies) 

In the mechanical type, the objects stand related 
in an external manner, and without evincing any 
natural affinity as regards each other. They 
are immediate, and each indifferent to all the 
others. 

In the chemical type, the objects exhibit an 
essential tendency to change and unite with 
others, so that their significance really lies in 
their union with something else. 

In the third type, the teleological relation 
1 See § 151, Zusatz. 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 255 

expresses the unity of mechanism and chemism. 
Like the mechanical object, it is, in a sense, a 
self-contained totality, inasmuch as a purpose 
has always some complete effect as an end in 
view; at the same time, it is subjected to the 
principle of differentiation and change in order 
to realize the end, which principle is the essential 
characteristic also of chemism. 

Hegel divides the principle of mechanism into 
three kinds : — 

(1) Formal Mechanism. (Formeller Median- 
isrnus.*) 

(2) Mechanism accompanied by affinity 
QDifferenter MechanismusJ) 

(3) Absolute Mechanism. (Absoluter Meeh- 
anismus^) 

Formal mechanism possesses two essential 
characteristics. The object has the notion 
within it only as a potential ; for the notion as 
subjective is primarily outside of it. And in 
the second place, the objects remain independent 
and are related to each other only in an external 
manner. Figuratively, we speak of a mechanical 
memory, where ideas are associated externally 
and where the element of thought to a large 
extent is omitted. Hegel says, "Whenever a 
man's mind and will are not in his actions, his 



256 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

conduct is called mechanical." 1 The relation 
which obtains between objects which are 
mechanically connected is one of pressure and 
of impact, which operate essentially as external 
forces. 

The second form of mechanism has associated 
with it the element of affinity. An object 
which is operated upon by some external force 
is affected by it not merely according to the 
nature of the force operating upon it, but as 
well by its own nature. Thus a billiard ball 
made of ivory and another made of putty 
behave differently when subjected to precisely 
the same impact. Therefore, what it is possible 
for any object to effect mechanically does not 
depend merely upon its own native force, or as 
Hegel puts it, its own centrality (die Central- 
itaf), but also upon the nature of the object 
upon which it acts as well, — that is, the central- 
ity of the other lying outside of itself. In other 
words, no object is fully self-centred ; and when 
two objects are so related that the centre of 
each must receive some complementary element 
which • belongs to the centre of the other in 
order to complete its significance, the relation 
between them is of this second type, that of 
i § 195. 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 257 

mechanism with affinity. The illustrations of 
this order of mechanism which Hegel gives are 
the relation of gravitation, in which the result 
varies according to the relative centrality of 
each of the objects mutually attracted ; the rela- 
tion of desire to its object ; and the relation of 
the social instinct which binds together the 
different members of one and the same society. 
Every object may be regarded as a system 
within itself. The centre of such a system 
Hegel calls an abstract centre, — that is, without 
reference to anything outside of itself. When 
two objects come into a mechanical relation, 
one to the other, the centre of each in turn 
becomes the relative centre of the other. The 
centre of that system which includes the two 
objects and their relative centres within its 
scope is the absolute centre. Absolute mechan- 
ism is merely the fully expressed form of the 
type of mechanism with affinity. These rela- 
tions of the various kinds of centres may be 
illustrated by the mutual attraction of two 
masses, each of which may be represented as 
concentrated at a single point, which is its 
abstract centre. Each point has in turn a rela- 
tive centre in the other, and both are referable 
to an absolute centre which lies between them. 



258 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

Thus the earth revolves about the sun as its 
relative centre ; its absolute centre lies between 
earth and sun in such a way that the earth and 
sun both revolve about it. However, the abso- 
lute centre is so near the sun centre that the 
difference is discounted, and we refer simply to 
the earth's revolution about the central sun. 
But to speak precisely, the real centre of the 
system lies between the earth centre and the 
sun centre. Inasmuch as this is a mechanical 
relation, it is dynamic. And the dynamic always 
expresses itself in a syllogistic process, — that is, 
the mediation of two terms by means of a com- 
mon or middle term. We have, therefore, a 
triad of syllogisms, corresponding to the three 
possible mechanical relations. Let I represent 
any individual object, P its particular or rela- 
tive centre, and U the universal or absolute 
centre. 

The resulting syllogisms would be as fol- 
lows : — 

(1) The type expressed by the formula 
I-P-U, in which the relative centre is regarded 
as the mediating term between the individual 
object and its absolute centre. 

(2) The type expressed by the formula 
U-I-P, in which the individual object forms 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 259 

the mean between its relative and absolute 
centres. 

(3) The type expressed by the formula P-U-I, 
in which the universal or absolute centre is the 
mean between the individual object and its 
relative centre. 

As an illustration of these three syllogisms, 
Hegel cites the state in its various relations to 
the individual and his particular needs. " In the 
first instance, the individual in virtue of his 
particular being, or his physical and mental 
needs (which when completely developed give 
civil society) enters into union with the uni- 
versal, — that is, with society, law, right, gov- 
ernment. Secondly, the will or conduct of the 
individuals is the intermediating force which 
procures for these needs satisfaction in society, 
in law, etc., and which gives to society, law, etc., 
their fulfilment and realization. But, thirdly, the 
universal — that is, the state, government, and 
law — is the mean, the underlying substance in 
which the individuals and their satisfaction 
have and receive their fulfilled reality, inter- 
mediation, and persistence." 1 

In mechanism the related objects preserve a 
quasi independence ; but when they lose their 
i § 198. 



260 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

independence in the affinity which each has for 
its antithesis, and they so coalesce that the 
identity of each is merged in the product result- 
ing from their combination, then the relation 
thus characterized is that of chemism. Thus a 
natural transition is effected from the mechani- 
cal relation to the chemical. The product 
thus formed is a neutral, inasmuch as the indi- 
vidual striving of each of the elements which 
constitute it ceases completely when the process 
has been finished and the product alone re- 
mains. However, concerning this neutral, 
which we may regard as the mean, it may be 
resolved by chemical analysis into the two 
original extremes. But the inverse process is 
independent of the former combining process. 
The resulting product does not of itself separate 
into its component parts. The first process 
exhausts itself, and its activity ceases when 
once the product has been formed. There is 
in these operations of chemical combination and 
of chemical analysis no centre of initiation. 
Chemical affinity seems in a manner to be a 
kind of selective attraction, and yet there is no 
self-directing activity. If there were, it would 
have a longer life, and not consume its energy 
in the process of using it. The chemical pro- 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 261 

cess, therefore, does not rise above a conditioned 
and finite activity. " The notion, as notion, is 
only the heart and core of the process, and does 
not in this stage come to existence in its own 
individual being. In the neutral product the 
process is extinct, and the existing cause falls 
outside of it." 1 

This lack of spontaneous activity, of all initia- 
tive, indicates a state which is unsatisfactory in 
the extreme. The very nature of thought con- 
strains us to demand some more fundamental 
relation than either mechanism or chemism 
as the supreme principle of activity in the 
universe. Such a relation must involve the 
element of purpose or finality, in which there 
is a liberation of the notion or reason. It is in 
the teleological relation that we find an ex- 
plicit and undisguised manifestation of a 
supreme principle of intelligence in its free 
conscious activity. In mechanism and chem- 
ism the notion is present, it is true, but only 
in the germ, and not yet evolved. The notion, 
however, in the form of the aim or end (der 
Zweck') comes into an existence of its own. In 
the lower relations the notion is imprisoned, as 
it were, behind the barriers of objectivity. But 
1 § 202, Zusatz. 



262 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

in the teleological relation these barriers are 
burst asunder, the objectivity overcome, and 
the subjectivity of the notion completely 
asserted. Hegel expresses this by saying that 
the idea of an end to be achieved is the nega- 
tion of immediate objectivity ; it is also a 
recognition of the antithesis between subject 
and object, and the overcoming of the same. 
Thus when we entertain a purpose in mind, 
its subjective character is antithetical to the 
purpose conceived as realized objectively. But 
when the purpose in the mind goes forth into 
action, and the objective end is actually realized, 
then all difference between the end in view and 
the end achieved has been overcome, and there is 
a complete synthesis of subjective and objective. 
The difference between efficient cause and 
final cause may be indicated at this point. The 
efficient cause appears as passing into its other, 
the effect, and it therefore loses its essential 
priority in the latter by sinking into a sort of 
dependency. The aim or end, on the other 
hand, must necessarily contain in its own nature 
the determining and significant factors of the 
whole resulting process. In the simple causal 
relation the effect seems to emphasize its nature 
of otherness as regards its cause. 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 263 

By aim or end we must not think merely of 
the purposes which are ever present in con- 
sciousness, and which we achieve by means of 
objects external to us. There is also an 
inner design, an immanent finality in things 
themselves, as has been emphasized both by 
Aristotle and Kant. The purely external de- 
sign, the adaptation of means to ends, may 
be seen in the various phenomena of utility. 
Hegel cites as an illustration of the relation 
of the subjective to the objective in teleology 
the case of appetite or desire. There is the 
subjective desire, on the one hand, and the 
object which will satisfy it, on the other. But 
the two are apart, and therein consists the con- 
tradiction between them. It is only in the 
complete satisfaction of the desire through the 
attainment of its object, that this contradiction 
is overcome, and the two extremes, subjec- 
tivity and objectivity, become reconciled. The 
teleological relation is represented bj* a syl- 
logism, in which the subjective design coa- 
lesces with its external object, by means of 
a middle term which constitutes the unity 
of both. The middle term is the means 
which is used to bring about the desired 
result. 



264 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

Hegel marks three stages in the development 
of the subjective design. 

(1) The Subjective End. (Der subjective 
Zweek.) 

(2) The End in process of accomplishment. 
(JDer sich vollfilhrende Zweck.*) 

(3) The End accomplished. (Der vollfiihrte 
Zweck^) 

The first syllogism of final cause is made up 
of the following three terms : — 

The universal is the end indefinitely desired. 

The particular is the end definitely desired, as 
a particular mode of the universal in question. 

The individual is the self whose activity 
makes a particular choice out of the various 
possibilities which the indefinite universal 
embraces. 

Thus, we might have as an indefinite end in 
view, the building of a house. This would 
stand as a universal admitting of an indefinite 
variety of particular modes of realization. The 
individual choice would then appear as the de- 
termining force, initiating the actual process of 
accomplishment towards a specific end. 

In the second place the initiative activity of 
the individual throws itself immediately upon 
something objective which it appropriates to 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 265 

itself as means of bringing about the desired 
end. Here the middle term is the subjective 
power of the notion tending to bring together 
the subjective end desired and the objective 
material which is to be used in its realization. 
In finite design the mediating term in this pro- 
cess is twofold, a combination of the active 
powers of the individual, and the objective 
material upon which they work as the means of 
realizing the end in view. Thus, in the illus- 
tration of building a house, the materials used 
in its construction must be first immediately 
appropriated by the constructive mind before 
they can become its instruments in the actual 
putting together of part to part in the realiza- 
tion of the complete architectural design, which 
process is essentially one of mediation, — that is, 
syllogistic. Or to cite Hegel's illustration, 
drawn from another and a higher source: 
" Every living being has a body ; the soul takes 
possession of it, and in that act has at once 
objectified itself. The human soul has much to 
do before it makes its corporeal nature into a 
means. Man must, as it were, take possession 
of his body, so that it may be the instrument of 
his soul." * 

1 § 208, Zusatz. 



266 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

All this is preliminary to the actual realization 
of the design by means of the objective mate- 
rials and forces which have been both invaded 
and pervaded by the purposing mind. This 
brings us to the point where the end is finally real- 
ized, — the third and last stage in the process. 
Now while the subjective end rules these material 
processes which are the mechanical and chemical 
forces already described, it does so without 
losing itself in them. It takes advantage of 
their activity and compels them to serve its 
ends, while its controlling intelligence is in the 
background. This Hegel calls the craft of 
reason (die List der Vernufi). The craft of 
reason consists in the controlling sway which it 
exercises over objects while yet permitting them 
to obey their own mechanical or chemical bent. 
" Divine Providence," says Hegel, " may be said 
to stand to the world and its processes in the 
capacity of absolute craft. 1 God lets men direct 
their particular passions and interests as they 

1 Wallace in this connection translates the word List as 
cunning. When applied to the Deity, it is apt to leave an 
incorrect and rather disconcerting impression. The word 
" craft," which may also offend the sentiments of some when 
applied to God, seems, however, to be less objectionable in 
this respect, and has therefore been used in the above 
translation. 



THE OBJECTIVE NOTION 267 

please ; but the result is accomplished, — not of 
their plans but of His, and these differ decidedly 
from the ends primarily sought by those whom 
He employs." 1 

The realized end expresses the complete unity 
of the subjective and the objective ; but in finite 
design the accomplished aim is itself no less 
fragmentary and defective than was the ini- 
tial aim and means used in the process of its 
realization. The end which is achieved is only 
itself an object, which may again become the 
means or material for other purposes, and so 
on ad infinitum. 

Infinite design is, on the other hand, of such 
a nature that it comprises within its own self 
the means to realize its ends. The process of 
the same is one of self-mediation. It is the 
self-determined notion, representing the com- 
plete unity of subject and object. This Hegel 
calls the idea (die Idee), — a term which he has 
selected in order to emphasize its nature as that 
which is essentially and fundamentally reason 
itself. 

In mechanism and chemism the notion appears 
as an sich, — that is, implicit. In the teleologi- 
cal relation, it is fur sich, — that is, explicit, 
i § 229, Zusatz. 



268 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

But in the eternal purpose {die Idee) it is 
both an sich und fur sieh, — that is, revealing 
itself by the light of its own nature in a mani- 
festation completely self-determined and self- 
directed. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 

HEGEL identifies the idea with truth. By- 
truth he means the complete correspond- 
ence of any object with its notion. That is 
only a formal truth, mere correctness, which con- 
sists solely in a reference to our consciousness. 
Truth in a deeper sense is the identification 
of subject and object. In this sense the Abso- 
lute is the idea, the truth itself. Every indi- 
vidual object of knowledge represents a phase 
of the Absolute, but a partial and imperfect 
phase. Every finite object fails to realize its 
notion completely, and therefore is so far forth 
limited and defective. All objects are true so 
far as they prove to be what they ought to be. 
The true man is the ideal man, — that is, one 
who perfectly realizes the idea of a man. So 
also the true state, the true work of art, are 
such so far only as they realize their ideal. 

The idea, moreover, as we have already seen, 
is not merely the underlying substance of all 

269 



270 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

things. It is essentially the subject. It is 
personal and conscious as well as intelligent. 
All individuals find their truth in this one uni- 
versal mind which upholds all things by His 
wisdom, power, and love. Far from being a 
mere abstract conception, the idea is the most 
concrete of all possible manifestations, for it 
embraces the totality of all objectivity. The 
categories of being, essence, and the notion find 
their truth only in this supreme category of the 
idea. 

The mere understanding would criticise the 
doctrine of the idea as containing inconsistencies 
and contradictions, such as are expressed in the 
terms, " subject and object," " finite and infinite," 
"the ideal and the real," "the one and the 
many." Yet it must be remembered that it is 
of the very nature of the dialectic that the 
idea, inasmuch as it embraces the totality of 
the universe, should involve contradictions ; but 
which, however, at the same time it is sufficient, 
to overcome, and to present in a profounder 
unity. The activity of the idea is eternal. 
The cosmic process is fundamentally the mani- 
festation of reason; it is the idea revealing 
itself in objectivity. The idea represents an 
infinite judgment whose several terms consti- 



THE IDEA OK THE ETERNAL KEASON 271 

tute an independent totality of such a nature 
that each term growing to the fulness of its 
own being passes over into its other and advanced 
form, thus providing for a progressive evolution 
of the one central idea which is eternally self- 
complete and self-sufficient. None of the other 
categories exhibits this totality as complete in 
its two essential aspects of subjectivity and 
objectivity. 

Hegel refers to the dialectic process of the mani- 
festation of the idea as an absolute negativity (ab- 
solute Negativitat), — that is, a process in which 
there is an antagonism of opposites, which is the 
first negative ; but this antagonism is overcome 
by means of the negation of the first negative, 
which is the absolute negation or real affirmation. 
Thus the notion as subjective is arrayed against 
the notion as objective, but this contradiction is 
overcome by an immanent dialectic which finds 
its way back again to a subjectivity which 
embraces objectivity as well. This state is 
something more than the mere unity of subjec- 
tive and objective, or of the infinite and finite ; 
for as Hegel insists, the idea is essentially a 
process which implies the idea of movement, 
whereas the term unity implies rest. Moreover, 
it is not a mere unity in which the infinite 



272 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

has been neutralized by the finite, the subjective 
by the objective, thought by being ; but in the 
absolute negative function of the idea, — that is, 
the overcoming of antithesis by a more profound 
synthesis, — the infinite is to be regarded as 
overlapping and embracing the finite ; so also 
thought embraces being, and subjectivity em- 
braces objectivity. The idea in its process of 
development passes through three distinct 
stages : — 

(1) The Idea as Life. (Das Leberi.) 

(2) The Idea as Knowledge. (Das Er- 
Jcennen.) 

(3) The Absolute Idea. (Die absolute Idee.) 
In the first form the idea is revealed in its 

simplest state as immediate, — that is, without 
manifesting the underlying ground by which 
it is constituted and the relations which it is 
capable of sustaining. 

In the second form the idea appears in its 
state of mediation or differentiation, — that is, it 
has become specified and definite by the mani- 
festation of its particular characteristics and 
relations. It is in this stage that the idea 
becomes conscious of itself. Its essential form 
is that of knowledge, both theoretical and prac- 
tical. The process of knowledge leads to a final 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 273 

synthesis which embraces all of the specific differ- 
ences revealed in the process of development. 
This gives the third form of the idea, the 
absolute idea which as the last term of the 
evolution proves itself to be the first also, and 
the underlying basis of the process as a whole. 
It is the source, ground, consummation all in one. 
In its primary form the idea is manifested im- 
mediately as life. This is the initial point in the 
objectifying of the subjective notion. As a begin- 
ning, it is to be merely accepted as immediately 
given. Starting, therefore, with this datum of a 
living being, Hegel proceeds to analyze its nature. 
Every living being is an individual, preserving its 
individuality through all the various changes of 
bodily growth, and the indefinite variety of its 
particular moods and activities. Moreover, all 
particular manifestations are to be referred to a 
central principle which is the ground of their 
unity and the source of their being and activity. 
This central principle is by nature essentially a 
universal. Thus in a living body we have exhib- 
ited the universal principle of its being, its soul 
centre, also its particular activities and phenome- 
nal manifestation, and the individuality which is 
self-preserved in the midst of all possible varia- 
tions. The living body, therefore, embraces in 



274 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

the simplest possible form the three moments of 
the notion, individuality, particularity, and uni- 
versality. All of its component parts form a 
complex system exhibiting, as Hegel styles it, 
a negative unity (negative Einheit), — that is, a 
unity which combines within itself differentiated, 
opposed, but at the same time essentially related 
parts ; it is a unity in the midst of difference. 

The defect of life consists in the fact that its 
notion and its reality do not correspond. It is 
characteristic of life that soul and body are sep- 
arable. The notion of life is the soul, and the 
soul has the body for its reality. But in its 
simplest and primary manifestation the soul is, 
as it were, poured out and diffused into the cor- 
poreal elements, and, therefore, the soul is in its 
earliest stage sentient only, and not yet freely 
self-conscious. The process of life consists in 
overcoming this preliminary stage of being and 
reaching the stage of self-consciousness. This 
process, however, has to run through three 
stages before it attains to the higher level of 
knowledge. 

The first stage is the process of the living 
being within itself. Its corporeal parts are rela- 
tively external, and present an evident distinc- 
tion and antagonism between its elements which 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 275 

are surrendered to one another, assimilate one 
another, and persist by reproducing themselves. 
All these functions, however, are to be referred 
to the activity of the architectonic principle 
within; consequently the underlying unity is 
preserved in the midst of this indefinite variety 
of seemingly independent functions. The pro- 
cess of the vital subject within its own limits 
appears in the three forms of sensibility, irrita- 
bility, and reproduction. 

As sensibility the soul is present in every part 
of the body, so that their independence and mu- 
tual exclusiveness is only a seeming, and they 
are in reality merely elements of one and the 
same central and all-pervading subject. 

As irritability, the living being seems to break 
up into separate parts, a process of differentiation. 

As reproduction, the living being is perpetu- 
ally restoring itself out of the inner differentia- 
tion of its members. 

In the second stage the living being proceeds 
to exert its power over inorganic nature ; it sub- 
dues and assimilates it to itself. The result of 
this process is not a neutral product as in chem- 
ism, but the living being embraces the inorganic 
elements within its own life. The inorganic na- 
ture, however, which is subdued by the vital 



276 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

agent, surrenders itself in the process because 
it is potentially what life is actually. This is 
in full accord with the fundamental postulate 
of the Hegelian system that there is but one 
elemental force in the universe, the mind force, 
and that it underlies the elements of inert mat- 
ter as well as the vital forces and activities. 
When, therefore, a living being assimilates its 
corporeal elements, matter is raised to a higher 
level in which is effected the realization of its 
potential essence. Thus, even in its material 
elements, the living body may be said to find 
itself. When, however, the soul is separated 
from its body in death, the elemental forces of 
objectivity begin their play upon the lower 
mechanical and chemical level. There is even 
in life a constant tendency in these forces to 
assert their lower functions, and life is a per- 
petual battle to subdue and elevate them. 

The result of this continuous process of assimi- 
lation gives us the third stage in the develop- 
ment of life, a combination of particular organs 
and functions constituting a definite and specific 
order of the living being, which Hegel charac- 
terizes as implicitly a genus or kind (eine Grat- 
tung an sicK). The living being, regarded as a 
genus, ranks as a universal. This universal 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 277 

particularizes itself in a number of individuals 
through the connection of the living subject 
with another subject of its own kind. 

The process of the genus brings it to a being 
of its own. But the being as an individual is 
dependent and mediated. The individual is 
implicitly a universal, but in his immediate 
existence is merely an individual. Death shows 
that the universal is the power that upholds the 
immediate individual. The mere animal never 
proceeds so far in its generic life as to have a 
being of its own. It yields to the domination 
of the genus. Tennyson has given expression to 
this Hegelian idea in the lines : — 

" Are God and Nature then at strife, 
That Nature lends such evil dreams, — 
So careful of the type she seems, 
So careless of the single life." 

In the process of life, however, there is a 
constant struggle to overcome the immediacy 
which is the defect of life, so that the idea may 
come to itself, and realize its own truth in a free 
existence of its own. That which appears as a 
generic universal in a lower sphere extricates 
itself and manifests itself as Ego or conscious- 
ness in its higher evolution. It is the process 
of the idea coming to a consciousness of itself, 



278 THE DOCTEINE OF THE NOTIOK 

and in this higher form it exists free and for 
itself. In this consciousness, two judgments 
are involved. The first is a distinguishing of 
itself in its pure nature as subjectivity; the 
second, the recognition of an objectivity seem- 
ingly external to itself. On the one hand, there 
is the Ego, the universal reason, and, on the 
other, the non-ego, or the objective world. The 
one is spirit, the other is nature. The two are 
implicitly identical but not yet necessarily rec- 
ognized as explicitly identical. That the iden- 
tity of nature and spirit should be only implicit 
is the mark of finitude. It is the peculiar office 
of reason to render explicit their fundamental 
identity. It is in the process of cognition, there- 
fore, in the idea coming to a self -consciousness, 
that the onesidedness of subjectivity and of ob- 
jectivity is overcome. In this process there is, 
on the one hand, a rationalizing of the objective 
world, — that is, its translation into subjective 
conception and thought ; and on the other, an 
assertion of subjective ideals in the midst of the 
objective phenomena of being, modifying and 
adapting them to its needs and standards. The 
tendency of thought to rationalize the universe, 
— to interpret by reducing it to the simplest 
forms of description and formulating its funda- 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 279 

mental laws, — this is the labor of science in 
its search for truth, and is, according to Hegel, 
cognition properly so called, or the theoretical 
activity of the idea. The tendency to compel 
the phenomenal world to conform to the ideals 
of reason, and to realize the ascendency of the 
good, is the peculiar office of the practical 
activity of the idea, or volition. Thus cogni- 
tion is of two kinds : — 

(1) Theoretical Knowledge, or Cognition 

Proper. (Das Erhennen als solches^) 

(2) Practical Knowledge, or Volition. (Das 

Wollen.) 
The finite cognition labors under the difficulty 
of being unable to overcome the antithesis of 
subject and object. The reception of the mate- 
rial data of the senses by the cognizing sub- 
ject seems to be merely an assimilation by the 
thought process of that which is in a way 
foreign to it. Its categories never enter into 
complete union with it. Therefore, while rea- 
son is active here as everywhere, it is reason in 
the form of the understanding merely, and it 
fails to reach the higher level of reason in two 
particulars : It presupposes an objective world 
already given and ready made, and secondly, 
it views the mind as a tabula rasa, which is 



280 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

perfectly passive in receiving and recording 
impressions made upon it by the data of sense- 
perception. The true view of the subject in 
its cognition of the object is that the mind is 
an active force not merely confronting the 
objective world, but in it, and through it, and 
underlying it as well. 

Finite cognition, working even upon the lower 
level in which a ready-made world in antithesis 
to the knowing subject is the nature of the 
presupposition framed by the perceiving mind, 
operates in two distinct forms : — 

(1) The Analytic Method. (Die analytische 
Methode.*) 

(2) The Synthetic Method. (Die synthetische 
Methode.} 

The analytic method examines every individ- 
ual phenomenon for the purpose of discovering 
its various particular characteristics, separating 
the essential from the unessential, and then 
referring it to its appropriate genus, cause, or 
law as the case may be, any one of which would 
represent its corresponding universal. 

The movement of the synthetic method is 
the reverse of the analytic method. The start- 
ing-point of the synthetic method is that of the 
universal. Its activity is essentially construe- 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 281 

tive. It works as an architectonic principle to 
produce all the particular manifestations of 
itself which are possible in accordance with 
its essential and universal nature, and as re- 
vealed ultimately in the organization and com- 
pleted being of concrete individuals. For the 
various elements which enter into the construc- 
tive activity of the notion, Hegel employs the 
following terms : — 

The essential nature of the fundamental uni- 
versal in its synthetic activity is given by defini- 
tion. 

The particular manifestations of which it is 
in general capable are given by division. 

The concrete individuality, which is always 
some definite object, constituted by a nexus of 
complex relations, is called a theorem. 

The process which supplies the necessary ele- 
ments which serve as mediating terms in the 
nexus of complex relations is called the process 
of construction. Its function is to fuse into 
one these different elemental parts. 

The process from which cognition derives the 
necessity of this nexus is called demonstration. 

Hegel has taken the names of these familiar 
logical processes, which in the traditional logic 
are essentially thought processes, and in the 



282 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

present connection has applied them to the 
actual dynamic processes operative throughout 
the entire realm of nature in the production of 
all beings animate and inanimate, each fashioned 
in particular forms according to its kind. More- 
over, it is the function of cognition to prove 
that the relations between the different elements 
in the objective world which it perceives are 
necessary relations. It is in this process, which 
Hegel calls demonstration, that an underlying 
necessity is revealed, whereas in the primary 
presupposition of finite thought the world is 
regarded as simply given and, as far as known, 
its relations contingent and variable. But in 
the process of cognition itself, there has been 
a progress towards an appreciation of existent 
relations as necessary. This necessity, Hegel 
affirms, is the necessity of reason. It is reached 
by subjective agency. This subjectivity was 
conceived at the starting-point by mere under- 
standing as a tabula rasa. This conception 
must now give place to the higher conception 
of the reason. Subjective thought must be 
regarded as essentially active, as a modifying 
and determining principle in the midst of the 
crude data of sense-perception. The knowing 
mind is essentially active, and in the manifesta- 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 283 

tion of this activity it determines the manner 
and the end of that activity. Thus the transi- 
tion is effected from theoretical to practical 
cognition, — that is, from cognition proper to 
volition. The significance of this, according to 
Hegel, is that a true appreciation of the nature 
of the universal necessitates its apprehension 
as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active, 
and imposing modifications. It merely empha- 
sizes in this particular connection the funda- 
mental principle of the entire Hegelian system, 
the recognition of the ultimate nature of reason 
as dynamic, — or, in other words, that the all- 
embracing unitary force in the universe is spirit 
and not matter. 

In volition the subjective idea is ever striving 
to assert itself and to mould the world, which 
stands seemingly opposed to it, into a shape 
conformable to its own ends. The end which is 
ever dominant in the activity of the universal 
reason is the realization of the good. At this 
point in Hegel's system the dialectic movement 
reaches a level at which the logical and ethical 
lines converge. Thus, intelligence takes the 
world as it finds it ; the will proposes to make 
the world what it ought to be. But here the 
finitude of volition is obvious, inasmuch as there 



284 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

exists a constant contradiction between the world 
as it is and the world as it ought to be. How- 
ever, in the process of the will itself , it abolishes 
its own finitude and overcomes the contradiction 
therein involved, and this is effected by pro- 
ducing a unity between the theoretical and 
practical idea, — that is, when that which is corre- 
sponds perfectly with that which ought to be. 
The idea possesses the deeper insight which 
recognizes that the discrepancies between the real 
and ideal are merely superficial, that essentially 
they are in accord, and that the world perfectly 
reveals the full purpose of its immanent notion. 
Thus the idea is stripped of all finitude. It 
is the Absolute Idea ; as defined by Hegel, it is 
the unity of the theoretical idea which regards 
the world as it is, and the practical idea which 
endeavors to make the world what it ought to 
be. Moreover, as cognition implies life, the 
Absolute Idea is a unity of cognition and life 
as well. It embraces naturally all the moments 
which enter into the evolution of the idea. In 
life, regarded merely as immediate being, the 
idea appears an sich, — that is, implicitly ; in cog- 
nition it appears fur sick, — that is, the idea as 
explicitly conscious of itself. In the Absolute 
Idea it is both an sich und far sich, — that is, 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 285 

self-contained and all-embracing. All the move- 
ments of its development fall within the sphere 
of its own determination. The idea has need 
of no support upon which to rest ; it acknowl- 
edges no dependence upon any element outside 
of itself. In its evolution there are no con- 
tingent factors or external conditions. " The 
idea," says Hegel, " is the vorjat^ vorjaecos which 
Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of 
the idea." 1 The true content of this idea, that 
which it thinks about and acts upon, — for it 
must be remembered that the idea is both 
cognitive and active, — must be regarded as the 
entire system, whose development we have been 
following. Of this evolution the Absolute Idea 
is the consummation, — a consummation, how- 
ever, which is not the resulting product of the 
process itself; for while the idea is the last 
term of the series it is also the first term, and 
the ground of the whole process as well. The 
true significance of the idea is admirably illus- 
trated by Hegel in the following paragraph, 
which is well worth quoting in full : — 

" With this retrospect of the process of devel- 
opment the Absolute Idea may be likened to 
an old man, who expresses the same religious 
1 § 236, Zusatz. 



286 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

convictions as a child, but for whom they pos- 
sess the added significance of his whole life, 
Even if the child understands in a measure the 
truths of religion, still they have value for him 
only in a limited sphere, outside of which lies 
the whole span of life and the wide, wide world. 
Such is the case with human life in general 
and the various events which constitute its ful- 
ness. All labor is directed towards some goal, 
and when it is reached, we are surprised to dis- 
cover nothing else save the bare end itself 
which had been purposed. The interest, how- 
ever, lies in the whole movement. As a man 
pursues his life's vocation, the mere end itself 
may appear to him very circumscribed ; but in 
the attainment, whatever it may be, the whole 
decursus vitce is comprehended. So, also, the 
content of the Absolute Idea is the complete 
sweep of its onward movement which we have 
followed thus far. There is, finally, the recogni- 
tion that the development as a whole constitutes 
both its content and its interest. Moreover, it 
is peculiarly the philosophical insight which is 
able to appreciate that while everything, when 
regarded in its isolation, may appear restricted, 
nevertheless, its real value consists in its rela- 
tion to the whole and its function as an essential 



THE IDEA OR THE ETERNAL REASON 287 

moment or factor in the Absolute Idea. Thus 
it is that having had the content, we now 
have the knowledge that this content is the 
living unfolding of the idea, and that this 
simple retrospect is contained in the very form 
of the idea itself. Each of the stages hitherto 
surveyed is an image of the Absolute, at the 
beginning, however, with restricted limitations, 
and consequently it is self-constrained to press 
forward to a complete revelation, which process 
is the dialectic method of development." 1 
1 § 237, Zusatz. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE RELATION OF THE LOGIC TO THE PHI- 
LOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF MIND 

THE exposition of the Logic would be incom- 
plete without a word, at least, in reference 
to the relation of the Logic to the two other philo- 
sophical disciplines of Hegel. The Philosophy 
of Nature (Lie Natur philosophic), The Philoso- 
phy of Mind (Lie Philosophic des Gieistes). 
These two form the second and third parts 
respectively of the Encyclopedia of the Philo- 
sophical Sciences. 

It would seem at the first glance as though 
these sciences were arranged in the order of a 
serial development, so that The Philosophy of 
Nature would represent an advance upon the 
first part of the Encyclopedia, the Logic ; and 
The Philosophy of Mind, the completion and 
consummation of the two preceding disciplines. 
This view, however, is erroneous and mislead- 

288 



THE LOGIC, NATURE, AND MIND 289 

ing. A careful student of the Logic cannot 
fail to be impressed with its fundamental doc- 
trine, that the supreme reason, or the Absolute 
Idea, is the creative and sustaining principle 
of all being, and not merely a principle of 
abstract thought as such. And this present 
exposition will have failed of its purpose if 
it has not left a similar impression upon the 
reader's mind. This principle, being granted 
as fundamental and essential to the Hegelian 
system, — namely, that the rational is also the 
real and that the laws of thought are the laws 
of being, — it follows, consequently, that both 
nature and mind must be regarded as falling 
within the scope of the all-embracing reason, or 
idea. It is affirmed again and again of the 
idea that it constitutes the totality of all being, 
and as such, therefore, it must comprehend the 
spheres both of nature and of mind. 

Moreover, Hegel himself insists that it is a 
false mode of statement to speak of the tran- 
sition from the idea to nature, and thence to 
mind. The term transition (der TJebergamf) 
has acquired in the Hegelian usage a peculiar 
significance. It means always an advance 
from an incomplete stage of development to a 
higher and more complete. This was found to be 



290 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

the case in every step of the progress from the 
simplest conception of immediate being to the 
complete all-embracing idea. The idea, more- 
over, represents that stage of development which 
is absolutely sufficient unto itself. It not only 
completes all defects, removes all limitations, 
and resolves all contradictions, but it is in the 
fulness of its own nature incapable alike of 
supplementation or of deterioration. To speak, 
therefore, of a transition from the idea to 
nature, would imply that the idea needed the 
concept of nature as a necessary complement 
in order to supply its defects and overcome 
its contradictions. Hegel expressly states that 
the idea does not become nature, but that it is 
nature. From this point of view, therefore, The 
Philosophy of Nature may be regarded as an 
attempt to rationalize nature, — that is, to show 
that throughout all of its processes and under- 
lying all its forces, and forming the essence of 
all its laws, there is ever present the immanent 
reason. 

Again, the transition from any given stage of 
development to a higher and complementary 
stage is always brought about through the inner 
constraint of thought. The transition is always 
conceived as a necessary one (gesetzt.*) The 



THE LOGIC, NATURE, AND MIND 291 

nature of thought is such that it is constrained 
to proceed onward to perfection. But from the 
idea to nature there is no transition in such a 
sense. On the contrary, Hegel insists most 
emphatically that the entire system of nature is 
the result solely and simply of the free activity 
of the idea. As he expresses it, " the idea pri- 
marily resolves as the outcome of its own 
inherent being to allow itself freely to reveal its 
essential being as nature." 1 We have seen that 
the idea possesses not merely a knowing func- 
tion but also a willing function as well. It is 
essentially an active force. The whole ten- 
dency of its being as dynamic is to reveal its 
activity along the lines of the free manifesta- 
tion of its own nature. The Absolute Idea, 
however, by no means exhausts itself or loses 
itself in its self-revelation as nature and as 
mind. The supreme reason, the Absolute Idea, 
God, however He may be named, is in and 
through all His works, yet nevertheless tran- 
scends them. This is unequivocally expressed 
by Hegel in the larger Logic as follows : — 
" The content of the Logic is the revelation of 
God as He is in His eternal essence before ever 
the world was formed, or a finite spirit came 
1 §2U. 



292 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

into being." 1 We may say, therefore, that it 
is of the very essence of the divine spirit to 
reveal Himself, and that such a revelation com- 
prehends both nature and mind, and yet the 
Absolute Ego is not absorbed in the revelation 
itself. 

But may it not be possible that the revelation 
itself is illusory, a passing shadow with no 
corresponding substance ? The dialectic move- 
ment which we have been following from its 
beginning to end would seem to confirm this 
view, inasmuch as all finite beings and all finite 
relations fail of self-sufficiency and permanency 
in the various stages of their development, and 
only in the Absolute Idea is there found a 
satisfactory resting-place for the thought which 
has tested all preceding stages and found them 
wanting. " The things which are seen are 
temporal, but the things which are unseen are 
eternal." Is, then, the whole cosmic process in 
time and space a fleeting show ? Is the spirit 
of man but the flashing ray of the central sun, 
lost forever in the dark and void, or perchance 
returning again in other forms to be reabsorbed 
in the primeval light ? On the contrary, Hegel 
in his Philosophy of Nature and his Philosophy of 
1 Log., I, 33. 



THE LOGIC, NATURE, AND MIND 293 

Mind endeavors to ground these essential mani- 
festations of being upon substantial foundations. 
Nature cannot be illusory, a mere seeming, for 
there is immanent in it the Absolute Idea. And 
so also the finite mind does not fall outside of 
the infinite, but within the area of its being 
and power. Moreover, inasmuch as the Abso- 
lute Idea is essentially a free activity, and as 
the human spirit partakes of the very nature 
of this Idea, its freedom is thereby assured and 
with its freedom, its immortality. 

By way of summary, it may be stated that 
the problem of the Logic is solved in the Abso- 
lute Idea, that fundamental principle of reason 
which is self-explanatory and capable of explain- 
ing all lower categories which are to be regarded 
merely as particular phases of its own self. 
But in the unfolding of the dialectic process 
which eventuates in the Absolute Idea, it is 
discovered that reason is essentially a principle of 
activity as well as a principle of knowledge. The 
Absolute Idea, therefore, as the supreme expres- 
sion of reason, reveals its own nature in the 
cosmic processes ; and in spite of the temporal 
and spatial contingencies of the great world 
system, it demonstrates its own eternal nature 
and purposes as the ground and end of it all. 



294 THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION 

For the enduring and abiding elements in the 
cosmic order are those which partake of the 
nature of the Absolute Idea, and which come to 
a full revelation in the mind of man, disclosing 
his affinity with the Absolute Mind, and stirring 
within his breast intimations of divinity and 
immortality. 



APPENDIX 

A GLOSSARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PHIL- 
OSOPHICAL TERMS IN HEGEL'S LOGIC 

Absolut: That which is unconditioned and conditions all 
things. That which is complete within itself, all- 
embracing, all-determining, the infinite, the eternal, 
God. In its highest expression, it is the absolute Idee. 

Abstrakt: A one-sided and partial view of any object of 
knowledge ; a term used in contrast to concrete, which 
signifies a comprehensive view of things embracing 
all possible considerations as to the nature of the 
things themselves, their origin, and the manifold 
relations which they may sustain. 

Allgemein, Allgemeiriheit : Universal, universality. The 
universal is not merely the summation of the various 
marks which are common to a number of individuals, 
by virtue of which they are regarded as members of 
one and the same group or class. The term has 
attached to it the additional significance of possess- 
ing a dynamic essence which is the source and the 
active constructive principle of all its particular 
manifestations. 

Analytisch: Analytical; in contrast with synthetical (syn- 
thetiscli). The analytical method examines every 
individual phenomenon for the purpose of discover- 
ing its various particular characteristics, separating 
the essential from the unessential, and referring it to 
its appropriate cause, law, or genus, — that is, to its 
corresponding universal. 
295 



296 APPENDIX 

The synthetical method starts, on the other hand, 
with the universal. Its activity is essentially con- 
structive. It works as an architectonic principle to 
produce all the particular manifestations which are 
possible in accordance with its essential and universal 
nature, and as revealed ultimately in the organization 
and completed being of concrete individuals. 

Das Andere: The other, — that is, the complementary 
aspect, of any object of knowledge which is necessary 
to the complete understanding of its significance ; its 
correlative. The other may be a cognate species, or 
the end for which the object in question may be 
used, or some other object with which it is essentially 
related; it is, in short, the complete setting of the 
object which gives to it depth and completeness of 
meaning. As applied to the process of development, 
the other of any stage in the process is the subsequent 
stage which lies immediately beyond it, and which 
for the time being is contrasted with it, but into 
which it passes through the constraint of the dialectic 
movement. 

Anschauung : Perception. A direct and immediate know- 
ing, as opposed to knowledge obtained by the medi- 
ating process of thought. The object may belong 
either to the internal or to the external sense. See 
Vorstellung. 

An sich: In itself; a phrase used to signify that which is 
implicit, or potential, in contrast to the phrase fur 
sich, which signifies that which is explicit or actual. 
The phrase which is compounded of these two con- 
trasted phrases, an und fur sich, signifies that which 
possesses the capacity of transforming whatever 
is potential into the actual manifestation of the 
same ; it is the capacity for self-determination and 
self -direction. 



APPENDIX 297 

Aufheben, aufgehoben : To transmute, transmuted. There 
are three distinct though related ideas which this 
term expressess, — to destroy a thing in its original 
form, to restore it in another form, and to elevate 
it upon a higher plane. It represents always a 
progress in thought and in development. It is dif- 
ficult to translate this term by any one English 
word. To transmute or to conserve would perhaps 
approximately express its meaning. 

Bedingung : Condition ; whatever is necessary in causa- 
tion to the eventuation of the effect. 

Begriff: Notion. It is the universal principle of reason 
which underlies all processes of thought. It is 
essentially dynamic. It is not merely the supreme 
category of thought, but it is also the fundamental 
law of being as well. It is the creative architectonic 
force of the universe. While Seyn is being, regarded 
merely as that which is immediately given, unex- 
plained, unrelated, and un analyzed, and Wesen refers 
to the underlying principles of being, its manifold 
relations, and essential ground, the Begriff represents 
a far deeper insight ; it is more than the mere source 
of determination and efficiency, it is the central force 
of self-determination and self-specification, realizing 
its own subjective purposes through their essential 
manifestation in the world of objectivity, and as such 
it constitutes the truth both of Seyn and of Wesen. 

Beisichseyn : Being by itself ; applied to an object of knowl- 
edge to indicate that it is self-sufficient and self- 
contained. See Fiirsichseyn. 

Besonderhelt : Particularity; having significance only, 
however, when recognized as the particular of 
some universal. 

Bestimmung : From bestimmen, to define or determine ; it 
is that differentiating capacity which gives to any 



298 APPENDIX 

object of thought definite form and character. The 
Denkbestimmungen are the most general forms of 
thought determination, and which themselves de- 
termine all others of a more particular or specific 
nature, — the categories. 

Bestimmt : Specifically determined. 

Bestimmtheit : The actual realization of the capacity 
expressed by Bestimmung ; it signifies a state of 
definiteness ; it refers to the specific and determinate 
character of any object of knowledge. 

Beweis : Demonstration. See Definition. 

Beziehung auf sich : A phrase which indicates a relation 
existing within the boundaries of the object of 
knowledge itself. From such a point of view the 
object of knowledge is regarded as a closed system, 
and for the time being, at least, isolated in reference 
to any larger system or systems with which it may 
sustain essential relations. 

Beziehung in Anderes : Indicates the essential relation 
of any object of knowledge to that which confronts 
it as peculiarly its other, — that is, its necessary com- 
plement in some larger system of thought within 
which the given object of knowledge together with 
its other necessarily fall. 
Sich auf sich beziehende Negativitdt. See Negativitat. 

Daseyn : Being which is definitely determined in contrast 
to Seyn, mere being which is wholly indefinite and 
undetermined. Daseyn is also used in contrast to 
Existenz, which latter signifies being which is defi- 
nitely determined, but with an implied reference 
to the source of the being in question, its essential 
ground. The terms Seyn, Daseyn, Existenz, form a 
series which represents successive stages in the 
progress of thought as regards a more precise de- 
termination and explanation. 



APPENDIX 299 

Definition: Definition. The essential nature of the fun- 
damental universal in its synthetic activity is given 
by definition. The particular manifestations of 
which it is in general capable are given by division 
{Division). The concrete individuality which is 
always some definite object constituted by a nexus 
of complex relations is called a theorem {Theorem). 
The process which supplies the necessary elements 
which serve as mediating terms in this nexus of com- 
plex relations is called the process of construction 
(Konstruktion) ; its function is to fuse into one 
these different elemental parts. The process from 
which cognition derives the necessity of this nexus is 
called demonstration (Beweis). 

Denkbestimmungen : Categories. See Bestimmung. 

Dialektik: Dialectic, a term used as a general characteri- 
zation of the Hegelian method. It signifies that 
process of thought which recognizes the inherent 
contradiction involved in every finite statement, and 
at the same time possesses the capacity of overcoming 
by an appropriate synthesis every observed contra- 
diction upon a higher level of thought. 

The term is used in two senses, the one referring 
- to the threefold process as a whole ; the other solely 
to the second stage of the process, that of contradic- 
tion. 

Differenz: Difference. This term can be defined only in 
its relation to the term Identitat (identity). They 
are so related that the differences which obtain 
between objects have significance only when con- 
trasted with an essential identity which forms their 
background, and in like manner the identity which 
may be affirmed in any instance has significance 
only when brought into relief by the contrast of 
some underlying difference. When identity and 



300 APPENDIX 

difference are used as predicates without this refer- 
ence to each other, there arises the false and unmean- 
ing abstraction of mere difference or mere identity. 

Ding an sich : The thing in itself. This Kantian phrase 
is used in a peculiar manner by Hegel. With him 
the Ding an sich refers always to the thing in its 
germinal or potential state. The seed, for instance, 
is the plant in itself ; the child is the man in himself. 

Division : Division. See Definition, 

Eigenschaft : The quality, property, or attribute of a thing. 

Einzelnheit: Individuality. The individual object of 
knowledge has significance only when the particular 
and differentiating characteristics are known which 
make it possible to refer the individual in question 
to its proper universal. 

Entwickelung : Evolution, development. The dialectic 
movement is essentially one of development, though 
it traces the logical rather than the temporal stages 
of the process. 

Erkennen : Cognition ; one of the higher forms in which 
the Be griff manifests itself. It is the notion rising 
to the level of a consciousness of itself and its own 
processes and the objects of its own knowledge. 

Erscheinung : Appearance or phenomenon. It is that 
aspect of being which is revealed in the world of 
phenomena. It is to be distinguished from Schein, 
which is the mere appearance, the shadow, illusion. 
The Erscheinung is the shining forth of that which 
is the underlying ground and essence of being. 
With Hegel the phenomenon has no significance 
apart from its noumenon. The one is the necessary 
complement of the other. 

Etwas : A somewhat or something. Any object of knowl- 
edge which possesses determinate being (Daseyn). 
Every Etwas is positiv by virtue of what it is, negatio 



APPENDIX 301 

in so far as it excludes from its own being its corre- 
sponding* other. 

Existenz : Se^ i 

Form: Form; with Hegel it signifies a formative, con- 
structive principle, which is immanent in the under- 
lying substance of things. 

Freikeit: Freedom. 

Fur sick : Explicit, actual. See An \ 

FSn Being for itself, — that is. being which de- 

fines its own bounds and determines its own proper- 
ties. It is self-determined, self-contained being. Its 
independence however is asserted but not explicitly 
justified. In Bei? ■ the independence of being 

is regarded as fully justified. 

lanken: Thoughts: a term often used by Hegel to 
mean merely abstract thoughts, the ordinary con- 
cepts of the formal logic. 

;: Antithesis; the second stage of every 
dialectic movement and an essential moment or 
factor in the resulting synthesis by which it is 
united upon a higher plane to that which upon a 
lower level of thought appeared as its opposite. 

Gesetzt : From the ver' Any object of thought is 

gesetzt which is necessarily and explicitly determined 
by the logic of the situation. Whenever that which 
is given in thought leads by the very necessity of 
the thought processes themselves to a conclusion 
depending upon it, that conclusion is always de- 
scribed by Hegel as Every phase of the 
dialectic process is gesetzt in the sense of following 
by the very momentum of thought itself from the 
nature of the stage immedia: ling it. 

Ge* tztseyn: The conditio 1 .: of being gesetzt, 

Grad : Degree or intensity of qualitative variation, as 
the degree of heat or cold, 



302 APPENDIX 

Grdnze : Limit, marking the line of differentiation be- 
tween any object of knowledge and its other. See 
Schranke. 

Grund : The ground underlying all surface appearance ; 
the basis upon which the existence of any object 
of knowledge depends. It is the noumenon under- 
lying every phenomenon. It is the constant 
and permanent essence of all objects of knowl- 
edge. 

Idealitat, Ideel : Ideality, ideal. The ideal is essentially 
characteristic of the truly infinite. It is the abiding 
and constant element in every definite being under- 
lying the changing and unstable elements which 
constitute its finiteness. Therefore the finite and 
the infinite, the real and the ideal, are not irreconcil- 
able opposites. Every finite being possesses elements 
of infinity. The truly real is such by virtue of some 
essential strain of ideality. And the human has the 
capacity of becoming partaker of the divine nature. 

Idee : The Idea ; the highest form of the Begriff, or notion, 
as manifesting its conscious, free, and self -determin- 
ing essence, the consummation and the source of all 
knowledge and of all being. 

Identitdt: Identity. See Differenz. 

Abstrakte Identitdt: Abstract identity; an incom- 
plete and colorless view of things. 

Absolute Identitdt: Complete identity; mere same- 
ness, an indefinite homogeneity. 

Mit sich identisch : Self -identical, — that is, pre- 
senting a sameness throughout and lacking any 
differentiation of parts or specification of functions. 
Anything which is completely homogeneous through- 
out is mit sich identisch. 

Inhalt : Content. It has meaning only when it is re- 
garded as one with the form. 



APPENDIX 303 

Kausalitat : The category of causality. 

Konkret : Concrete ; a complete comprehensive view of 
things. See Abstrakt. 

Konstruktion : Construction. See Definition. 

List: Craft. It is a characterization of the manner in 
which reason works out its ends in nature by bring- 
ing under its control the mechanical and chemical 
forces of the world and swaying them at will. 

Maass : Measure. The standard measure or typical form 
to which all things in their several spheres, more 
or less perfectly correspond. 

Mittelbar : Mediate. This term is used in contrast to 
unmittelbar, immediate. Anything is unmittelbar, im- 
mediate, which is represented as an object of knowl- 
edge given but un analyzed and unexplained. And 
anything is mittelbar, mediate, which is regarded 
as a product due to a certain process by which it is 
brought about or mediated. 

Immediate knowledge is given ; mediate is ex- 
plained. The immediate is unrelated ; the mediate 
is related. The immediate is elementary ; the medi- 
ate is developed. The immediate marks the begin- 
ning ; the mediate, the result. 

Moglichkeit : Possibility, — the possibility, however, not of 
the fancy, but that possibility which represents a 
definite potential capable of actual realization. 

Moment : Moment or factor ; an essential element in any 
complex system or process. 

Negativ : Negative ; refers to the element of difference in 
the essence of any object of knowledge, and whose 
significance lies wholly in the relation to its com- 
plementary element; the positive. The two unite 
together in constituting the essential ground of being. 

Negativitcit : Negation; the process of the so-called nega- 
tive reason which confronts any primary thesis with 



304 APPENDIX 

its corresponding antithesis. The absolute Nega- 
tivitat is the overcoming of this first negation by 
a denial which involves a higher point of view. 
This second negation, being the denial of the first 
negation, has the force of an affirmation. It is, how- 
ever, not a simple reaffirmation of the primary thesis ; 
it is a process which, while affirming the primary 
thesis, at the same time embraces its contradiction 
in the resulting synthesis as one of its essential 
moments or factors. Negation as a process, more- 
over, draws a line of distinction between any object 
of knowledge and that which lies immediately beyond 
it as its other. This is a line of definition, inasmuch 
as it differentiates that which a thing is from that 
which it is not. In this sense negation is a process 
of determination. 

Negative Einheit: A system containing many different 
parts, all of which are, however, united through an 
underlying unity; it is a unity in the midst of 
diversity. 

Sich auf sich beziehende Negativitat : A self-imposed 
negation, — that is, a system which contains within 
the sphere of its own essential being certain con- 
tradictory elements which cause the system as it 
stands to fall of its own weight, as it were, and 
indicates the necessity of overcoming such con- 
tradictions by the introduction of some higher cate- 
gory of thought. 

Nichts: Non-being. It is that stage which is not yet 
reached in any process of development but may 
become Seyn, or actual being, through the process 
of becoming ( Werden) . 

Noihwendigkeit : Necessity. 

Objectiv : Objective. It is a term used to designate in the 
Kantian sense all that is universal and necessary 



APPENDIX 305 

in any object of knowledge. Hegel adds, however, 
that thoughts as universal and necessary are not 
to be regarded merely as our thoughts but as the 
real essence of existing things as well. 

Objectivitat: Objectivity; that stage in development of 
being which is the explicit manifestation of the sub- 
jective notion immanent within it. 

Positiv : Positive ; a term whose significance lies only in 
its relation to its correlative, the negative. See 
Negative. 

Realitdt : Reality. The positive aspect of any determi- 
nate being which constitutes it what it is, and as such 
it forms an essential moment of that w T hich is truly 
infinite and therefore ideal. See Idealitat. 

Reflexion : Reflection ; that fundamental process of 
thought by w 7 hich any object of knowledge is fully 
revealed only when we see it in its complete setting 
and possess a thorough knowledge of the relations 
which it sustains to every part of the system to 
which it is referred. The object itself, therefore, 
cannot be said to shine in its own light so much as 
in the light reflected from all the coordinate elements 
with which it is related. 

Reflexion in sich : The process by which an object of 
knowledge shines in its own light. 

Reflexion in Anderes : The process by which an object of 
knowledge shines in the light of something which 
is related to it as its other, or complement; that 
w r hich is essentially its correlative. 

Setzende Reflexion: Positing reflection ; that phase of the 
process of reflection which regards being as self- 
illuminated, and therefore as immediately given and 
independent. 

Voraussetzende Reflexion: Presupposing reflection. This 
represents a deeper insight, in that it sees that the 
x 



306 APPENDIX 

supposed immediacy and independence of a given 
object of knowledge must be referred to some other 
•which is its necessary presupposition. 

Aeusserliche Reflexion : External reflection; in which the 
relation existing between being and that upon which 
the being depends is regarded as a purely external 
relation, the one affecting the other wholly from 
without. 

Bestimmende Reflexion : Determining reflection ; which re- 
gards the seemingly external relation as in reality 
obtaining between coordinate elements of one and 
the same essential system of being. 

Reflexionsbestimmungen : The categories of reflection. 

Regel : Rule, — that is, the usual or typical form which is 
found to characterize members of the same class 
or species. 

Satz : Proposition ; a statement which is correct as regards 
certain circumstances but does not hold true uni- 
versally and necessarily. It differs in this respect 
from the judgment (das Urtheil) which contains 
this element of universality and necessity. The 
proposition maybe said to be correct or incorrect; 
the judgment, however, is either true or not true. 

Schein: Show; to be distinguished from Erscheinung, 
appearance or phenomenon, which see. 

Schluss : Syllogism. This is not merely the logical form 
of inference; it is used also to characterize every 
active process in the world of being which unites 
together any two elements through the mediation 
of a third, the common or middle term. The syl- 
logistic process is one, therefore, which underlies the 
activities of being as well as of thought. 

Schranke : The bound ; marking the limit which any 
definite being may have attained at any particular 
stage of its development, but which by the inner 



APPENDIX 307 

constraint of its own nature it must transcend in the 
more advanced stages of its development. 

Seyn : Being ; in the sense of mere being, indefinite and 
undetermined. See Begriff. 

Subjectiv: Subjective; not merely that which concerns 
the individual and personal thoughts and interests 
in distinction from the whole body of facts in the 
world of phenomena, but that which is at the same 
time immanent in the fact, and as thus immanent 
constitutes the very truth of the fact itself and its 
informing principle. 

Substantialitat, Substanz : Substantiality, substance ; that 
which is the absolute formative principle and source 
of all power and necessity in the universe. At its 
last analysis, substance is revealed as subject, — that 
is, the power of an absolute personality. 

Synthetisch : Synthetical; see Analytisch. 

Theorem : Theorem. See Definition. 

Totalitdt: The sum total of all properties and relations 
pertaining to any object of knowledge taken not as a 
mere sum, but as a systematic unity. 

Uebergang : Transition; a term used to indicate the 
passage of thought from any given stage of its de- 
velopment to that which lies immediately in advance 
and which is essentially connected with the former 
by the inner necessity of the thought process iteelf . 

Unvermittelt : That which is not mediated. It is a term 
used to imply that although a process of mediation 
doubtless underlies the object of knowledge to which 
it is applied, nevertheless that process is not as yet 
recognized or rendered explicit. See Mittelbar, 

Unmittelbarkeit : Immediacy. See Mittelbar and Un- 
vermittelt. 

Unterschied : Difference. It is something more than 
mere diversity ( VerschiedenheU) ; it also signifies a 



308 APPENDIX 

determinate and specific difference (bestimmter Unter- 
schied) which serves as the differentiating mark of 
a definite species. 

Ursache: Cause; its root meaning indicating that the 
cause as the primary essence must underlie its effect 
(Wirkung). 

Urtheil: Judgment; its root meaning signifies a division 
into elementary parts, and this significance is pre- 
served in the essential function of the judgment 
which is the process of breaking up an indefinite 
and incoherent universal into particular forms of 
its manifestation which are both definite and co- 
herent. As a process, judgment applies not merely 
to the activity of thought but to the activity of 
being as well. 

Verhaltniss : Relation ; applied especially to the relation 
which obtains between any object of knowledge and 
its correlative as mediated by the category of reflec- 
tion, such as the causal relation or the relation of 
reciprocal activity. 

Vermittelt, Vermittelung : Mediated, mediacy. See Mittel- 
bar and Unvermittelt. 

Vernunft : Reason ; as distinguished from Verstand, the 
understanding. Reason is that function of the mind 
which overcomes, in a higher synthesis, the con- 
tradictions which it is the function of the under- 
standing to observe and which, however, it cannot 
reconcile. The understanding regards the various 
objects of knowledge as distinct, separate, isolated. 
Reason is the synthetical function of thought which, 
while it by no means ignores the differences amidst 
the world of phenomena, nevertheless possesses the 
capacity of apprehending the unity which underlies 
all differences. 

Verschiedenheit : Diversity. 



APPENDIX 309 

Verstand : Understanding. See Vernunft. 

Voraussetzung : Postulate. 

Vorstellung : A generalized image of a class or group 
of objects in distinction from Anschauung, which is 
the immediate perception of an object, and Begriff 
which is the thought grasp of the essential signifi- 
cance of a universal idea without any adventitious 
aid from the pictures which the imagination may 
attempt to form of the same. 

Wahrheit : Truth ; according to Hegel truth consists in 
the complete conformity of any object of knowledge 
with its fundamental Begriff, and this implies a 
process in which it is seen in the totality of its 
relations. 

Wechselwirkimg : The category of reciprocal activity. 

Werden: Becoming; the process through which non- 
being issues into being. 

Wesen: Essence. See Begriff. 

Widerspruch : Contradiction. 

WirHichkeit: Actuality. The concrete unity of essence 
and appearance. 

Wirkung: Effect. See Ursaclie. 

Zufdlligkeit : Contingency ; the contingent is that which 
does not have the ground of its being in itself, but 
in some other. 



INDEX 



Absolute, 20 f., 52, 81, 98, 100, 
106 f., 122, 146 f., 208, 212, 
214, 235, 251, 269. 

Abstract, 70. 

Actuality, 169, Chap. XIII. 

Alteration, 97. 

Antinomies, 51 f., 108. 

Appearance, 166, Chap. XII. 

Aristotle, 8, 184, 185, 263, 285. 

Arithmetical Operations, 109 f . 

Atomic philosophy, 103. 

Attraction, 103. 

Aufgehoben, 138 f., 161, 188, 
253. 

Becoming, 89 f . 

Being, 68 f . ; determinate 160 f . ; 

for itself , 98 f. ; of God, 33 f., 

53, 65. 

Categories, 8 f . 
Causality, 192, 196 f . 
Centrality, 256 f . ; syllogistic 

formulae of, 258 f . 
Chemism, 260 f. 
Cognition, 278 f. 
Conceptual capacity, 5. 
Condition, 187. 
Construction, 281. 
Content, 171 f . 
Contingency, 187. 
Continuous quantity, 107. 
Contradiction, 150. 
Copula, 221 f. 
Cosmology, 28, 32 f . ; 51. 



Cosmological proof, 53. 
Craft of Reason, 266 f . 
Critical philosophy, Chap. 



IV. 



Definition, 281. 
Degree, 105, 112. 
Demonstration, 281. 
Development, 209 f. 
Dialectic, 10 f., 185, 209 f. 
Difference, 151 f. ; 219, 242. 
Ding an sich, 48, 163, 170. 
Discrete, 107 f . 
Diversity, 151 f . 
Division, 281. 
Dualism, 34. 

Empiricism, Chap. III. 

Empiricist, 67. 

End, 261 f . ; subjective, 264 f . ; 
in process of accomplish- 
ment, 264 f.; accomplished, 
264 f. 

Entelechy, 185. 

Essence, 68 f., 72 f., 78, Part 
II. 

Ethics, 42, 57 f . 

Excluded middle, 154. 

Existence, 160 f. 

Explicit, 267. 

Extensive quantity, 112 f . 

Feuerbach, 43. 

Force, 171. 17»? f. 

Form 166 f.. 171 f., 172, 206. 

Freedom, 33, 191 f. 



311 



312 



INDEX 



Genus, 276. 

Gesetzt, 181, 190, 211, 220, 290. 
Goethe, 179. 

Ground, 219 ; of existence, 
Chap. XI. 

Haller, 115; 179 f. 
Von Hartmann, 207. 
Hegelians of the Left, 43. 
Heraclitus, 91 f., 185. 
Herder, 178. 
Hindoo Philosophy, 26. 
Hume, 41. 

Idea, 20, 213 f . ; Chap. XVII; 
as life, 272 f . ; as knowledge, 
272 f.; absolute, 272 f., 284, 
286 f., 291 f. 

Idealism, 191, 49, 100 f. 

Ideality, 5. 

Identity, 71, 150 f., 219, 242. 

Immediacy, 62 f ., 71, 136 f. 

Implicit, 267. 

Individual, 216 f. 

Infinity, 97, 212. 

Inner, 171, 178 f. 

Intensive quantity, 112 f. 

Intuition, 67. 

Intuitive knowledge, Chap. V. 

Jacobi, 62. 

Judgment, 221 f . ; specific con- 
tent of, 223; of being, 224; 
of essence, 224; of notion, 
224, 225 f . ; qualitative, 225 f . ; 
of reflexion, 225 f. ; of neces- 
sity, 225 f . ; singular, 228 f . ; 
particular, 228 f . ; universal, 
228 f. ; categorical, 230 f . ; 
hypothetical, 230 f . ; disjunc- 
tive, 230 f . ; assertory, 232 f . ; 
problematic, 232 f . ; apoditic, 
232 f. 



Kant, 30, 45 ff., 100, 251, 252, 
263. 



Leibniz, 157, 159, 194. 
Limit, 94. 

Logic, formal, 217; modern, 
221. 



Magnitude, 105. 

Manifestation, 171, 176 f. 

Materialism, 43. 

Matter, 164 f . 

Measure, Chap. IX. 

Measureless, 127. 

Mechanism, 106; formal, 255; 
with affinity, 256 f . ; abso- 
lute, 257 f . 

Mediation, 62 f., 73, 136 f., 158, 
189 f. 

Metaphysical systems, 23 f., 
Chap. II. 

Metaphysician, 67. 

Method, 11 f. ; analytic, 280; 
synthetic, 280 f . 

Mind, 31, 56; philosophy of, 
Chap. XVIII. 

Mode, in frequent curves, 124. 

Nature, 35; philosophy of, 
Chap. XVIII. 

Necessity, 33; 189 f. 

Negation, 14 f ., 55, 74 f., 136 f. ; 
absolute, 14 1, 271. 

Negative, 155. 

Neutral, The, 260. 

Nodes, 126 f . 

Non-being, 86 f . 

Notion, 18, 29 f., 68 f., 76 f., 
159, 201, Part III.; the ob- 
jective, Chap. XVI. ; the sub- 
jective, Chap. XV. 

Noumenal, 183. 

Number, doctrine of, 116. 



INDEX 



313 



Objective, 46 f., 213 f. 

Ontology, 28 f . 

Ontological argument, 56 f., 

251. 
Opposition, 154. 
Other, the, 95 f . 
Outer, 171, 178 f . 

Pantheism, 34, 253. 
Parmenides, 91 f . 
Particular, 216 f . 
Parts, 171, 174 f . 
Permanence, 136, 142 f . 
Personality, 6, 100, 149, 194, 

207, 277. 
Phenomenal, Chap. XII. 
Philosophy, Logic as a system 

of, 3 ff. ; history of, 16 f . 
Physico-theological proof, 53. 
Plato, 11, 184, 185. 
Pneumatology, 28, 30. 
Positive, 154 f . 
Possibility, 186 f . 
Potential, 72, 77, 88, 185, 188 f ., 

193, 250. 
Property, 163 f . 
Proposition, 224. 
Psychology, 28, 30. 
Pythagoras, 116 f. 

Quality, Chap. VII. 
Quantity, 93 f., Chap. VIII; 
determinate, 105, 109. 

Reality, 101. 

Reason, 12; negative, 12; posi- 
tive, 12. 

Reciprocal activity, 192, 198 f . 

Reflection, 73, 136, 140, 168, 
209. 



Religion, 42. 
Repulsion, 103. 
Rule, 123 f. 

Socrates, 11. 

Soul, 30, 50 f . 

Spencer, 66, 78 f . 

Spinoza, 75, 115, 194, 195, 207. 

Strauss, 43. 

Subjective, 46 f. ; 213 f . 

Substantiality, 192 f . 

Sufficient reason, 157. 

Syllogism, 54, 234 f . ; qualita- 
tive, 237 f. ; of reflection, 
237 f . ; of the notion, 237 f . ; 
formulae of, 237 f . ; figures 
of, 238 f . ; categorical, 246 f . ; 
hypothetical, 246 f . ; disjunc- 
tive, 246 f . 

System, 136, 144 f ., 158, 257. 

Teleology, 261 f . 

Tennyson, 277. 

Theology, 28, 33 f . 

Theorem, 281. 

The thing, 162 f., 167. 

Thought, General nature of, 

4ff. 
Totality, 209. 
Transition, 289 f . 
Truth, 22. 

Understanding, 12 f . 

Unity, negative, 274. 
Universal, 3f.,216f. 

Volition, 279 f., 283. 

Wallace, 266 n. 
Whole, 171, 174 f. 

Zeno, 10, 115. 



ii .''! ! 



